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Refraiing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion
DONNA M. NAGY*
For almost two decades, the United States Supreme Court was silent as to
the validity of the so-called 'fraud on the source" misappropriationtheory of
insider tradingliability. This changed in June 1997 when the theory received a
resoundingendorsementfrom the Courtin United States v. O'Hagan.
Critics of O'Hagan have argued that the Court's decision reaches too far.
However, this Article contends that the Court actually endorsed a theory that
does not reach far enough. By analyzing and critiquing the reasoning of the
majority opinion in O'Hagan, this Article demonstrates that the Court's
unnecessarily restrictive misappropriationtheory will frustrate the prosecution
of future cases involving trading on misappropriatedinformation and may
generatepublic mistrust of the SEC. This Article suggests a broader 'fraudon
investors" version of the misappropriationtheory, contending that investors in
the marketplace are also deceived and defraudedwhen a person purchases or
sells securities based on material, nonpublic information that has been
misappropriatedfromthe information'ssource.
After more than seventeen years of uncertainty as to the validity of a
"misappropriation theory" of insider trading liability,' the United States Supreme
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; B.A. 1986,
Vassar College; J.D. 1989, New York University School of Law. I want to thank Graeme
Dinwoodie, Donald Langevoort, Peter Letsou, Richard Painter, Celia Taylor, and Michael Van
Alstine for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article. I am also grateful
for the research assistance provided by Susan Beamer, Aviva Rich, and Bryan Schultz.
1
In 1980, and again in 1987, the Government presented a misappropriation theory of
insider trading liability to the Supreme Court, but a majority of the Court failed on both
occasions to decide its merits. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235-37 (1980);
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987), discussed respectively infra text
accompanying notes 28-42, 49-59, and notes 68-70. The Court also avoided consideration of
a misappropriation theory by repeatedly denying certiorari in insider trading cases raising the
issue. See United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. United
States v. Cusimano, 117 S. Ct. 2509 (1997); United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.),
cert. deniedsub nom. Sablone v. United States, 510 U.S. 976 (1993); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d
403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d
551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992); United States v. Grossman,
843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,488 U.S. 1040 (1989); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). The Court agreed to hear the issue in 1997 after
a split had developed between the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits (approving the validity
of a misappropriation theory) and the Fourth and Eighth Circuits (rejecting the validity of a
misappropriation theory). See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997) (granting writ
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Court recently decided United States v. O'Hagan,2 handing down a six member
majprity opinion that can only be described as a ringing endorsement of an
argument long-championed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC" or the "Commission"): that a person commits fraud in connection with a
securities transaction, and thereby violates Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") 3 and SEC Rule 1Ob-5 4 promulgated
thereunder, when he or she trades securities based on material, nonpublic
information that has been misappropriated in violation of a pre-existing duty of
loyalty and confidentiality owed to the source of that information. 5 Prior to
O'Hagan,a majority of the Court had recognized Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
liability for insider trading only under the so-called "classical theory," which
posits that these provisions are violated when corporate insiders trade in the
shares of their corporation while in possession of material, nonpublic

information. 6 This more traditional theory of insider trading liability is based on
the premise that insiders of a corporation, such as officers and directors, owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation's shareholders. 7 Thus, a corporate insider who
of certiorari); see also infra notes 60-81 and accompanying text (discussing circuit split).
2 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly:
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id.
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). SEC Rule lOb-5 provides in pertinent part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [... or]
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
Id.
5 See O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2207.
6 See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 228-30; see also O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207 (identifying
Chiarellaas the source of the "classical" or "traditional" theory of insider trading liability).
7 See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 227-28. The term "insider" is also used to describe persons
such as attorneys, investment bankers, and other professionals who work as temporary agents
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possesses material, nonpublic information is under an obligation either to
disclose that information to the corporation's shareholders or to abstain from
trading. 8 Failure to do so constitutes fraud "in connection with" a securities
transaction and violates Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 9
An example may be useful here to illustrate the fundamental difference
between the classical and misappropriation theories. It is the classical theory of
insider trading that would prohibit a hypothetical director of General Motors
(GM) who learns confidential "good news" in the course of a GM board meeting
from purchasing stock in GM. The classical theory, however, would not preclude
the GM director from using that same confidential information in connection
with her purchases of stock in Ford 10 -the GM director is an "outsider" to Ford
and clearly does not owe duties of a fiduciary nature to Ford's shareholders.
Because O'Hagan'smisappropriation theory now extends liability under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to cover such instances of "outsider trading," 11 the
decision is considered to be "the most important securities law ruling in years."' 12

of the corporation (sometimes termed "temporary insiders" or "quasi-insiders"). See Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
8 See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 228-29 (stating that the fiduciary relationship between an
insider and the stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a duty to disclose in part because of
the 'necessity of preventing a corporate insider from ... tak[ing] unfair advantage of the
uninformed minority stockholders") (quoting Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808,

829 (D.Del. 1951)).
9See id. at 227-31; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653-64. Liability for insider trading under the
classical theory also has been extended to certain "tippees," i.e., those individuals who trade
securities of a company while in possession of material, nonpublic information about that
company (a "tip") that was conveyed by a corporate insider in violation of his fiduciary duty to
the company's shareholders. See id. at 655-57. The theory here is that the tippee's duty to
disclose or abstain from trading is derivative from that of the insider's duty owed to corporate
shareholders. See id. at 659; see also Chiarella,445 U.S. at 230 n.12 (recognizing that tippees
of corporate insiders may be held liable under Section 10(b) because a disclosure obligation
arises "'rom[their] role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty').
10
Assume, for instance, that the "good news" announced at the GM board meeting
involved an innovative, and highly lucrative, confidential joint venture between GM and Ford.
I1The term "outsider trading" is generally used to describe securities transactions by any
person who is not an insider or temporary insider of the corporation whose securities are
purchased. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991) (observing that "[t]he
misappropriation theory extends the reach of Rule lOb-5 to outsiders who would not ordinarily
be deemed fiduciaries of the corporate entities in whose stock they trade").
12
Linda Greenhouse, Benchmarks ofJustice, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1, 1997, at Al; see also
Brett D. Fromson, JusticesSpell Out Insider Trading:Any Misuse of ConfidentialInformation
is illegal,Supreme Court Rules, WASH. POST, June 26, 1997, at Cl (describing O'Hagan as
"the most significant securities fraud case in nearly two decades").
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The classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading also delineate
the particular parties that are deceived and defrauded "in connection with"
securities trading based on material, nonpublic information. Under the classical
theory, it is relatively easy to identify the victims of an insider's violation of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5: the GM director who trades GM stock while in
possession of material, nonpublic information deceives and defrauds those GM
shareholders who sold their shares contemporaneously without full access to that
information. But against whom is a fraud perpetrated when an outsider to a
corporation uses confidential misappropriated information in connection with a
securities transaction?
In O'Hagan,the Court clearly identified the "source of the information" as
the victim of securities trading by a fiduciary who has misappropriated
confidential information from her principal: 13 the GM director who secretly uses
the company's confidential information to purchase stock in Ford would deceive
and defraud GM within the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. This is
because, in the Court's view, "a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a
principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in a breach of a duty of
loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that
information." 14 Unfortunately, having identified the source of the confidential
information as the person deceived and defrauded by a fiduciary who trades on
the basis of misappropriated information, the O'HaganCourt failed to pursue an
inquiry as to whether other parties may also have been deceived and defrauded
by such securities trading.
This Article continues where O'Hagan left off and argues that investors in
the marketplace are also deceived and defrauded when a person purchases or
sells securities based on material, nonpublic information that has been
misappropriated from the information's source. Under this broader "fraud on
investors" version of the misappropriation theory, 15 such securities trading
violates Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 because the unlawful act of
misappropriating information from its rightful owner triggers an obligation to
disclose to other investors in the marketplace or to abstain from trading securities
13 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
14 Id.
15

The

O'Hagan Court noted that Chief Justice Warren Burger had advanced a "fraud on

investors" type misappropriation theory in his dissenting opinion in Chiarella.See id. at 220809 n.6 (citing Chiarella,445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). Without addressing the
merits of the Chief Justice's theory, the O'Hagan Court commented only that "[t]he
Government does not propose that we adopt a misappropriation theory of that breadth." Id.
Chief Justice Burger's arguments in favor of a "fraud on investors" misappropriation theory,
which, in turn, were likely influenced by arguments in the Government's brief in Chiarella,are
discussed infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
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based on that misappropriated information. 16 Acceptance of a fraud on investors
misappropriation theory would mean that the GM director, using the company's
confidential information to purchase stock in Ford, not only deceives and
defrauds GM, but also those Ford shareholders who contemporaneously sold
their stock in ignorance of the superior information that the director had
misappropriated. For a number of reasons, this Article suggests that "the"
misappropriation theory-O'Hagan's misappropriation theory-should be
refrarned to emphasize the fraud on investors rather than the fraud on the source.
The analysis in this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I focuses on the
federal judiciary's development of classical and misappropriation theories of
insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Part II turns to the
Court's endorsement of the "fraud on the source" misappropriation theory in
O'Hagan and examines both the majority and dissenting opinions. Part I
analyzes O'Hagan,and highlights a number of fundamental problems with the
Court's reasoning. In particular, Part I argues that O'Hagan endorsed an
unnecessarily restrictive misappropriation theory that will frustrate the
prosecution of future cases involving trading on misappropriated information;
that the policy rationale used by the Court to support the "fraud on the source"
theory is highly misleading and may generate public mistrust of the SEC; and
that the "fraud on the source" theory is very difficult to reconcile with judicial
and congressional determinations regarding standing in private insider trading
actions for violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Part IV of this Article
maintains that the text of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as well as prior Court
precedents would support a misappropriation theory premised on the "fraud on
the investors," and that such a theory, for a variety of different reasons, is far
superior to the "fraud on the source" version announced in O'Hagan. Part IV
concludes that O'Hagan's endorsement of a narrow misappropriation theory
should not preclude lower courts from recognizing a broader one, and that
16

See infra Part IV.A (discussing both the common law and statutory basis for

recognizing a disclosure obligation that is triggered by the misappropriation of information).
Although the Government advanced only the fraud on the source version of the
misappropriation theory in its brief to the Supreme Court in O'Hagan, both "fraud on the

source" and "fraud on investors" misappropriation theories were proposed in an amici brief
filed in support of the Government. See Brief of Amici Curiae North American Securities
Administrators Association, Inc., and Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, United States v.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997) (No. 96-842), available in 1997 WL 86236, at *10-14
[hereinafter NASAA Brief]. The NASAA Briefs arguments in favor of a "fraud on investors"
misappropriation theory themselves reflected views expressed previously by at least one of the
Briefs signatories. See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High about Rule 10b-5:
Chiarella's History, Central Bank's Future,20 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 865, 883-84 (1995) (favorably
critiquing Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarellaand advocating judicial recognition of a
misappropriation theory premised on the fraud that is perpetrated on other marketplace traders).
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O'Hagan itself provides support for construing the text of Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 in light of the investor protection and market integrity policy
objectives underlying the federal securities laws.

I. COMPLEMENTARY THEORIES OF INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY UNDER
SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 1Ob-5
O'Hagan clarified the law of insider trading by clearly delineating two
"complementary" approaches pursuant to which a person may be held liable
under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for trading securities while in possession of
material, nonpublic information: a classical theory and a misappropriation
theory. 17 Although the historical development of both theories has been
examined extensively by other securities law scholars,18 a brief refresher is
17 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
18
There is a vast amount of legal scholarship on the law of insider trading. The following
constitutes only a fraction of the pre-O'Haganarticles that contain insightful discussions of the
development of the classical and misappropriation approaches under Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5: Barbara Bader Aldave, The MisappropriationTheory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 373 (1988) [hereinafter Aldave, Carpenter and Its Aftermath]; Barbara Bader
Aldave, Misappropriation:A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic
Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (1984) [hereinafter Aldave, A General Theory]; Alison
Grey Anderson, Fraud,Fiduciaries,and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341 (1982);
Douglas M. Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule lob-5 and
Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263 (1981); Jan G. Deutsch, Chiarella v. United States: A
Study in Legal Style, 58 TEX. L. REv. 1291 (1980); Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An
Analysis and Proposalfor Insider TradingRegulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179 (1991); Dennis S.
Kajala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the Interpretation of
FederalSecurities Law, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1473 (1986); Donald C. Langevoort, Insider
Tradingand the FiduciaryPrinciple:A Post-ChiarellaRestatement, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudenceofthe MisappropriationTheory and the New Insider
Trading Legislation: From Fairness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L. REV. 775 (1988);
Richard J. Morgan, The Insider Trading Rules after Chiarella: Are They Consistent with
Statutory Policy?, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1407 (1982); Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation
Theory ofInsider Trading: A Legal, Economic, and EthicalAnalysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 223 (1992); Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of FederalSecurities Law Concerning
Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.L 1083 (1985); William KS. Wang, Trading on Material
Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue
Whom Under SEC Rule l0b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981). In addition to the articles
cited supra,see generally RALPH C. FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY, HEBERT THOMAS, FERRARA
ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL (1997) [hereinafter FERRARA ET AL.]. Much of the
following description of the classical and misappropriation theories, as well as the description
of O'Haganin Part II infra, is based on the more extensive discussion in this treatise. For other
comprehensive works on the subject of insider trading, see DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER
TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION (1998); WILLIAM KS. WANG &
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nonetheless necessary to highlight a number of points that will play an important
role in the analysis of O'Haganthat follows.

A. The Development of the ClassicalTheory
The Supreme Court entrenched the classical theory of insider trading
liability in 1980, when it decided Chiarellav. United States.19 Prior to Chiarella,
both the SEC20 and the Second Circuit 21 had broadly interpreted Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 to require any person in possession of any material, nonpublic
information to disclose that information or to abstain from trading. This
expansive approach to insider trading liability, which came to be known as the
"parity of information theory,"22 was based on the dual notions that persons with
MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1996

& 1998 Supp.).

19 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
20 11 re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), presented the SEC with its first
opportunity to address the application of Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 in the context of open
market securities trading based on material, nonpublic information. Prior to Cady, Roberts,
courts and the SEC had imposed liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 only when
insider trading occurred in face-to-face transactions between corporate insiders and
shareholders. See id. at 908. In Cady,Roberts, the SEC imposed sanctions against a partner in a
brokerage firm who had sold securities in the open market for client accounts on the basis of
confidential "bad news" pertaining to a company; this confidential news was conveyed to him
by his brokerage firm partner, who was a director of the company. The SEC found that trading
while in possession of such material, nonpublic information violated Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. It noted that the obligation to disclose or to abstain from trading in the open market rests
on two principal elements:
[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone; and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
Id. at 912 (footnote omitted). In subsequent cases, the SEC soon began to highlight the second
element it identified in Cady, Roberts, suggesting that the duty to disclose or abstain did not
arise merely as an incident to a fiduciary relationship, but as a result of the "inherent
unfaimess" of using nonpublic information to reap personal trading profits. See In re Investors
Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971) (imposing liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb5 against non-insiders who had reason to know that the information they possessed was not
publicly available).
21 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (stating
that "anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing
public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he
chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned
while such inside information remains undisclosed"), cert. denied,394 U.S. 976 (1969).
22
See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 233-35 (declining to adopt "a parity of information rule").
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access to material, nonpublic information have an "unerodable" informational
23
advantage that no amount of insight, luck, or diligent research can overcome
and that the use of such an advantage in securities transactions is not only unfair
but also fraudulent. 24 Thus, as the Second Circuit explained in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur,2 5 the parity of information theory 26 was grounded in "the justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal
27
exchanges have relatively equal access to material information."
23 See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Ifonnational Advantages Under the
FederalSecurities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322, 354-55 (1979). Professor Brudney was one
of the first securities law scholars to advocate application of an "equality of access to
information" theory to govem the legality of insider trading. In his view, the principal
congressional purpose behind Section 10(b) was to protect investors in the marketplace from
transactions that could be characterized as "overreaching.' See id. at 334, 336-37. Although he
recognized that traditional corporate insiders were more likely than outsiders to be in a position
giving them such "unerodable" advantages in trading, Professor Brudney maintained that
anyone with such an advantage should be prohibited from profiting at the expense of public
investors. See id. at 360. Thus, according to Professor Brudney, even a lawfully obtained
"unerodable" information advantage could not be used in connection with a securities
transaction. See id. For example, under his equality of access approach, Section 10(b) and Rule
I Ob-5 would prohibit a supplier who has knowledge of a significant increase in orders by a
customer from purchasing stock in that customer because the supplier "has an informational
advantage over the public in trading in the stock of the customer, an advantage which the
public cannot overcome unless the customer is willing to disclose it [publicly]." Id. at 359.
24
See id. at 333-39. Professor Brudney's post-O'Hagancommentary indicates that he
continues to favor interpreting Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to prohibit all trading by persons
who are in possession of material, nonpublic information (whether lawfully or unlawfully) that
other securities traders "could not have discovered, purchased, or otherwise acquired." Victor
Brudney, O'Hagan 's Problems, SUP. CF. REv. 249, 256 (1997).
25 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
26 Of course, a true "parity of information" rule would operate to ban virtually all
securities trading because certain types of informational advantages, such as those that result
from differences in diligence or intelligence, are inevitable. Thus, as Justice Blackmun noted in
Chiarella, a more accurate characterization of the SEC's and the Second Circuit's theory
would be a "parity of access to material information" rule. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 252 n.2
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). In the interest of brevity, this Article uses the phrase "parity of
information" with the understanding that the focus is to be on the parity of access to
information rather than the parity of information per se.
27 Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848. At the opposite side of the academic spectrum
from those advocating a parity of information approach to insider trading regulation are those
securities law scholars who argue that insider trading should not be illegal. See, e.g., HENRY G.
MANNE, INsIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Regulation oflnsider Trading,35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983). These commentators
argue that insider trading is an effective and appropriate method of compensating insiders and
entrepreneurs, see MANNE, supra at vii-viii, and that insider trading can benefit securities
markets by increasing their allocative efficiency through a swift incorporation of new
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In Chiarella, the Supreme Court determined, as a matter of statutoiy
construction, that the mere possession of material, nonpublic information does
not give rise to a general duty under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to disclose
that information or abstain from trading.2 8 The case involved the now infamous
actions of Vincent Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer engaged to print
announcements of a number of corporate takeover bids.2 9 Although the identity
of both the acquiring and target corporations had been concealed by code names
until the night of the final printing, Chiarella had managed to decipher the
identity of the companies from other facts provided in the materials supplied to
the printer by the acquiring companies. Chiarella then purchased securities in the
target companies and sold them immediately after the takeover attempts were
made public, for a total profit of about $30,000.30 He was indicted and convicted
for violating Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 3 1 The Second Circuit affirmed his
conviction, holding that "[a]nyone-corporateinsider or not-who regularly
may not
use
that
nonpublic
information
receives
material
32
information... without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."
The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's conviction. 33 In a majority opinion
joined by four other members of the Court, Justice Lewis Powell reasoned that "a
duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of
nonpublic market information" 34 because "[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak."'35 Quoting the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Court maintained that such a disclosure duty
arises when one party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
information in the marketplace. See Carlton & Fischel, supra at 861-72. Both of these
justifications have been subjected to substantial criticism. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner
H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 627-42 (1984);
Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider TradingRules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large
Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1067-71 (1982); Ray A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any
Price:A Reply to Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425
(1967).
28
See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 235.
29
See id.at 224.
30
See id.
31 Insider trading can be criminally prosecuted by the Justice Department under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff(a), which provides for criminal penalties for any willful violation of any provision of the
Exchange Act or any rule or regulation thereunder. Chiarellawas the first attempt by federal
prosecutors to invoke this provision in an insider trading case.
32
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d. Cir. 1978).
33 See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 225.
34
Id. at 235.
35 Id.
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them.' 36 As the employee of a financial printer hired by the acquiring
corporations, Chiarella owed fiduciary duties neither to the target corporations
nor to their shareholders. 37 The Court therefore concluded that Chiarella's
silence in securities transactions with target shareholders was not fraudulent
within the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 38

The Chiarella Court then went on to critique directly the reasoning upon
which the parity of information theory was based.39 According to the Court, the
theory was grounded on two shaky assumptions. First the theory assumes that
transactions based on unequal access to material, nonpublic information are
inherently fraudulent. The Court rejected this assumption, maintaining that "not
every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under
§ 10(b)." 40 Likewise, the theory assumes that all marketplace traders are under a
general duty to refrain from trading on certain information merely because such
information is material and not publicly available. The Court declined the
invitation to impose "such a broad duty" because it was contrary to "the
established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two
36

Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). For an

argument that Justice Powell's statement overlooks other, equally well recognized, exceptions
triggering disclosure obligations in business transactions, see infra note 310 and accompanying
text.
37
See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232-33. Here, Justice Powell appears to assume that, under
the common law, directors and officers owed duties of a fiduciary nature to shareholders (in
addition to the corporation itself) and that the existence of a fiduciary relationship between an
insider and corporate shareholders triggered a duty to disclose in anonymous open market
transactions (as opposed to face-to-face transaction where reliance could be demonstrated). Yet
neither assumption would have been recognized as the common law majority rule prior to
1934. See Seligman, supra note 18, at 1091-1103; see also Theresa A. Gabaldon, State
Answers to Federal Questions: The Common Law of FederalSecurities Regulation, 20 J.
CORP. L. 155, 160 (1994) (concluding that Justice Powell's approach was "more than a little
unsatisfactory, given that states typically imposed no such generalized duty of disclosure
before the federal courts began to suggest its existence"). Thus, in this regard, Chiarellaitself
constituted a broad interpretation of the common law. See infra text accompanying notes 35354.
38
See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 234-35.
39 The ChiarellaCourt also acknowledged the lower court's specific contention that its
'regular access to information' test would create a workable rle embracing 'those who
occupy... strategic places in the market mechanism."' Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231 n.14
(quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978)). But the Court
rejected this test, maintaining that " [t] hese considerations are insufficient to support a duty to
disclose" and that such "[a] duty arises from the relationship between parties and not merely
from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the market." Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 231 n.14 (citations omitted).
40
Id. at 232 (citing Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,474-77 (1977)).
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parties," and Congress had not expressed an intention to depart from the
common law.4 1 On these points, Justice Harold Blackmun (joined by Justice
Thurgood Marshall) vehemently disagreed, arguing in a dissenting opinion that
the "narrow construction" placed upon Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by the
majority reflected "a position opposite to the expectations of Congress at the
'4 2
time the securities laws were enacted.
Three years after Chiarella, in Dirks v. SEC,4 3 the Court once again
emphasized that liability under the classical theory of insider trading turns on the
existence of a fiduciary obligation owed to the shareholders with whom the
defendant is trading. The conduct at issue involved a "tip" by Ronald Secrist, a
former officer of Equity Funding of America ("Equity Funding"), to investment
analyst Raymond Dirks.44 Secrist told Dirks that Equity Funding's assets were
vastly overstated as a result of fraudulent corporate practices. Dirks then
investigated this tip, and after confirming its truth, advised his clients and other
investment analysts to sell off their stock in Equity Funding. 4 5 In an
administrative proceeding against Dirks, the SEC concluded that "[w]here
'tippees'-regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into possession
of material 'corporate information that they know is confidential and know or
should know came from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly disclose
that information or refrain from trading. ' 46 The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that "a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider
has breached his fiduciary duty to shareholders by disclosing the information to
47
the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach."
41 See id.at 233.
42
Id. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 251 ("I would hold that persons
having access to confidential material information that is not legally available to others
generally are prohibited by Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural
informational advantages through trading in affected securities.").
43 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

44 See id. at 648-51.
45
See id. at 649. Clearly evidencing the validity of the adage "no good deed goes
unpunished," Dirks also reported to the SEC his findings with respect to Equity Funding's
fraudulent practices. See id. at 650 n.3.
46
In the Matter of Raymond L. Dirks, 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (quoting
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,230 n.12 (1980)).
47
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. The Court was particularly concerned that imposing liability
against Dirks would have a chilling effect on other market participants, particularly investment
analysts, and that this would discourage them from investing their time and resources in
.'ferret[ing] out and analyz[ing] information."' Id. at 658 (quoting Dirks, 21 SEC Docket at
1406). The Court further noted that such information is often "the basis for judgments as to the
market worth of a corporation's securities" and that this type of information "cannot be made
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The Court then concluded that Dirks did not violate Section 10(b) and Rule lOb5 because Secrist's tip to Dirks did not violate his fiduciary duty to the
48
shareholders of Equity Funding.
B. The Development of a MisappropriationAlternative
1. Views Expressed in Chiarella
A misappropriation alternative to the classical theory of insider trading was
raised by the Government in its brief to the Supreme Court in Chiarella,where it
argued that Chiarella had "committed fraud against both the acquiring
corporations whose information he converted and the investors who sold him
securities in ignorance of forthcoming market events of critical importance." 49
Specifically, the Government contended that Chiarella's "secret conversion of
confidential information operated as a fraud on the corporation that entrusted
him with that information" '50 and also that his "purchase of securities based on
material nonpublic information obtained by misappropriation constituted fraud
on the sellers of those securities." 5 1 Yet the Chiarellamajority did not rule on
the validity of either of these theories because, in its view, the theories had not
been presented to the jury.52 Misappropriation theories, however, were discussed
at length by a total of five Justices in separate concurring or dissenting opinions.
Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices William Brennan, Blackmun, and
Marshall agreed that liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 would be
triggered by any person who unlawfully obtained or converted for his own
simultaneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or the public generally." Id. at

659. 48

See id.at 665. The Court explained that whether an insider's disclosure of confidential

information to a third party is a breach of duty depends "in large part on the purpose of the
disclosure." Id. at 662. This involves an inquiry into "whether the insider would personally
benefit, directly or indirectly, from the disclosure." Id. The Court also noted that this "direct or
indirect personal benefit" test requires a court to focus on a variety of objective factors, citing
examples such as whether the tip could be considered a quid pro quo or whether the insider
made a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. See id. at 663. Applying
this analysis to Secrist's disclosure to Dirks, the Court concluded that Secrist did not breach his
fiduciary duty to Equity Funding's shareholders because Secrist was motivated by a desire to
expose an illegal fraud rather than by a desire to obtain any direct or indirect personal benefit.
See id. at 666-67.
49
Brief for Respondent United States at 24, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1979) (No. 78-1202), availablein LEXIS.
50 Id. at 28.
51
52

Id.
at 3&-39.
See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 236.
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benefit nonpublic information which he then used in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. 53 Thus, four Justices in Chiarellaendorsed a broad
version of the misappropriation theory that recognized a general disclosure
obligation running to those investors with whom the misappropriator trades: "a
person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to
disclose that information or refrain from trading. '54
It was Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion that most clearly elucidated
this "fraud on investors" misappropriation theory. He opined:
As a general rule, neither party to an arm's-length business transaction has an
obligation to disclose information to the other unless the parties stand in some
confidential or fiducary relation. This rule permits a businessman to capitalize
on his experience and skill in securing and evaluating relevant information; it
provides incentive for hard work, careful analysis, and astute forecasting. But the
policies that underlie the rule should also limit its scope. In particular, the rule
should give way when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior
experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means. 55
To support his view of the requirements at common law, Chief Justice Burger
quoted Dean Page Keeton's observation that .'[a]ny time information is
acquired by [] an illegal act it would seem that there should be a duty to
disclose that information. '56 Accordingly, Chief Justice Burger concluded that
Chiarella owed the target shareholders a duty to disclose or to refrain from
trading by virtue of the fact that he "misappropriated-stole to put it bluntlyvaluable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence. '57
A fifth member of the ChiarellaCourt, Justice John Paul Stevens, advanced
an alternative misappropriation theory that focused on Chiarella's possible fraud
on the source of the information. Justice Stevens indicated that while he did not
53 See id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (endorsing a broad
misappropriation theory, but agreeing with the majority that misappropriation instructions had
not been presented to the jury), 239-43 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (endorsing a broad version of
the misappropriation theory and contending that the theory was properly presented to the jury),
245-46 (Blackmun, J, joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (endorsing the more expansive parity

of information theory, see supra notes 22-23, 42 and accompanying text, but noting that
Chiarella's trading on misappropriated confidential information "is the most dramatic evidence
that [he] was guilty of fraud").
54

Id. at 240 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).

55

Id. at 239-40 (citations omitted).

56

Id. at 240 (quoting Page W. Keeton, Fraud-Concealmentand Non-Disclosure, 15
TEX. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1936)). For a more extensive discussion of Dean Keeton's
interpretation of disclosure requirements under the common law, see infra text accompanying
notes 322-23.
57
Id. at 245.
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accept the existence of a general duty owed to all securities investors on the other
side of Chiarella's transactions, "[r]espectable arguments could be made" that
Chiarella's action constituted a fraud or deceit on the acquiring companies that
entrusted confidential tender offer information to his employer, and that this
fraud or deceit occurred "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." 58 Justice Stevens's concurring opinion therefore raised the possibility
of a narrow version of the misappropriation theory. Yet he thought the Court
wise for "leav[ing] the resolution of this issue for another day."5 9
2. Conflicting FederalAppellate Views Regardingthe
"Fraudon the Source'"Theory
Encouraged in part by the positive signals sent by multiple members of the
Supreme Court in Chiarella,the SEC and the Justice Department soon began to
embrace a misappropriation theory of insider trading liability in instances where
the Government wished to pursue Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions against
persons who did not owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders of the companies in
which securities transactions were made. Specifically, the Government began to
emphasize the argument advanced by Justice Stevens in Chiarella;namely, that
trading securities based on material, nonpublic information obtained in breach of
a pre-existing duty of confidentiality constituted a fraud or deceit against the
source of the information in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
UnitedStates v. Newman60 presented the Government with an opportunity to
litigate this "fraud on the source" misappropriation theory of insider trading
liability. The case involved a scheme by two employees of Morgan Stanley Inc.
and Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc. who channeled confidential information
about their employers' investment banking activities to third parties. These third
parties then engaged in securities transactions based on this confidential
information. Both the employees and their tippees were prosecuted under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for the tippees' purchases of stock in tender offer targets
based on confidential information given to the investment banks by the acquiring
companies. The Second Circuit found that the entire scheme (both the tipping
and the trading) defrauded the investment bank employers as well as their
respective clients. 61 The court further concluded that the defendants' fraud and
deception occurred "in connection with" the purchase of securities because the
employees' and the third party traders' "sole purpose in participating in the
58 Chiarella,445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
59

1d.
60 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).

61 See id. at 17.
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misappropriation of confidential takeover information was to purchase shares of
62
the target companies."
After its decision in Newman, the Second Circuit continued to apply the
misappropriation theory in cases involving corporate outsiders, premising each
finding of liability on the fraud that was perpetrated on the source of that
information. 63 The Second Circuit further extended the misappropriation theory
in UnitedStates v. Carpenter.64 The case involved a Wall Street Journalreporter
who had leaked information about his upcoming "Heard on the Street" columns
to two stockbrokers who, based on these tips, purchased securities in companies
that were to receive favorable press. 65 The Second Circuit had little trouble
concluding that the tipper's and tippees' scheme deceived and defrauded the
Wall Street Journalwithin the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, even
though the Wall StreetJournalhad no relationship to or interest in the companies
whose securities were traded. 66 The Second Circuit also affirmed the defendants'
67
convictions under federal mail fraud and wire fraud statutes.
62
63

Id. at 18.

See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984) (injunction and disgorgement
affirmed in a case against a financial printer involving facts almost identical to those of
Chiarella), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying misappropriation theory against psychiatrist who allegedly traded
on the basis of material, nonpublic information concerning a corporate executive's activities
learned in the course of treating the wife of the corporate executive); United States v. Reed, 601
F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.) (applying misappropriation theory against son who allegedly traded
on the basis of nonpublic information obtained from father, a corporate director), rev'd on
other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (enjoining tippees of an administrative staff employee of law firm who purchased shares
of companies targeted for takeover by the law firm's clients). But see United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (finding that, although the misappropriation
theory may be used to impose liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 upon a breach of
trust among family members who share business confidences, the Government failed to offer
sufficient evidence of such a relationship between a wife and her husband), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 1004 (1992).
64 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986); see Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)
(affirming Carpenter's convictions under the securities laws by an equally divided court).
65
See Carpenter,791 F.2d at 1026-27.
66
See id. at 1033-34. Although in the mid-1980s Carpenterwas viewed as an "unusual
case," see Aldave, Carpenter and its Aftermath, supra note 18, at 381, its fact pattern soon
became a more common basis for prosecution under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (criminal action for alleged violations of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by government official who traded securities on the basis of
confidential information misappropriated from government agency that had no interest in the
securities that were traded).
67
See Carpenter,791 F.2d at 1034-36. The mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C.
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Although the Supreme Court agreed to review the Section 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5 convictions as well as the defendants' mail and wire fraud convictions, the
Court's opinion in Carpenterv. United States68 focused almost entirely on mail
and wire fraud. 69 With respect to the long awaited issue of the validity of the
"fraud on the source" misappropriation theory, the Court offered but one
sentence: "The Court is evenly divided with respect to the convictions under the
securities laws and for that reason affirms the judgment below on those
Counts." 70
Despite its failure to capture an endorsement by a majority of the Court in
Carpenter,the "fraud on the source" version of the misappropriation theory was
73
thereafter accepted by the Seventh,7 1 Ninth,7 2 and-arguably-Third Circuits.
§§ 1341, 1343, prohibit the use of mails or wire communication to further a scheme to defraud.
See id.
68 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
69
See id. at 24-27.
70

Id. at 24. The Court split 4-4 on this issue; the seat vacated by Justice Powell had not

yet been filled by Justice Anthony Kennedy. Had Justice Powell remained on the Court that
decided Carpenter,the misappropriation theory would likely have had a clear five votes
against its validity. Initially, the Court had voted to deny certiorari, and Justice Powell had
prepared and circulated a draft dissent from that denial. See Draft of Dissent from the Denial of
Certiorari for Carpenterv. United States, Justice Powell (Dec. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Powell
Draft Dissent], reprintedin A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law & Justice
Powell's Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 55-58 (1998). Justice
Powell's Draft Dissent conveyed his opposition to the misappropriation theory, reasoning that
the theory was inconsistent with Chiarella and Dirks because the relevant inquiry under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "must focus on 'petitioner's relationship with the sellers of
the... securities ... ."' Powell Draft Dissent at 6 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 233 (1987)), reprintedin Pritchard, supra, at 58. The Court then re-voted and granted
certiorari. See Carpenter v. United States, 479 U.S. 1016 (1986). Justice Powell's retirement,
however, took effect before Carpenterwas argued before the Court the following term.
71 See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991) (misappropriation theory applied
in action against an individual who broke into his former place of employment to steal
nonpublic information about his former employer's clients and then used that information to
trade securities), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 634 (7th Cir.
1995) (applying misappropriation theory to affirm the conviction of tippees who purchased
securities of target corporation based on tip provided by officer of acquiring corporation).
72
See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 445 (9th Cir. 1990) (misappropriation theory applied
to employee who tipped and traded in the securities of a company he knew to be a takeover
target of his employer).
73 See Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1985) (tippee's trading
on the basis of confidential merger information obtained from corporate official violated Rule
lOb-5), rev'd on other grounds after remand, 808 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986). But see SEC v.
Lenfest, 949 F. Supp. 341,345 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (expressing uncertainty as to whether the Third
Circuit actually applied the misappropriation theory in Rothberg, but nonetheless recognizing
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Thus, for many years, dissension over the theory's validity stemmed not from
74
courts but rather from academic scholars.
The unanimity among the federal circuits regarding the validity of the "fraud
on the source" misappropriation theory dissipated in 1995 when the Fourth
Circuit decided United States v. Bryan. 5 The defendant in that case, Elton
"Butch" Bryan, was a former director of the West Virginia Lottery. On the basis
of confidential information entrusted to him in his official capacity, Bryan
purchased the stock of companies that were slated to receive contracts from the
Lottery Commission.76 The Fourth Circuit overturned Bryan's conviction for
violating Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, concluding that while Bryan violated a
fiduciary duty owed to his employer, breach of that duty did not constitute
deceptive or manipulative conduct "in connection with the purchase or sale of [a]
security."' 77 In the Fourth Circuit's view, the text of these provisions would be
stretched beyond recognition were liability imposed in instances where the
"'defrauded' person has no connection with a securities transaction, [and] where
78
no investor or market participant has been deceived."
the validity of that theory in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
74
See, e.g., C. Edward Fletcher III, The "In Connection With "Requirement ofRule 10b5, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 913, 922-29 (1989) (questioning whether the "in connection with"
requirement of Rule 10b-5 is met in misappropriation cases); Richard M. Phillips & Robert J.
Zutz, The Insider TradingDoctrine:A Needfor Legislative Repair, 13 HOFsTRA L. REv. 65,
91 (1984) (arguing that the misappropriation theory is a 'nisconceived effort to broaden the
narrow focus of the insider trading doctrine"); Carole B. Silver, PenalizingInsider Trading:A
CriticalAssessment ofthe Insider TradingSanctionsAct of 1984, 1985 DuKE L.J. 960, 983-84
(1985) (concluding that the misappropriation theory conflicts with Chiarellaby disassociating
a fraudulent act from an investor's decision to purchase or sell); Manning Gilbert Warren IH,
Who's Suing Who? A Commentary on Investment Bankers and the MisappropriationTheory,
46 MD. L. REV. 1222, 1248 (1987) (arguing that the "misappropriation theory... works a
serious distortion of [R]ule IOb-5 jurisprudence").
75 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
76
See id. at 937-39.
77
Id.at 944.
78
Id. at 950. The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Bryan sparked a new wave of commentary
critical of the misappropriation theory. See, e.g., Michael P. Kenney & Theresa D. Thebaut,
Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation
Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139, 188 (1995) (contending that "whatever
irresistible force" brings together a misappropriator's so-called "fraud on the source" and his
securities transactions, it is "not the magnetic attraction of the statutory text"); John R. Beeson,
Comment, Rounding the Peg to Fit the Hole: A Proposed Regulatory Reform of the
MisappropriationTheory, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1077, 1138 (1996) (stating that "it is only
through considerable legal gymnastics that the misappropriation theory leaps from the
requirement of finding a breach of a duty unrelated to the market, to a holding that causation of
remote and indirect harm to investors in the market is the basis for Rule lOb-5 liability").
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The following year, in an opinion adopting the Fourth Circuit's Bryan
analysis "in its entirety as [its] own," 79 the Eighth Circuit rejected the validity of
the misappropriation theory. 80 In response to what was then a clear split in the
federal circuits, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Government's appeal of
the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. O'Hagan.81
3. The Pre-O'HaganStatus of the "Fraudon Investors" Theory
Before turning to an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. O'Hagan, it is useful to pause and consider what became of the
alternative version of the misappropriation theory that premised liability on a
trader's duty to disclose his misappropriated information to the other traders in
the marketplace-the version suggested by the SEC in Chiarella and
subsequently endorsed by Chief Justice Burger and three other members of the
Court.82 One could speculate that after this encouraging signal in Chiarella,the
Government was well poised to advance "a fraud on investors" theory in United
States v. Newman, 83 its first post-Chiarella opportunity to litigate a
misappropriation theory. Yet the Government chose not to litigate a "fraud on
investors" misappropriation theory, opting instead to argue only that the tippers
and tippees defrauded the investment banks and their clients within the meaning
of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 84 Perhaps the Government feared that
85
presenting alternative theories would confuse the jury and trigger an acquittal,
or may have presumed that the "fraud on the source" theory was the easier one
86
for juries to understand and apply.
79 United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612,620 (8th Cir. 1996).
80 See id.

81 117 S.Ct. 759 (1997) (granting writ of certiorari).
82

See supranotes 53-57 and accompanying text.

83 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
84

See Langevoort, supra note 16, at 883 (noting that Chief Justice Burger's

misappropriation theory "was deliberately not pursued in Newman").

85 See id.
86

After Chiarella and Dirks, securities law scholars expressed differing opinions with

respect to the viability of the Chief Justice's misappropriation theory. Compare Aldave, A
General Theory, supra note 18, at 115 (observing that lower courts failed to embrace the

broader theory, and contending that the Chief Justice's authority for the theory consisted of a
single citation to a law review article that argued that "'there shouldbe a duty,' not that there is
a duty, to disclose information that was illegally acquired") (quoting Burger quoting Keeton,
supranote 56, at 240), and id. at 116 (contending that the Chief Justice's theory "appears to be
inconsistent with the language and reasoning of Chiarellaand Dirks"), with Langevoort, supra

note 16, at 883 (discussing advantages of Chief Justice Burger's theory and contending that
recognition of the theory would "require some revisionism, but there is ample cover").
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Less than two years after the Second Circuit decided Newman, the
underlying facts of the case presented another opportunity for judicial
consideration of the "fraud on investors" version of the misappropriation theory,
when a private cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 was instituted
against the investment banks' employees and their tippees who had been
88
criminally convicted. 87 The private plaintiff in Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.
had unwittingly sold stock in the open market prior to the public announcement
of a tender offer for that stock. 89 The plaintiff argued that because both the
tippers and tippees had violated Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, they were liable
for the loss he suffered in selling his stock. At the pleadings stage, the defendants
successfully argued that the case should be dismissed because their disclosure
duties under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 ran only to the source of the
information. 90 Plaintiff Moss appealed the dismissal to the Second Circuit.
Significantly, the SEC filed with the Second Circuit an amicus curiae brief
supporting Moss's argument that he was entitled to damages, and developing
more fully the "fraud on investors" misappropriation theory that Chief Justice
Burger outlined in his Chiarella dissent. 91 The Second Circuit, nonetheless,
affirmed the district court's dismissal. 92 The court determined that the selling
shareholder had not been deceived and defrauded by the defendants because,
under the majority opinion in Chiarella,"defendants owed no duty of disclosure
to plaintiff Moss." 93 The court further opined that Moss could not obtain
standing under Rule lOb-5 by riding "'piggyback upon the duty owed by
87

See supranotes 60-62 and accompanying text.
88 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
89

See id.at 8.

90 See iL at 9-12.
91 See Brief of the Securities Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 11-22, Moss v.
Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983) (No. 83-7120) (copy on file with author). The
SEC summarized its argument as follows:
A person who misappropriates material nonpublic information owes a duty to investors
not to trade on the basis of that undisclosed information (whether the information may be
viewed as insider information or market information). Because defendant Newman in this
case purchased shares of [the target] on the basis of market information which he knew
had been misappropriated from the tender offeror, the selling shareholders of [the target]
were defrauded under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5. This
conclusion is consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. U.S., as
well as the decision of this [c]ourt in US. v. Newman, the common law of fraud, and the
language, legislative history, and purposes of the federal securities laws.

Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted).
92

See Moss, 719 F.2d at 23.

93

Id. at 16.
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defendants to [their investment bank employers].' 94 According to the Second
Circuit, imposition of civil liability in this private action "would grant [the
plaintiff] a windfall recovery simply to discourage tortious conduct by securities
purchasers. '95 And in the court's view, "the Supreme Court has made clear that
[S]ection 10(b) and [R]ule lOb-5 protect investors against fraud; they do not
96
remedy every instance of undesirable conduct involving securities.
Within a few years, Congress reacted to the Second Circuit's ruling in the
Moss case by amending the Exchange Act to provide contemporaneous traders,
such as Moss, with an express right of action under Section 20A. 97 Congress's
response to Moss therefore overturned the Second Circuit's holding as a practical
matter-Section 20A provides plaintiffs with express standing to sue any
individual who violates any provision of the Exchange Act by trading securities
while in possession of material, nonpublic information. 98 Yet, because the case
involved the validity of an implied private right of action under Rule lOb-5,
Moss's holding that shareholders are not owed a disclosure duty by an outsider
trading on misappropriated information continues to be cited with approval. 9 9
Moss's holding, however, was significantly weakened by the Second Circuit
in United States v. Carpenter,10 0 where in stark contrast to Moss, the court
advanced the argument that an outsider's securities trading based on information
misappropriated from an employer constituted not only a fraud on the source but
also a fraud on investors. In an often overlooked part of the Carpenter
decision, 10 1 the Second Circuit maintained that because the reporter and his
tippees breached a duty of confidentiality owed to the Wall Street Journal,these
defendants had "a corollary duty, which they breached, under [S]ection 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, to abstain from trading in securities on the basis of the
94 Id.

at 13 (quoting Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1353 (S.D.N.Y.

1983)).
95 Id. at 16.
961Id.

97 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1994).

98 15 U.S.C. at § 78u-l(a). For a discussion of Section 20A and its implications for a
"fraud on investors" misappropriation theory, see infra notes 289-95, 298-302 and
accompanying text.
99

See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 445 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that "the Second
Circuit correctly rejected Chief Justice Burger's version of the misappropriation theory as
contrary to the holdings in Chiarella and Dirks") (citing Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719
F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983)).

100 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
101 For example, although the Ninth Circuit in Clark cited both Moss and Carpenterwith
approval, it made no mention of the latter's recognition of the very disclosure duty that was
rejected in Moss. See Clark,915 F.2d at 445.

1998]

A POST O'HAGAN SUGGESTION

misappropriated information or to do so only upon making adequate disclosure
to those with whom they traded."10 2 Because the actual holding in Carpenter
turned on the fraud that was perpetrated on the Wall Street Journal,the Second
Circuit apparently considered it unnecessary to reconcile its "fraud on investors"
10 3
dicta with its contrary holding in Moss.
1. UNITED STA TES

v

O'HAGAN

The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. O'Hagan10 4 resoundingly
endorsed the "fraud on the source" version of the misappropriation theory. Five
members of the Court joined in the majority opinion authored by Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg. The dissents consisted of a brief opinion by Justice Antonin
Scalia, and a lengthier, more strongly worded opinion by Justice Clarence
Thomas joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
A. 0 'Hagan'sSecuritiesPurchasesBased on Misappropriated
Information
The facts of O'Hagan involved trading in the securities of a tender offer
target company by an attorney whose law firm represented the prospective
bidder. 105 In July 1988, James O'Hagan, a partner with the Minneapolis,
Minnesota law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, learned that his firm's client, Grand
Met PLC ("Grand Met"), was contemplating a takeover of Minneapolis-based
102 Carpenter,791 F.2d at 1034 (emphasis added).
103 The significance of Carpenter'sdicta was not lost, however, on the district court in
SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), which cited Carpenter'sacknowledgement
of a misappropriator's corollary duty to marketplace traders but concluded that, in this case, it
"need go no further than enforcement of the duty not to trade without disclosure to the
beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship." Id. at 621 n.47.
104 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997).
105
In addition to the antifraud prohibitions in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, trading
while in possession of material, nonpublic information in connection with a tender offer may
trigger liability under Exchange Act Section 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994), and SEC Rule
14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1997), promulgated thereunder. Specifically, Rule 14e-3
prohibits trading by any person in possession of material, nonpublic information relating to a
tender offer when that person knows or has reason to know that the information is nonpublic
and was received from the offeror, the target, or any person acting on behalf of either the
offeror or the target. See id.Although the validity of Rule 14e-3 was also at issue in O'Hagan,
this Article limits its focus to the analysis of the misappropriation theory of insider trading
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Consequently, it discusses neither the
development of Rule 14e-3 nor the Court's decision in O'Hagan to reinstate O'Hagan's
convictions that were premised on Rule 14e-3's validity.
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Pillsbury Company ("Pillsbury"). 10 6 The following month, and on other
occasions throughout that summer, O'Hagan purchased call options for Pillsbury
stock as well as shares of common stock. In October 1988, Grand Met
announced a public tender offer for Pillsbury, and the stock immediately rose
from $39 per share to almost $60 per share. When he exercised his Pillsbury
options and subsequently liquidated the stock, O'Hagan realized a profit of over
$4.3 million. He was charged with securities fraud (in violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Section 10(b) and Section 14(e), 10 7 and Rules lOb-5 and
14e-3 10 8 promulgated thereunder) and with federal mail fraud. 10 9 A jury
convicted him on all of the counts, and he was sentenced to forty-one months of
imprisonment. 110
The Government premised its Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 case on a
misappropriation theory because neither O'Hagan nor his law firm had any
relationship with, or owed any duty to, the shareholders of Pillsbury."' On
appeal, a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit rejected the validity of that theory
and reversed O'Hagan's convictions for violating Section 10(b) and Rule lOb5.112 The Eighth Circuit articulated two reasons in support of its conclusion that
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability cannot be based on the misappropriation
theory. First, the court found that contrary to Section 10(b)'s explicit
3
requirements, "the misappropriation theory does not require 'deception."'
And second, even assuming that Section 10(b)'s deception element is satisfied,
the court found the theory "renders nugatory the requirement that the 'deception'
be 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.""'114
B. Views ofthe Majority
The O'Haganmajority concluded that both of the Eighth Circuit's holdings
regarding the misappropriation theory were in error. In so doing, it reversed an
106 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.

107 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e) (1994).
108 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14e-3 (1997).
109 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
110

See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.

111 See id.at 2208 n.5.
112 See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 622 (8th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit
also reversed O'Hagan's convictions under Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3, and under the federal
mail fraud statute. See id.at 627-28.
113 Id. at 617. The court noted that Section 10(b) also proscribes the use of manipulative
devices, but concluded that manipulation is a term of art that did not in any way encompass
O'Hagan's conduct. See id. at 615 n.4.
114

Id. at 617.
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unmistakable trend in two decades of Supreme Court opinions that had narrowly
construed the text of the federal securities laws in general, and Section 10(b) in
115
particular.
At the outset of its analysis, the majority clearly articulated the definition of
the misappropriation theory that it was measuring against the statutory text: "The
'misappropriation theory' holds that a person commits fraud 'in connection with'
a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, when he
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information." 116 While the Court
acknowledged the broader reading of the theory advocated by Chief Justice
Burger and other members of the Chiarella Court, the Court noted that the
Government did "not propose that we adopt a misappropriation theory of that
breadth." 11 7 Accordingly, the Court premised misappropriation liability solely
on a "fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access
1 18
to confidential information."
The Court then elaborated on why a misappropriator's conduct satisfies the
"deception" element that is necessary to state a claim for liability under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Quoting substantially from the Government's brief, the
Court maintained that "misappropriators... deal in deception... [by
pretending] 'loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal's
information for personal gain."' 119 Thus, the misappropriator "'dupes' or
115 See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164

(1994) (no implied private right of action for aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (tippee of a traditional insider violates
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 under the classical theory only when the insider-tipper acts for a
personal benefit); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (securities trader, under the
classical theory, violates Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 only when a relationship of trust and
confidence exists with the parties ith whom she is trading); Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977) (breach of fiduciary duty not involving deception or manipulation is not
unlawful under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 does not extend to conduct that is merely
negligent-only intentional misconduct is proscribed); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (standing to bring an implied private right of action under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is limited to actual purchasers or sellers of securities).
116 O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2207.
117 Id. at 2208-09 n.6. The Court's reference to Chief Justice Burger's misappropriation
theory may have been prompted by arguments by amici supporting the validity of that broader
theory. See NASAA Brief, supra note 16, at 11-14 (maintaining that "Chief Justice Burger's
disclosure-based misappropriation theory of liability is a sound and sensible application of
Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, and it satisfies the statutory requirements of a deception and a
connection to the purchase or sale of securities").
118 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
119
Id. at 2208 (quoting Brief for the United States at 17, United States v. O'Hagan, 117
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'defrauds' the principal. '120 The Court also harmonized its view of the
1 21
"deception" element with its holding in SantaFe Industries, Inc. v. Green that
Section 10(b) should not be read as proscribing every breach of fiduciary duty
connected to a securities transaction. According to the Court, the critical
difference was that, in contrast to the Government's allegations against O'Hagan,
in Santa Fe the defendants had disclosed all facts that were pertinent to the
disputed transaction. The Court therefore emphasized that full disclosure to the
source of the information of the fiduciary's intent to trade would foreclose
22
liability under the misappropriation theory.1
The Court turned next to Section 10O(b)'s requirement that the
misappropriator's deceptive use of misappropriated information must be "in
connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security."'12 3 The Court maintained
that this element was satisfied "because the fiduciary's fraud is consummated,
not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without
disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell
securities." 124 Thus, liability under Section 10(b) is triggered because the
deception and the securities transaction necessarily coincide. The Court further
acknowledged that the misappropriation theory does not extend to all
conceivable forms of fraud and deception involving confidential information;
"rather, it catches fraudulent means of capitalizing on such information through
securities transactions." 125 The Court also stressed that Section 10(b)'s language
requires only deception "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"
and does not specify deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller. 126 Thus, the
Court held that the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that "' [o]nly a breach of a duty to
the parties to the securities transaction... or, at most, to other market
participants such as investors, will be sufficient to give rise to § 10(b) liability'
S. Ct. 2199 (1997) (No. 96-842)).
120Id.

121 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
122
See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208. The Court did note, however, that where a person
trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information owes pre-existing duties of loyalty and

confidentiality to multiple entities or persons, disclosure only to one entity or person is not
enough to foreclose liability under Section 10(b)-full disclosure must be made to each entity
or person to whom the trader owes a duty. See id. at 2209 n.7.
123 Id. at 2209.
124 Id.
125

Id. Here, the majority was mindful to note that the Government somewhat overstated

its case in contending (in briefs and in oral argument) that confidential information of the kind
possessed by O'Hagan derives its value only from its utility in securities trading. Yet the Court
concluded that "[s]ubstitut[ing] 'ordinarily' for 'only,"' brought the Govemment back "on the
mark." Id. at 2210.
12 6

See Id.
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12 7
was clearly in error.
Finally, the Court justified its reading ofthe statutory text by highlighting the
policy behind the Exchange Act: "to insure honest securities markets and thereby
promote investor confidence." 128 It made "scant sense" to the Court "to hold a
lawyer like O'Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm representing
the target of a tender offer, but not if he works for a law firm representing the
bidder." 12 9 It is here that the O'Hagan majority came closest to validating a
more expansive version of the misappropriation theory that would have included
investors among the parties defrauded by the misappropriator's trading. 130 Yet
the majority was able to disentangle the possibly serious harms to third party
investors from the deception that gave rise to the misappropriator's Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 liability. That is, while acknowledging that trading on the basis
of misappropriated information may perpetuate injury on at least two identifiable
parties-the source of the information and the investors on the other side of the
misappropriator's transaction-the Court recognized only the source of the
information as the party actually deceived within the meaning of Section
10(b). 13 1

C. Views ofthe DissentingJustices
The three dissenting members of the Court disagreed not with the majority's
contention that the undisclosed misappropriation of confidential information by a
fiduciary can constitute a "deceptive device" within the meaning of Section
10(b), but rather with the majority's conclusion that such deception is used or
employed "in connection with the purchase or sale" of securities. 132 Justice
127

Id. at 2211 (quoting United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996)).
128 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210.
12 9 Id. at 2210-11.
130

the
See infra text and accompanying notes 385-92 (contending that O'Hagan left
validity of a broader misappropriation theory unresolved).
131 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 (noting that "the deception essential to the
misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of the information-...
132See Id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 2220-21
(Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

Justice Scalia dissented only from the Court's holding with respect to O'Hagan's liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and concurred with the majority's decision to reinstate
O'Hagan's convictions under Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 and under the federal mail fraud
statute. See id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas and
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from both of the Court's holdings under the federal securities
laws and concurred only in the Court's judgment with respect to reinstating O'Hagan's
convictions under the federal mail fraud statute. See id. at 2220-21 (Thomas, J., and Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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Scalia issued a brief opinion emphasizing that, in light of the rule of lenity
applied to criminal statutes, 133 the unelaborated statutory "in connection with"
language "must be construed to require the manipulation or deception of a party
to a securities transaction." 134 This conclusion by Justice Scalia was essentially
echoed in a more lengthy opinion by Justice Thomas, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist. In that opinion, Justice Thomas sharply criticized both the
majority and the SEC for their failure "to provide a coherent and consistent
interpretation of this essential requirement for liability under § 10(b)."135
Justice Thomas appeared particularly troubled by the failure of both the SEC
and the majority to offer a satisfactory explanation as to why the fraudulent theft
of information for the purpose of purchasing securities falls within the
misappropriation theory, while the fraudulent theft of money for the purpose of
purchasing securities does not. 136 The majority's explanation-that the "fraud"
involving the misappropriation of the information is consummated when the
securities trading occurs, whereas "fraud" involving the theft of tangible property
occurs immediately-was dismissed as unsatisfying. 137 According to Justice
Thomas, misappropriated information could be used for many purposes other
138
than securities trading. It could, for example, be sold to newspapers. Thus, just
as trading in securities using stolen money was too attenuated to satisfy the "in
connection with" requirement, so too, in his view, was trading in securities using
stolen information. 139 Emphasizing that "it is the use of fraud 'in connection
133 The "rule of lenity" provides that any ambiguity in criminal statutes must be strictly
construed. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1225 (1997); Dowling v. United
States, 473 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1985). In this regard, the rule of lenity is said to ensure fair
warning of criminal sanctions and to limit the scope of many penal statutes:

[W]hen assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, we must pay close heed to
language, legislative history, and purpose in order to strictly determine the scope of
conduct the enactment forbids. Due respect for the prerogatives of Congress in defining
federal crimes prompts restraint in this area, where we typically find a 'narrow
interpretation' appropriate.

Dowling, 473 U.S. at 213-14.
134 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135
Id. at 2221 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
13 6
See id. (noting the majority's approval of the Government's contention that
purchasing securities with funds that had been embezzled from a fiduciary would not trigger
liability under Section 10(b)).
137
138

139

See id. at 2223-24.
See id. at 2223.

See id. at 2223-24 (contending that "[i]f the relevant test under the 'in connection
with' language is whether the fraudulent act is necessarilytied to a securities transaction, then
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with' a securities transaction that is forbidden" under Section 10(b), Justice
Thomas concluded that "[w]here the relevant element of fraud has no impact on
the integrity of the subsequent transactions ...one can reasonably question
140
whether the fraud was used in connection with a securities transaction."
Accordingly, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist would have affirmed
the Eighth Circuit's decision to overturn O'Hagan's convictions for insider
14
trading in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 1
Hi. A CRITIQUE OF O'HAGAN
By reinstating O'Hagan's convictions for violating Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, the Court in O'Hagan reached the right result for a number of wrong
reasons. 14 2 Without a misappropriation theory to supplement Chiarella's and
Dirks's classical theory of insider trading liability, a large variety of securities
transactions involving the use of material, nonpublic information would
necessarily fall outside the scope of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 14 3 For
example, in the absence of a misappropriation theory, Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 would not preclude the following: transactions involving corporate
the misappropriation of confidential information used to trade no more violates § 10(b) than
does the misappropriation of finds used to trade").
140

Id.
at 2226.
141 See id.
142
To be sure, some of the other commentary on O'Hagan has been more
complimentary, even while acknowledging certain problems with the Court's reasoning. See,
e.g., Brudney, supra note 24; Pritchard, supra note 70; Joel Seligman, A Mature Synthesis:
O'Hagan Resolves "Insider" Trading'sMost Vexing Problems, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1998);
Elliott J. Weiss, United States v. O'Hagan: PragmatismReturns to the Law ofInsider Trading,
23 J. CoRP. L. 395 (1998). Other commentary has been, perhaps, even more critical. See,e.g.,
Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading On Confidential Information-A Breach in Search of a
Duty, 20 CARDOzo L. REv. 83 (1998); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fiduciaries, Misappropriators
and the Murky Outlines of the Den of Thieves: A Conceptual Continuumfor Analyzing United
States v. O'Hagan, 33 TULSA L.J 163 (1997); Richard W. Painter et aL., Don't Ask,Just Tell:
Insider Trading After United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153 (1998); Carol B.
Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court Misappropriates the
MisappropriationTheory, 32 WAKEFORST L. REV. 1157(1997).
143 See John F. Olson et al., Reporting of the ABA Task Force on the Regulation of
Insider Trading, 41 Bus. LAW 223, 237 (1985) (stating that misappropriation theory fills
regulatory gaps left open by strict analysis in Chiarellaand Dirks); see also Brief for United
States, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997), available in1997 WL 86306 at *16
n.8 (describing the misappropriation theory as a "comerstone in the SEC's efforts to combat
the deceptive misuse of confidential information in the nation's securities markets" and noting
that the "theory has been used in the past 15 years in scores of civil and criminal cases,
including some of the most significant securities fraud cases of that period").
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insiders or temporary insiders of one company who use material, nonpublic
information to purchase securities in another company; 144 transactions by
employees who use confidential business information in the course of trading
securities in companies other than their employers; 145 transactions by
government officials who purchase securities based on confidential information
that they learn in the course of their public service; 146 and (possibly) transactions
by officers, directors, and other permanent or temporary insiders who use
material, nonpublic information to purchase debt securities issued by their own
corporation.' 47 Because all of these transactions involve conduct that
significantly undermines the integrity of, and investor confidence in, securities
144

See supratext accompanying notes 9-12 (discussing a hypothetical GM director who
trades Ford stock on the basis of information learned at a board meeting). The facts of
O'Hagan as well as Chiarellaalso fit this scenario of outsider trading. Because both O'Hagan
and Chiarellainvolved temporary insiders of an acquiring company who purchased a target's
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information concerning a tender offer, Rule 14e-3
would provide the Govemment with an alternative avenue for prosecution. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-3; see supra note 105. However, in cases where securities are purchased in a
company to be acquired by means other than a tender offer, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
would constitute the only provisions under the federal securities laws that would proscribe such
purchases by an outsider of the acquired company.
145 The Wall Street Journal reporter and his tippees who traded securities based on
upcoming favorable press provide an example of this type of outsider trading. See United
States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S.
19 (1987).
146
InChiarella, Chief Justice Burger cited the example of a hypothetical judge's law
clerk who trades on information in an unpublished opinion. See Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 242 n.3 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The state lottery commissioner in Bryan
who purchased securities in companies to be awarded lucrative government contracts provides
an actual example. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
147 Securities law scholars are not in agreement as to whether the classical theory of
insider trading would extend liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to a corporate insider
who purchases publicly traded debt, as opposed to equity, securities in the corporation. The
point of contention involves the fact that, traditionally, corporate executives have not owed
state law fiduciary obligations to holders of the company's debt. Compare LANGEVOORT,
supra note 18, at 3-21 ("The approach more consistent with Chiarellais that no abstain or
disclose obligation arises in connection with trading in debt securities, leaving liability in such
a case to rest on the misappropriation theory.. . "), with Aldave, A General Theory, supra note
18, at 110 ('The reasoning of [Chiarellaand Dirks] should bar insider trading in debt as well
as equity securities, since it is arguable that the holders of debt securities are among the classes
of persons to whom insiders owe fiduciary duties."). Although the SEC contends that there are
valid arguments for liability under the classical theory, the SEC typically invokes the
misappropriation theory when it institutes Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 actions against
insiders who purchase debt securities in their companies while in possession of material,
nonpublic information. See WANG & STEINBERG, supranote 18, at 326 (citing cases).
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markets, 148 the public policy behind the federal securities laws would support the
imposition of liability.1 49 With this investor protection rationale clearly in mind,
the O'Hagan Court admirably declined the opportunity to construe the text of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in the narrow manner urged by the defendant (and
indeed, the dissenting Justices). This reversed a trend of defense victories, and
Government losses, in Section 10(b) cases over the last two decades.15 0
Although O'Haganproduced an admirable result, the route the Court took to
get there is highly problematic for three separate, though somewhat related,
reasons. First, O'Hagan endorsed an unnecessarily restrictive misappropriation
theory that will likely frustrate the Government's ability in the future to pursue
other, more factually complex, instances of securities trading based on
misappropriated information. Second, the policy rationale used by the Court to
justify the imposition of liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for a fraud
on the source is misleading and leaves the Court vulnerable to the charge that the
misappropriation theory is only a pretext for enforcing the parity of information
theory that was rejected in Chiarella and Dirks. Finally, O'Hagan's
identification of the source of the information as the actual victim of a
misappropriator's fraud is very difficult to reconcile with judicial and
congressional determinations regarding standing in private actions based on
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5. This Part explores each of these three
fundamental problems.
A. The Restrictive Scope of O'Hagan's MisappropriationTheory
Commenting on the Government's victory in O'Hagan, a former SEC
General Counsel noted that "'[the case] was about as good a factual setting as
you could hope for.' ' 15 1 Of course, the validity of this statement entirely
depends on the result for which one hoped. Although the egregious conduct at
issue may well have been ideal for sustaining O'Hagan's convictions for
securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the nature of O'Hagan's
148 For a discussion of investor protection and market integrity policy considerations for
prohibiting persons from trading securities on the basis of misappropriated information, see
infra notes 220-28 and accompanying text.
14 9
See infra notes 344-52 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent
behind federal securities regulation).
150
See supranote 115 (citing cases).
151 Dominic Bencivenga, The Right Set of Facts: 'O'Hagan' Court Affirms SEC RuleMaking Power, N.Y. L., July 3, 1997, at 5 (col. 2) (quoting SEC former General Counsel
Simon M. Lome); see also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURrms LAW HANDBOOK 1183

(1998) (observing that "[t]he SEC and the Government could not have had a better set of facts
on which to have the misappropriation theory resolved... ").
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particular misappropriation scheme presented the Court with a rather
unimaginative scenario around which to frame a theory. As such, the purportedly
"good" facts were probably not so good, for they seem to have prompted a
majority opinion with reasoning that is far too restrictive to accommodate many
future insider trading cases involving more "sophisticated" scenarios, such as
conduct involving outright theft of information by a non-fiduciary, conduct
involving a fiduciary's nondeceptive securities trading, and (possibly) conduct
involving a fiduciary who tips misappropriated information. O'Hagan's
restrictiveness is all the more troubling because, as will be argued in Part IV of
this Article, the statutory text would have supported an alternative interpretation
of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, which, in turn, would have ensured liability in
152
these more "sophisticated" cases.
1. The Non-FiduciaryThief
One scenario involving securities transactions based on misappropriated
information that is not covered by O'Hagan'smisappropriation theory would
surface whenever information has been misappropriated for securities trading
purposes by a person who we can refer to as a "non-fiduciary thief." Indeed,
prior to O'Hagan, some courts considered it an open question as to whether
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit securities trading on the basis of material,
nonpublic information that has been misappropriated from a source who did not
stand in a fiduciary relationship with the misappropriator. 153 O'Hagan's
misappropriation theory, however, would be of little use in such situations
because it is premised on the existence of a pre-existing relationship of trust and
154
confidence between the misappropriator and the source of the information.
152

See infra Part IV.A-B.
153 See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 412 n.6 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that although
"[t]here has been some suggestion that Rule 1Ob-5 should apply even to 'mere' thieves [who
trade on the basis of misappropriated information] ... [w]e need not reach this question
because of our holding that [defendant] breached a fiduciary duty owed to [the source of the
information]"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); see also United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d
933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that the circuits endorsing the misappropriation theory would
in principle "be obliged to find liability in thecase of a simple theft... even where no fiduciary

duty has been breached, for the raison d'etre of the misappropriation theory in fact is
concerned over 'the unfairness inherent in trading on [stolen] information') (quoting Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,241 (1980) (Burger, C.J, dissenting)).
154
See Seligman, supra note 142, at 22 (observing that "[O'Hagan's]misappropriation

theory requires deception and breach of a duty to the source of information"); Weiss, supra
note 142, at 430 (contending that a number of statements in O'Hagan "seem[ ] to establish
dispositively that misappropriation will be held to involve a deceptive act or practice only
when a fiduciary has traded on the basis of confidential information without first informing his
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Consider the case of a computer hacker who unlawfully gains access to a
corporation's internal network and subsequently manages to uncover
confidential information revealing that the company is set to announce an
exciting break-through in technology that is sure to send its stock price soaring.
Assuming that he has no pre-existing relationship with the corporation, any preannouncement stock purchases by the computer hacker would escape Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability under O'Hagan's "fraud on the source"
misappropriation theory. This is because, in the words of O'Hagan, "the
misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned trader's
deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential
information." 155 Because the computer hacker was not entrusted with such
access, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 would not be violated under O'Hagan's
theory, even though the computer hacker would be trading securities on the basis
156
of material, nonpublic information that had been misappropriated.
The result would be the same in a case involving a less technologically
sophisticated non-fiduciary thief who misappropriates information the old
fashioned way-by breaking into a locked corporate office and stealing the
confidential information. Although such a person may be guilty of burglary and
theft, O'Hagan's theory would not hold subsequent securities trading by this
thief a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.157 Moreover, even if the thief
beneficiary that he intends to trade"). But see infra text accompanying notes 161-65
(questioning whether O'Hagan leaves open the possibility of a broader "fraud on the source"
misappropriation theory that would establish Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability in cases
where a non-fiduciary uses deceptive acts or practices to misappropriate information for
securities trading purposes).
155 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997); see also id. at 2209
(emphasizing that "the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning
fidelity to the source of the information").
156 Breaking into a company's confidential computer database and using the company's
information for any personal purpose would likely constitute the misappropriation of a trade
secret, actionable in private civil suits and potentially triggering criminal liability under federal
and state laws. See, e.g., Unif. Trade Secrets Act of 1996, 14 U.L.A. 433 (Supp. 1998)
(adopted in forty-one states and the District of Columbia and providing private right of action
for misappropriation of a trade secret); Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294
§§ 1831-1839, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839) (federal criminal trade
secrets statute that, despite its name, applies to anyone who knowingly engages in any act of
misappropriation "with intent to convert a trade secret,... to the economic benefit of anyone
other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will injure any owner
of that trade secret"); MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRErS LAW, App. L-1 through App. L-43

(1996) (collecting state criminal trade secret statutes). See generally James H.A. Pooley et al.,
Understandingthe Economic EspionageAct of 1996, 5 TEx. INTaLL. PROP. L.J. 177 (1997)

(discussing liability for misappropriation of trade secrets under federal and state law).
157In oral argument before the Court in O'Hagan, the Government explicitly
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had been a former employee of the company rather than a stranger, his
undisclosed securities trading would still not constitute deception under
O'Hagan.Unlike a current employee such as O'Hagan, the former employee
would not have .'pretend[ed] loyalty to the [source] while secretly converting
the [source's] information for personal gain,""' 158 and he would not have
"feign[ed] fidelity to the source of the information" while carrying out his
securities trading. 15 9 Indeed, under this scenario, the former employee would
have been a "non-fiduciary" both at the time he stole the information and at the
time he used the information for his personal profit in securities trading.
Accordingly, O'Hagan would not support Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5
liability. 160
acknowledged that under its version of the misappropriation theory, Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 are not violated if the misappropriated information was obtained through "mere" theft by
a non-fiduciary. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1998), availablein 1997 WL 182584 at *5 [hereinafter Tr. of Oral Arg.]:
MR. DREEBEN: The misappropriation theory... involves, just as the facts did in
Carpenterv. United States, an agent entrusted with information by a principal under the
understanding between the parties that the agent would not use that information for any
personal gain without obtaining the principal's agreement.
QUESTION: Well, Mr. Dreeben, then if someone stole the lawyer's briefcase and
discovered the information and traded on it, no violation?
MR. DREEBEN: That's correct Justice O'Connor.
Id.
158 O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2208 (quoting Brief for United States, O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct.
2199 (1997), availablein 1997 WL 86306 at *17).
159 See O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2209.
160
InSEC v. Cherif 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992),
the Seventh Circuit affirmed a Rule lOb-5 violation in a case involving a former bank
employee who had unlawfully entered the offices of his former employer for the purpose of
gaining access to confidential client information that he would later use for securities trading
purposes. The Seventh Circuit viewed as irrelevant the fact that Cherif's thefts and trades were
carried out "after his employment ended," id. at 411, concluding that "Cherif [had] breached a
continuing [fiduciary] duty to his former employer." Id. (emphasis added). Even prior to the
Court's decision in O'Hagan, the Seventh Circuit's holding in Cherif was criticized by
securities law scholars who questioned how Cherif could be said to have deceived and
defrauded aformer employer. See, e.g., Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 78, at 200 (bemoaning
that "the Seventh Circuit [in Cheri] abandoned its dictionary and expanded the definition of
'fraud' in Section 10(b) to apply to the theft of information by a non-fiduciary"); LANGEVOORT,
supra note 18, at 6-19 n.4 (stating that "[t]hough surely well intentioned, Cherif is
awkward ....
If a former employee did not formulate the plan to misuse the information while
an employee, only doing so after the representation of loyalty ceases, then it is hard to see the
implicit fraud"). O'Hagan's reasoning now seems to establish that Cherif's undisclosed
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It is certainly possible that in future cases, even after O'Hagan,lower courts
might be willing to broaden the "fraud on the source" misappropriation theory to
extend Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability in cases where a non-fiduciary
engages in affirmative acts that deceive the source into releasing confidential
information. 16 1 Professor Donald Langevoort, for example, hypothesizes a
situation where a person tricks another into leaving a business meeting room in
order to access confidential file folders left on the table. 162 He contends that
"[s]o long as an element of intentional deception was present in the action, the
resulting trading would lead to liability under Rule lOb-5."'1 63 Yet, even under
this broadened misappropriation theory, it is doubtful that securities trading by
the computer hacker or the "mere" thief would violate Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, because neither scenario would involve misappropriation through acts
that would constitute affirmative deception. 164 Moreover, even in those
circumstances where affirmative acts of deception could be established, the
Government must also demonstrate that such acts occurred "in connection with"
a securities transaction. In light of O'Hagan's narrow construction of Section
I0(b)'s "in connection with" element, this may be very difficult to do. 165 Thus,
both the utility and the viability of a broadened misappropriation theory remain
unclear.
What is clear is that "the" misappropriation theory, the one framed by the
securities trading did not operate as a fraud or deception on his former employer. But see infra
note 164 (noting that, although the Seventh Circuit premised Cherifs Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 liability on his purported breach of a duty owed to his former employer, Cherifs scheme
to gain access to the confidential information involved acts of affirmative deception, acts that
could, potentially, establish the requisite element of deception under Section 10(b)).
161 See LANGEvOORT, supra note 18, at 6-40 (suggesting that the misappropriation theory
may apply to "deceptive acts or practices generally in connection with a defendant's own
trading, fiduciary or not"); see also Daniel A. McLaughlin, The "In Connection With"
Requirement of Rule 10b-5 as an Expectation Standard,26 SEc. REG. L.J. 3, 68-69 (1998)
(same).
16 2 See LANGEVOORT, supranote 18, at 6-40 to 6-41.
163 Id.
164 As

Professor Langevoort points out, a broader version of the misappropriation theory

may have provided a reasoned basis for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Cherif discussed at
supranote 160, because the former bank employee was able to gain access to the bank only by
lying to bank employees about his status. See id. at 6-19 n.4; see also McLaughlin, supra note
161, at 68-69 (arguing that "what Cherif did-forgery and unauthorized use of an electronic
device-seems to constitute a fairly common type of fraud, and would have been equally
fraudulent if Cherifhad never worked for the bank but managed to get access to the premises
through a clearly forged letter").
165
See infra text accompanying notes 239-45 (questioning whether O'Hagan's
misappropriation theory establishes Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability only when the
deception of the source "coincides" with a securities transaction).
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O'Hagan Court, does not provide a theory of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
liability that can be utilized in cases involving securities trading based on
information that was misappropriated by a non-fiduciary thief. This is troubling
because O'Hagan expressed repeated and sincere concerns for trading that
negatively affects the federal securities markets.1 66 Yet, as will be discussed
more fullybelow, 167 the impact on the market would seem to be precisely the
same regardless of whether trading on misappropriated information is carried out
by a current employee and fiduciary (like O'Hagan) or by a person who lacks
any current or former relationship to the source of the confidential information
(like the computer hacker or the "mere" thief).
2. The Brazen Fiduciary
O'Hagan'sversion of the misappropriation theory fails to provide a theory
that would extend Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability to cases involving
another category of individuals trading on stolen information: fiduciaries who
disclose to their principals the fact that they intend to use confidential
information in a subsequent securities transaction. Before the Court's decision in
O'Hagan,it was well recognized that fiduciaries or other third parties could trade
with impunity under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 if the source of the
information had authorized the use of its confidential business information in
personal securities trading. 168 O'Hagan now widens this existing liability
loophole to cover fiduciaries who, though they lack authorization, nonetheless
disclose their trading intent to the source of the information. 169 As the O'Hagan
166

See infra text accompanying notes 237-45.
167 See infratext accompanying notes 251-55.
168 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2225 n.5 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg., supranote 157, at *9

(Government attorney conceding that had the Wall Street Journalin Carpenterauthorized the
reporter to trade, there would have been no Section 10(b) violation because "there would have
been no deception of the Wall StreetJournal')).As the O'HaganCourt recognized, one of the

SEC's principal reasons for promulgating Rule 14e-3 was to prevent "warehousing," which the
SEC describes as "the practice by which bidders leak advance information of a tender offer to
allies and encourage them to purchase the target company's stock before the bid is announced."
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2217 n.17 (citing Reply Brief for the United States at 17). The Court
further recognized that the SEC cannot use Rule lOb-5 to prosecute warehousing because
"trading authorized by a principal breaches no fiduciary duty." Id.
169 See the recent and aptly titled article by Painter et al., supra note 142, which calls
attention to O'Hagan'sirony that "[o]nce the intent to trade is disclosed to the principal, the
trading is legal under Section 10(b), no matter how strenuously the principal objects." Id. at
180; see also Joseph McLaughlin, 'O'Hagan': Some Answers, More Questions,N.Y. L.J. July
1, 1997, at I (characterizing O'Hagan's "full disclosure to the source exception" as a "foul
ball" in an otherwise "home run" decision and stating that "the damage [it] causes will not be
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Court explained, "if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on
the nonpublic information, there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no § 10(b)
violation." 170 Let us term the individual who discloses to the source and then
trades the "brazen fiduciary."
How likely is it that securities ading by brazen fiduciaries will occur? In the
employment context, one can expect instances of ading by brazen fiduciaries to
be few and far between. Although O'Hagan's misappropriation theory may
foreclose liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, brazen fiduciaries who
use their employer's confidential information for personal securities trading
purposes would no doubt get their comeuppance through a termination notice
that likely would be followed by the initiation of a civil lawsuit by the employer
sounding in breach of fiduciary duty. 17 1 This is probably enough to deter most
employees from taking advantage of O'Hagan's "full disclosure" liability
loophole.
But the same conclusion probably cannot be drawn with respect to fiduciarylike relationships outside the employment context. Indeed, family members who
use confidences placed in them by other family members, or professionals who
use confidences placed in them by their clients, may well have less to lose by
informing the source about their intent to trade securities based on those
confidences. And O'Hagan makes clear that these brazen fiduciaries have very
much to gain: full disclosure to family members or clients would seem to
foreclose a finding of deception, even if they were to voice an objection to the
trading. 17 2 Thus, had the son in United States v. Reed1 73 told his father about his
personal securities trading or, for that matter, had the psychiatrist in United
States v. Willis17 4 informed his patient about his personal trading plans, they
presumably would have been free to purchase or sell securities based on that
information without any risk of liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Yet
once again, as with trading on misappropriated information obtained by a
computer hacker or a "mere" thief, the impact on the securities markets would
known for some time").
170 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209.

171 See id. at 2211 n.9 (noting that "once a disloyal agent discloses [to the source] his
imminent breach of duty, his principal may seek appropriate equitable relief under state law").
172
Seeid at 2209.
173 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.) (applying misappropriation theory against son who

allegedly traded on the basis of material, nonpublic information obtained in breach of a duty
owed to father, a corporate director), rev'd on othergrounds,773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
174 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying misappropriation theory against a
psychiatrist who allegedly traded on the basis of material, nonpublic information concerning a
corporate executive's activities, information that was learned in the course of treating the wife
of the corporate executive).
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seem to be the same regardless of whether the securities trading is carried out by
175
a brazen fiduciary or a deceitful one.
Moreover, even in the absence of a fiduciary's disclosure of his trading
intent to the source of confidential information, O'Hagan'sliability loophole for
brazen fiduciaries may have an unintended consequence in future
misappropriation cases. Indeed, the opinion may encourage defendants to defend
against Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 liability on the ground that the source of
the information knew about the intended use of the misappropriated information
and therefore was not deceived by such use. 176 This possibility is again less
troubling in the context of employment relationships because few employers
would support an employee's asserted defense that the employer was aware of
the use of its confidential, nonpublic information. 177 However, the father whose
son is charged under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 with trading on
misappropriated information, or the patient who does not wish to see her doctor
in jail or subject to a civil penalty for such a violation, may well be reluctant to
cooperate with the government in refuting the defendant's allegations that they
knew about the defendant's personal securities trading. 178 Thus, after O'Hagan,
175

See infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text. O'Hagan's speculation that a

principal may seek appropriate equitable relief under state law against a brazen fiduciary, see
supranote 171, even if realistic in the employment context, would be fanciful in the context of
family or professional relationships. Can fathers be expected to file injunctive actions against
sons, or patients to file injunctive actions against doctors, to ensure that their fiduciary's
imminent securities trading is not carried out?
176 See Christopher C. Faille, Securities FraudProsecution: Drifting Into Dangerous
Waters, 44 FED. LAW., Nov.--Dec. 1997, at 24, 30 (stating that after O'Hagan, "[i]t is easy to
imagine a series of cases, in each of which a trader, alleged to have misappropriated
information, claims that the source of his information did know that he intended to use it to
trade [securities] .... [Courts must now] struggle to create standards for how much one has to
tell one's client or principal to immunize one's self from prosecution.").
17 7
To be sure, company officials are also unlikely to cooperate with a brazen fiduciary's
defense because doing so may jeopardize their own innocence, by triggering "controlling
person" liability under Section 21A(a)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(3) (1994).
Section 21A authorizes the SEC to seek civil monetary penalties against any person who,
directly or indirectly, controlled a person who has violated the Exchange Act by trading
securities while in possession of material, nonpublic information if that controlling person
"knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that such controlled person was likely to engage in the
act or acts constituting the violation and failed to take appropriate steps to prevent such act or
acts before they occurred." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(a).
178 In connection with the Rule 14e-3 issue presented in O'Hagan,the Court specifically
acknowledged the "difficulties in proving breach of duty in 'misappropriation' cases [brought
under Rule 10b-5]." O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2218 n.20. The Court hypothesized that a lawyerfather who told a child about an upcoming tender offer might "gratuitously protect" his son or
daughter-a possibility that,in the Court's view, makes Rule 14e-3 an essential regulatory tool

1998]

A POSTO'HAGAN SUGGESTION

1259

the government may face higher hurdles in proving deception in
misappropriation cases premised on the fraud that is perpetrated on the source of
the information.
3. Tipper/Tippee LiabilityAfter O'Hagan
Because O'Hagan acted alone in his scheme to defraud Dorsey & Whitney
and Grand Met, the Court was not asked for, nor did it render, an opinion as to
whether the "fraud on the source" theory applies when securities transactions are
based on a "tip" grounded in misappropriated information. Although lower
courts routinely have used a "fraud on the source" misappropriation theory to
impose Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability in tipper/tippee cases, 179 a postO'Haganquestion is sure to be whether such cases fall within the reasoning that
was used by the Court to uphold O'Hagan's convictions.
Traditionally, the liability imposed in tipper/tippee misappropriation cases
stems from the theory noted by the Court in Chiarella and Dirks as to why a
corporate insider's tippee incurs liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5:
under the classical theory, the tippee's obligation to abstain from trading or to
disclose the material, nonpublic information to the shareholders arises from his
role as a co-participant in the tipper's breach of a fiduciary duty. 180 Similarly,
under the misappropriation theory, a tippee's liability is premised on the fact that
the misappropriator (i.e., the tipper) breaches a fiduciary duty to the source of the
information and that, as a co-participant in that breach, the tippee inherits the
misappropriator's disclosure duties to the source of the information. 18 1 In other
words, in "fraud on the source" cases, just like in classical insider trading cases,
the tippee's Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability for nondisclosure is
derivative. A misappropriator's tippee therefore can be considered a cofor preventing fraud in tender offers because liability under Rule 14e-3 does not depend on the

government's ability to prove the breach of a fiduciary duty. See id.
179 See, e.g., United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1996) (director of acquiring
company tipped friend vho purchased stock in target), cert. denied sub nom. United States v.
Cusimano, 117 S. Ct. 2509 (1997); Carpenter v. United States, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986),
afjfd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (Wall Street Journalreporter tipped
friends as to the contents of upcoming financial columns); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (investment bank employees illegally
tipped third parties of upcoming acquisitions); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (staff employee of law firm tipped friends and relatives of upcoming transactions).

180 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659-64 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.

222, 230 n.12 (1980); see also supra notes 9, 43-48 and accompanying text (discussing
tipper/tippee liability under the classical theory of insider trading).
181 See Mylett, 97 F.3d at 667-68; Carpenter,791 F.2d at 1032; Newman, 664 F.2d at 16;
Musella, 578 F. Supp. at 434-37.
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participant in the misappropriator's deceptive scheme to "feign[ ] fidelity to the
source of the information 1 82 and to "pretend[] loyalty to the [source] while
secretly converting the [source's] information for personal gain."'183 Even after
O'Hagan, this analysis would seem to satisfy Section 10(b)'s "deception"
184
requirement in tipper/tippee cases under the misappropriation theory.
But a similar conclusion cannot as easily be reached regarding Section
10(b)'s requirement that the fraud and deception occur "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of a security. According to O'Hagan:"This element is satisfied
because the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the
confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses
the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and the
breach of duty thus coincide." 185 In other words, O'Hagan's purchases of
Pillsbury can be said to have "coincided" with his breach of duty to the source
because, until he traded those securities, he did nothing to deprive the law firm
and the client of their "exclusive use of that information." 186 Thus, as recent
commentators have stated succinctly, O'Hagan's misappropriation was
"connected to the securities trade because it [was] the act of trading
187
securities."
O'Hagan'srather tight construction of the "in connection with" requirement
may well have been necessary to demonstrate the requisite nexus between the
fraud on the source and the securities transaction, a nexus that is a precondition
to liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Unfortunately, this exacting
nexus fails to embrace most cases involving securities trading on a
misappropriated tip. Unlike when the misappropriator is acting alone, in most
tipper/tippee insider trading cases, the misappropriator's undisclosed breach of
182 O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2209.
183
Id.at 2208.
184But see Weiss, supra note 142, at 437 (anticipating potential difficulties in

misappropriation cases involving tippee trading because, to satisfy Section 10(b)'s deception
element, "[t]he government would need to prove that the tippee knew or should have known
that [the tipper] acted without the consent of his principal or did not inform his principal of his
intent to tip"). Professor Weiss contends that "[sluch evidence would seem to be required if the
tipper's only deceptive act was his failure to disclose his intent to tip." Id. at 439 n.305.
185 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209.
186
Id. at 2207. The Court in O'Hagan noted that the Government relied on a
conversation between O'Hagan and the Dorsey & Whitney partner heading the law firm's

Grand Met representation to establish that O'Hagan traded on the basis of nonpublic
information that had been misappropriated. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205 n.l. Certainly
there was nothing improper, let alone unlawful, about one partner questioning another about
law firm business. O'Hagan engaged in unlawful misappropriation only when he used that
confidential information for his personal benefit. See id.at 2209.
187
Painter et al., supranote 142, at 185 (emphasis added).
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fiduciary duty will not "coincide" with a securities transaction. Instead, the
undisclosed breach of duty will occur before any securities transaction takes
place-at the very moment when confidential information is conveyed to a
tippee by the fiduciary for a personal benefit. Accordingly, it is the
misappropriator's tip that deprives the source of its "exclusive use of the
information."1 88 Moreover, because the tippee is a co-participant in the tipper's
undisclosed misappropriation, the tippee's deception can also be said to
"coincide" with the tip, rather than with the securities transaction presumably
planned at a later date. Under this analysis, trading on "tipped" information
begins to look a lot like securities trading with stolen money, an activity which
the Government (and apparently the Court) readily concedes is beyond the scope
of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.18 9 In both cases, "the fraud [on the source]
would be complete as soon as the [stolen product] was obtained."1 90
The Court's focus on the fact that O'Hagan's breach of duty "coincided"

with his securities transactions calls into question convictions obtained in a
number of high profile tipper/tippee cases that were premised on the "fraud on

188 Justice Thomas made this important point in his dissent. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at

2223 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting, that if
O'Hagan had tipped someone else who used the information to trade, "the misappropriation
would have been complete before the trade and there should be no § 10(b) liability").
189
See id. at 2209.
190 Id; see also id. at 2224 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasizing that "[tihe mere act of passing the information along [to a
tippee] would have violated O'Hagan's fiduciary duty and, if undisclosed, would be an
'embezzlement' of the confidential information, regardless of whether the tippee later traded on
the information"). Here, a useful analogy can be drawn from prosecutions for corporate bribery
under the federal mail fraud or wire fraud statutes codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1994).
See, e.g., United States v. Kent, 608 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1979); Abbott v. United States, 239
F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass.
1942). As the Court in Proctor& Gamble made clear:
The normal relationship of employer and employee implies that the employee will be
loyal and honest in all his actions with or on behalf of his employer, and that he will not
wrongfully divulge to others the confidential information, trade secrets, etc., belonging to
his employer. When one tampers with that relationship for the purpose of causing the
employer to breach his duty he in effect is defrauding the employer of a lawful right The
actualdeception that ispracticedis in the continued representationof the employee to the
employer that he is honest and loyal to the employer's interests.

lId at 678 (emphasis added and citations omitted). The fact that the purpose of the bribery is to
obtain information to facilitate risk-free trading should not change the analysis that the
deception of the source occurs before (perhaps long before) a securities transaction ever takes
place.
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the source" misappropriation theory. 19 1 The facts of United States v. Libera,192
for instance, provide useful insight into potential problems that the Government
may encounter with respect to satisfying the "in connection with" element of
post-O'Hagantipper/tippee cases brought under the misappropriation theory.
In Libera, the Government demonstrated at trial that the tippee-defendants
had traded securities based on information contained in advance copies of
Business Week's "Inside Wall Street" column, which routinely listed "hot
stocks."1 93 Key to their successful conviction under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb5 was the fact that defendants obtained this information by paying two
employees of R.R. Donnelley & Sons, the printers for Business Week, $20 (later
$30) for pre-publication copies of the magazine. 194 The employees and their
tippees, who had traded based on information in the columns, were found to have
been co-participants in the fraud and deception that was perpetrated on the
195
information's source.
O'Hagan's analysis of Section 10(b)'s "in connection with" element now
prompts us to ask when, exactly, did this fraud on the source occur? A careful
review of Libera's facts would indicate that the employees breached their
fiduciary duty to R.R. Donnelley and Business Week at the '¢Monkey Farm
Caf6," the coffee shop where the employees accepted money in return for the
magazine. 196 The employees' deception commenced when, upon returning to
work at the printers, these fiduciaries "feigned fidelity" to their employer even
191 See cases cited in supra note 179. O'Hagan's analysis of Section 10(b)'s "in
connection with" element in "fraud on the source" misappropriation cases should not affect the
Court's prior holdings in ChiarellaandDirks that an insider's tippee violates Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 when the tippee trades while in possession of material, nonpublic information that
he knows was obtained from the insider in a manner that breached the insider's fiduciary duty
to the shareholders of the corporation. See supranotes 9, 43-48 and accompanying text. Under
both the classical theory and the misappropriation theory, the tippee inherits the tipper's duty to
abstain or disclose. See id. However, under the classical theory, the tippee's deception-his
fraudulent failure to disclose--is necessarily "in connection with" a securities transaction
because the disclosure duty is owed to the parties with whom the tippee is trading. See id. In
other words, the deception that violates Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 under the classical theory
does not "coincide" with the tip. Instead, it occurs only when the tippee fails to abstain and
trades securities in violation of his (derivative) fiduciary duty to disclose material facts to the
shareholders. The source of the information (the company and its shareholders) are no doubt
deceived by the tippee at an earlier point in time, but that deception is the gravamen of a
complaint based on the misappropriation theory-not on the classical theory.
192 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noin. Sablone v. United States, 510 U.S. 976
(1993).
193 See id. at 598-99.
194
See id. at 599.
195
See id. at 597-99.
196
See id. at 598.
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though they had stolen and sold their employer's property for personal profit. 197
And we know that the fraud and deception "coincided" with the
misappropriation, rather than with any securities transactions, because, had the
purchasers of the magazine gotten cold feet and abandoned their plan to acquire
the "hot stocks" listed in the column, R.R. Donnelley and Business Week could
still claim to have been "duped" and defrauded by their disloyal employees as
198
well as by the individuals who had bought the magazine's property.
Accordingly, because the breach of duty was "consummated" as soon as the
tipped information was conveyed, the fraud on the source and the subsequent

securities transaction arguably lack the requisite "in connection with" nexus for
liability to be imposed under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.1 99
In future tipper/tippee liability cases brought under the "fraud on the source"

misappropriation theory, some lower courts may well de-emphasize O'Hagan's
particular construction of Section 10(b)'s "in connection with" element and
stress instead the Court's observation that, unlike stolen money, misappropriated
information "ordinarily" has value only in securities trading.2 00 This would
197

See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 (emphasizing that "the deception essential to the

misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of the information"), 2208
(contending that "[a] fiduciary who pretends loyalty to the principal while secretly converting
the principal's information for personal gain 'dupes' or defrauds the principal").
198
See supra note 190 (discussing prohibitions for corporate bribery under federal mail
and wire fraud statutes).
199 The specific question appealed to the Second Circuit in Libera involved whether the
Government had to prove that the defendants' tippers specifically knew that their breach of
duty to Donnelley and Business Week would lead to securities trading on that misappropriated
information. See Libera, 989 F.2d at 597. The court concluded that this element was not
required by its prior cases and declined to add it to this case. Instead, it maintained that the
misappropriation theory requires only two elements "(i) a breach by the tipper of a duty owed
to the owner of nonpublic information, and (ii) the tippee's knowledge that the tipper had
breached the duty." Id. at 600. This aspect of Libera's holding certainly must be reevaluated in
light of O'Hagan.If the tippers did not have any knowledge that the information conveyed
would be used by the tippees for securities trading purposes, it is difficult to see how the
tippers' breach of duty (in which the tippees are co-participants) can satisfy even the broadest
interpretation of Section 10(b)'s "in connection with" nexus. And without a breach of duty on
the part of the tipper "in connection with" a securities transaction, there is simply no basis for
imposing Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability on either the tippers or the tippees.
200
See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210; see also supra note 125 (discussing the majority's
substitution of the word "ordinarily" for the Government's exaggerated word "only"). In this
regard, even the Court's substituted term "ordinarily" may be considered an exaggeration.
Government officials routinely prosecute, and obtain convictions, in cases where defendants
have used misappropriated nonpublic information to reap substantial profits in non-securities
related ventures, such as cases involving purchases of real estate or cases involving commercial
trade secrets. See supra note 156 (discussing federal prohibitions against the theft of trade
secrets) and infra note 321 (discussing cases involving convictions under federal statutes for
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allow the Government to argue that, in tipper/tippee cases, the deceptive scheme
is not complete until the tippee's securities transaction takes place.20 1 Focusing
on the "ordinary" use of misappropriated information would also allow a court to
view tipping as a co-venture or conspiracy between the fiduciary and the tippee,
such that the tip and the subsequent trading could be considered a single scheme
that occurred "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities. But many
courts, particularly those judges who agree with the arguments posited by
O'Hagan's dissenting Justices, may well follow O'Hagan'slead by narrowly
construing Section 10(b)'s "in connection with" language as a requirement that
the securities transactions themselves must constitute the act of
misappropriation. 20 2 Accordingly, O'Hagan's version of the misappropriation
theory may create a substantial roadblock in future "fraud on the source" cases
where the misappropriator stands as the tipper rather than the trader.
B. The RationaleBehind the "Fraudon the Source" Theory: And the
Search Continues...
The foregoing analysis focused on O'Hagan'sweakness from a doctrinal
perspective and criticized the decision based on the likelihood that it will
frustrate the prosecution of insider trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 in
cases that are more "sophisticated" than the particular scheme before the Court in
O'Hagan. But the fact that many instances of trading on misappropriated
information may escape liability under O'Hagan's version of the
misappropriation theory also evidences an analytical weakness with the theory
itself By premising the Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violation entirely on
whether the source of the information was deceived and defrauded by a
misappropriator's trading, the "fraud on the source" theory necessarily regards a
misappropriator's conduct vis-it-vis the securities marketplace as legally
irrelevant to the textual question of whether a "deceptive device" was used "in
connection with" a securities transaction.
As the following subsections will demonstrate, the ultimate irony in
mail and wire fraud where defendants used misappropriated information to acquire real estate
at a bargain price).
201 Yet even under an argument that centers around the "ordinary" value of
misappropriated information, it is generally difficult to see how the source of the information
can be considered any more deceived or defrauded by a tippee's trading on information that
was misappropriated by the source's fiduciary. As noted above, see supra text accompanying
notes 188-99, the source loses its exclusive property rights to the information at the time of the
tip and, except in those cases where the source has a financial interest in the underlying
securities, see infra note 283, the source presumably would be no worse off because of the
tippee's subsequent trading.
202
See supranote 187 and accompanying text.
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O'Hagan is that while the decision regards a misappropriator's effect on the
securities marketplace as irrelevant to whether the source was defrauded within
the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the misappropriator's effect on the
securities marketplace is precisely what the Court uses as its policy justification
for sustaining liability under these provisions. The result is a misappropriation
theory that is far too narrow to achieve the investor protection and market
integrity goals that it purports to serve, while at the same time far too broad to fit
within prior Supreme Court precedents establishing when unfairness to investors
can be proscribed under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Thus, in addition to its
doctrinal shortcomings, O'Hagan can be criticized because the "fraud on the
source" misappropriation theory continues to stand, in the words of one
20 3
commentator, as "a theory in search of a rationalization.
1. Pre-O'HaganRationalesfor the MisappropriationTheory
Since its first endorsement by the Second Circuit in the 1981 case of United
States v. Newman,204 the "fraud on the source" version of the misappropriation
theory has generally been supported by one of two principal rationales:
protecting the source's property rights to confidential information, or ensuring
that securities markets operate-and are perceived by investors to be operatingfairly and honestly.
a. The PropertyRights Rationale
The first court to impose liability under the misappropriation theory
apparently did so to protect the source's property rights to confidential
information.2 0 5 Indeed, in Newman, the Second Circuit focused on the injuries
suffered by the investment banks and their clients whose confidential
information was leaked by the investment banks' employees to third parties who
subsequently traded securities based on that information. 20 6 In particular, the
203 BLOOMENTHAL,supranote 151, at 1183.
204 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,464 U.S. 863 (1983).
205
See Newman, 664 F.2d at 18 (stating that "investor protection was not the sole
purpose" of the federal securities laws); see also Aldave, A General Theory, supra note 18, at
120 (contending that "the Newman Court introduced an unnecessary complication when it
argued that the federal securities acts have a broader purpose than the protection of investors");
Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HoFsRA L. REV. 9, 27 n.96 (1984) (noting that "[t]he holding in Newman
relies squarely on a property theory to find liability under [Rule] IOb-5").
206 See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17-18 (discussed at supranotes 60-62 and accompanying
text); see also Aldave, A General Theory, supra note 18, at 119-20 (contending that "[t]he
Newman Court seemed to assume that it needed to identify some damage to the parties that
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court noted that the defendants had "sull[ied] the reputations of [the investment
banks] as safe repositories of client confidences"2 0 7 and that the defendants "also
wronged [the investment banks'] clients, whose takeover plans were keyed to
target company stock prices fixed by market forces, not artificially inflated
through purchases by purloiners of confidential information." 2 08 The court
further emphasized that an employee's deceitful misappropriation of confidential
20 9
business information is a crime punishable under a variety of federal statutes,
and that it is difficult "to believe that Congress intended to establish a less
rigorous code of conduct under the Securities Acts." 2 10 Notably absent from the
court's opinion was any discussion about the harms experienced by the investors
who had traded with the misappropriators' tippees, or the tippee-trading's effect
on the securities marketplace as a whole.
Although Newman may only have intimated a property-rights based
rationale for the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability, a number of
securities law scholars, as well as a few courts, have articulated that rationale
explicitly. 2 11 Indeed, shortly after Newman, Professor (now Judge) Frank

Easterbrook 2 12 and Professor Jonathan Macey 2 13 each expressed the view that
protecting a business's property rights in secret information is the principal
justification for reading Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to prohibit the use of
misappropriated information in securities transactions. 2 14 Judge Easterbrook's
were deceived-the investment bankers and the acquiring companies that were their clientsin order to establish the elements of fraud").
20 7
Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
208 Id. at 17-18.
20 9
See id.at 18 (citing cases involving prosecutions under the federal mail fraud and wire
fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952).
2 10
Newman, 664 F.2d at 18.
211 See authorities cited in infra notes 212-19; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating
State Law FiduciaryDuties into the FederalInsider TradingProhibition,52 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1189 (1995); Carlton & Fischel, supranote 27, at 861; Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and
Economies of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 718-19 (1980); see also
Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, PropertyRights in Information, and SecuritiesRegulation, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 815, 844 (1997) (stating that "[u]nder the misappropriation theory, insider
trading is harmful and illegal not because the insider is at an informational advantage, but
because the insider violated someone else's property right in the information").
2 12
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading,Secret Agents, EvidentiaryPrivileges,and
the ProductionofInformation, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309.
2 13

See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY

(1991); Macey, supranote 205.
2 14
See MACEY, supranote 213, at 7-12; Easterbrook, supra note 212, at 330-39; Macey,
supra note 205, at 39-56. Professor Macey and Judge Easterbrook have been particularly
critical of any justification for the regulation of insider trading grounded in concepts of
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scholarship particularly informed the thinking of Second Circuit Judge Ralph
Winter, who summarized this "property rights" theory in his partial dissent in
2 15
UnitedStates v. Chestnan:
Information is perhaps the most precious commodity in commercial markets. It
is expensive to produce, and, because it involves facts and ideas that can easily
be photocopied or carried in one's head, there is a ubiquitous risk that those who
pay to produce information will see others reap the profit from it. Where the
profit from an activity is likely to be diverted, investment in that activity will
decline. If the law fails to protect property rights in commercial information,
2 16
therefore, less will be invested in generating such information.
Thus, by proscribing securities transactions that are "in connection with" the
fraudulent theft of intangible property, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are said to
operate as a way to further the social good of producing information. 2 17 Judge
Winter's rationale in Chestnan subsequently was endorsed by a unanimous
panel of the Second Circuit in United States v. Libera,2 18 where the court
expressly stated that "the purpose of the misappropriation theory ... is to protect
2 19
property rights in information."
b. Investor Protection/MarketIntegrity Rationales
Many securities law scholars have sharply criticized the property-rights
rationale for the misappropriation theory, reasoning that the goal of protecting
property rights in secret information lies outside the zones of interest of the
federal securities laws. 220 Traditional goals of federal securities regulation, it is
"fairness" or "market integrity." See

MACEY, supra note 213, at 67 (contending that "[t]he
regulation of insider trading cannot be justified on the grounds that it promotes the goals of
efficiency, fairness, or market integrity" and that attempts to do so "simply reflect efforts by a
farrago of special interest groups to obtain private advantage through the regulatory and
legislative process"); Easterbrook, supra note 212, at 323-30 (contending that "fairness
arguments get us nowhere").
215 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
2 16
Id. at 576-77 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing

Easterbrook, supranote 212, at 313).
2 17
See id.; see also Easterbrook, supra note 212, at 313 (stating that "[a] rule allowing
information to be used freely, once in existence... would reduce the ability of those who
create information to appropriate the benefits of their efforts; people would create less
information and take costly precautions to keep what they do create").
218 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Sablone v. United States, 510 U.S. 976
(1993).
219/d.at 600.
220 See Aldave, Carpenter and Its Aftermath, supra note 18, at 378 (stating that "[t]he
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argued, relate to investor protection and market integrity, and other statutory
regimes or common law doctrines, including state protections for trade secrets,
exist to encourage individual and corporate investments of time and money in
the production of intangible property.2 21 In part for these reasons, the investor
protection and market integrity rationales traditionally invoked by the SEC to
justify the misappropriation theory 222 have garnered significant scholarly
purpose of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws is to protect the interests of
investors, not the property rights of employers or the reputations of newspapers" and noting
that "if, in fact, the [Carpenter] defendants injured no one but the Journal,they should not
have been convicted of violating [R]ule 10b-5"); Fisch, supranote 18, at 205 (noting that "[i]t
is hard to see how any breach of a private duty of nondisclosure can implicate the objectives of
the securities laws, which are concerned with duties to the market"); Roberta S. Karmel, The
RelationshipBetween MandatoryDisclosureand ProhibitionsAgainst Insider Trading: Why a
PropertyRights Theory of Inside Information is Untenable, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 149, 173-94
(1993) (reviewing BERNHARD BERGMANS, INSIDE INFORMATION AND SECURITIES TRADING: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LiABILrTY IN THE USA AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(1991); JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY (1991);
INSIDER TRADING: THE LAWS OF EUROPE, THE UNTED STATES AND JAPAN (Emmanuel
Gaillard ed., 1992)). Professor Karmel argues that:
[A] theory that attempts to protect inside information as intellectual
property.. is... wide of the mark. The purpose of the securities laws is to protect
investors by mandating the continuous disclosure of information by public
companies ....
[Thus] in order to preserve the fairness, honesty and integrity of the
public securities markets, any failure to disclose material information must be
accompanied by an absence of trading informed by such information.
Karmel, supra,at 173.
221 See Langevoort, supranote 16, at 878; Bainbridge, supra note 211, at 1257. Although
he ultimately concludes that "the insider trading prohibition can be justified only as a
mechanism for protecting property rights in information," id. at 1269, Professor Bainbridge
acknowledges that:
If one accepts protection of property rights as the rationale for regulating insider trading, it
becomes quite difficult to discern any compelling federal interest in doing so. The
property rights rationale makes it obvious that the federal insider trading prohibition has
nothing to do with disclosure or fraud. Instead, like the trade secrets rules, the insider
trading prohibition is mainly concerned with preventing employees and other fiduciaries
from using information belonging to the corporation for personal gain. As such, the
prohibition is unrelated to the traditional purposes of the securities laws.
Id. at 1257.
222
See Brief for the United States at 11, Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987),
available in LEXIS (emphasizing that "the prohibition of petitioners' trading on
misappropriated information also serves ... the Exchange Act's central purpose of 'insur[ing]
the maintenance of fair and honest markets... "' (quoting Section 2 of the Exchange Act, 15
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support. Indeed, commentators have advanced a variety of normative arguments
as to why defrauding the source of information "in connection with" a securities
22 3
transaction should be prohibited under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
including arguments contending that securities transactions based on
misappropriated information: cause damage to investors, 2 24 are fundamentally
unfair,22 5 contribute to the inefficient pricing of securities,2 26 undermine the
federal securities laws' system of mandatory disclosure,2 27 and compromise

U.S.C. §78(b))). The SEC's traditional concern for "fair and honest markets" was recently
reinforced by the SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt in a speech to an audience largely composed of
securities lawyers. See Arthur Levitt, A Question ofIntegrity: PromotingInvestor Confidence
By FightingInsider Trading, 64 VrrAL SPEECHEs, Apr. 1, 1998, at 354-57. Chairman Levitt
concluded his remarks with the following statements:
Investor protection is our legal mandate. Investor protection is our moral responsibility.
Investor protection is my top personal priority. Let's keep up the fight for fairness in our
society. Let's continue defending the cause of honesty in our marketplace. Let's redouble
our efforts to eradicate the crime of insider trading. It's simply a question of integrity.
Id. at 357.
223 See generallyNAASA Brief, supranote 16, at 5-9.
224 Professor Barbara Bader Aldave was one of the first securities law scholars to advance
investor protection concerns as specific policy justifications for the "fraud on the source"
version of the misappropriation theory. See Aldave,. A General Theory, supranote 18, at 120
(contending that "one who misappropriates confidential information and uses it in his securities
trading deceives the rightful owner or possessor of the information, but causes economic harm
to other investors .... The victims of the fraud were investors."); Aldave, Carpenter and Its
Aflermath, supra note 18, at 380 (contending that the fraud at issue in Carpenter"damaged
investors--spebific if unidentifiable investors"). Professor Aldave was influenced, in part, by
Professor William Wang's arguments that insider trading directly damages contemporaneous
traders in the marketplace by causing them to sell (or buy) at an improper time or price. See
Wang, supranote 18, at 1230-40.
225
See Brudney, supranote 23, at 346; Kim Lane Scheppele, "It'sJust Not Right": The
EthicsofInsider Trading,56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1993).
226
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Selective DisclosureNow Lawful?, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1997,
at 6 (arguing that "the victims of insider trading are not simply those who traded with the party
possessing inside information, but rather all shareholders, who must trade in less efficient
markets because of the market makers' need to protect themselves" from the possibility that
others trading may possess nonpublic information) (emphasis added). But see Carlton &
Fischel, supra note 27, at 895 (contending that federal securities laws prohibiting insider
trading are inefficient and discussing arguments why such trading may contribute to market
efficiency).
227
See Karmel, supra note 142, at 84 (contending that "prohibitions against trading on
inside information should be justified as necessary to enforce the mandatory disclosure
provisions of the securities laws but should extend no fiurther").
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investor confidence in the securities markets. 228
Investor protection and market integrity rationales for the misappropriation
theory have also been widely accepted by lower courts presented with
prosecutions for insider trading premised on the misappropriation theory. Indeed,
notwithstanding obvious exceptions like Libera and Judge Winter's partial
dissenting opinion in Chestma4,229 courts generally eschew the business
property rationale in favor of policy goals that more clearly fit within the zones
of interest of federal securities regulation.2 30 For example, the Second Circuit in
United States v. Carpenter2 31 and the district court in SEC v. Musella2 32 each

emphasized the "commonsensical view that trading on the basis of improperly
234
obtained information is fundamentally unfair."233 Similarly, in SEC v. Clark,
the district court highlighted the fact that "the integrity of the marketplace is
insured by holding an insider accountable for his misappropriation. ' 235 Yet,
while it clearly avoided any criticism based on "zones of interest," these investor
protection and market integrity rationales for the misappropriation theory had
their own analytical weakness; namely, the parties whose interests were said to
be served by the imposition of liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5
(securities investors) were in most cases completely unrelated to the parties who
were said to have been defrauded by the misappropriator's trading (the sources
2 36
of the information).
See Brudney, supra note 23, at 356 ("If the market is thought to be systematically
populated with... transactors [trading on the basis of misappropriated information] some
investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and others will incur costs to avoid dealing with
such transactors or corruptly to overcome their unerodable informational advantages.");
Seligman, supranote 18, at 1115 (contending that "[t]he primary policy reason for proscribing
trading while in possession of material nonpublic information is to make investors confident
that they can trade securities without being subject to informational disadvantages").
2 29
See supranotes 215-19 and accompanying text.
230
See Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 78, at 144 (noting that "the common theme!' of
misappropriation cases seems to be "that it is unfair to allow people to [trade] securities based
on [misappropriated] information").
231 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
232 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
233 Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1029 (quoting Musella, 578 F. Supp. at 438); see also id. at
1027 (maintaining that "[t]he faimess and integrity of conduct within the securities markets is a
concern of utmost significance for the proper functioning of our securities laws").
234 699 F. Supp. 839 (W.D. Wash. 1988), affd, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
235
Id. at 845; see also id. at 844 (asserting that Rule lOb-5 was "designed primarily 'to
assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among
investors"') (quoting Chiarella,445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
23 6
See Mitchell, supra note 18, at 826 (contending that "[t]he misappropriation theory
was born schizophrenic"). In this regard, the "protection of property rights" rationale for the
228
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2. O'Hagan's Rationale
The Supreme Court's opinion in O'Hagan must have been an unqualified
disappointment to those securities law scholars and judges who may have been
hoping to see the Court shift away from investor protection and market integrity
rationales toward a misappropriation theory grounded in the value of protecting
an individual's or entity's property rights to secret information. Although the
Court reaffirmed its holding in Carpenter that a company's confidential
information "qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive
use," 237 the Court's attention to property rights was drawn only as a means to
establish that O'Hagan's "undisclosed misappropriation of such
information... constitute[d] fraud akin to embezzlement. '238 Once it established
that O'Hagan's personal securities trading defrauded both Dorsey & Whitney
and Grand Met, the Court's recognition of their underlying property rights in the
confidential information all but disappeared from the opinion. To be sure,
O'Hagannever mentioned a policy goal of protecting secret information, and the
production of information was not emphasized as a social good in and of
itself.2 39

Instead of grounding the misappropriation theory in a protection of property
rationale, like most lower courts that had previously endorsed the
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability, the O'Hagan Court
reconciled its holding with the policy goals of protecting the integrity of the
securities markets and reducing the incidence of securities transactions that are
fundamentally unfair to investors. The Court, for example, acknowledged early
in its opinion that "the misappropriation theory is... designed to 'protec[t] the
integrity of the securities markets against abuses by "outsiders" to a corporation
who have access to confidential information that will affect th[e] corporation's
security price when revealed .... ,-240 And after demonstrating that its version of

the misappropriation theory comported with the language of Section 10(b), the
misappropriation theory is analytically superior to the "fair and honest markets" rationale.
Whereas the fairness rationale supports a finding of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability
regardless of whether a misappropriator's securities trading operates as a fraud or deceit on
investors, the "protection of property rights" rationale supports findings of liability only in
those circumstances where the securities trading constitutes a fraud and deceit on the source of
the information. Thus, under the "protection of property" rationale, the party who is defrauded
by a misappropriator's securities trading is also the party whose interests are said to be served
by the prohibitions in the rule.
237 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
23 8
Id.
239 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 18, at 6-28 (recognizing that "the Supreme Court's
decision in O'Hagancontains no significant discussion of harm [to the source]").
240 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
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Court was quick to reaffirm that its theory was "also well-tuned to an animating
purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and thereby
promote investor confidence." 241 The Court also emphasized that "[ain
investor's informational disadvantage vis-a-vis a n-isappropriator with material,
nonpublic information stems from contrivance, not luck..."242 and observed
that "investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where
trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by
2 43
law."
O'Hagan'saffinity toward the investor protection/market integrity rationales
for the misappropriation theory is further evidenced by the Court's description of
the harm caused by O'Hagan's securities trading. According to the Court,
O'Hagan "deceive[d] the source of the information and simultaneously harmfed]
members of the investingpublic."244 Quoting a law review article by Professor
Barbara Bader Aldave, the Court explained that "'a fraud or deceit can be
practiced on one person, with resultant harm to another person or group of
persons.'245 In other words, O'Hagan's fraud on the source of the information
was viewed by the majority as the cause of cognizable injury to other securities
investors.
The majority's perception of the harm caused by trading on misappropriated
information also corresponds closely to certain views expressed by the trial judge
at O'Hagan's sentencing. Ostensibly, O'Hagan was sentenced to prison for
perpetrating a fraud on his law firm and the law firm's client within the meaning
of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. But the record clearly demonstrates that he was
held accountable for the broader injuries that were experienced by the investors
who were selling the Pillsbury securities that he was purchasing. In fact, the trial
judge characterized O'Hagan's fraud "as a typical insider trading case" and
emphasized:
[Certainly] Dorsey and Whitney were identified as the victims, but it is obvious
when you look at where the dollars came from, and the dollars certainly came,
that the victims, from a pecuniary standpoint, were those who thought that they

241 Id. at 2210. This statement was then supported with a quote from an SEC Release that
"trading on misappropriated information 'undermines the integrity of, and investor confidence
in, the securities markets."' Id. (quoting Tender Offer, Exchange Act Release No. 17120, 45
Fed. Reg. 60410 (Sept. 12, 1980)).
242

Id. (citing Brudney, supra note 23, at 356; Aldave, A General Theory, supra note 18,

at 122-23).

243 O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2210.
244
Id. at 2209 (emphasis added).
245
Id. (quoting Aldave, A General Theory, supranote 18, at 120).
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were putting their options into a fair market when you weren't playing fair.

Thus, like the majority in O'Hagan, the trial judge who sentenced O'Hagan
affirmatively sought to demonstrate how his application of the misappropriation
theory related to the important and well-recognized policy goals of protecting
investors and ensuring fair and honest securities markets.
3. Proscribing"Fraudon the Source" to Ensure Fairand Honest
SecuritiesMarkets
Although the policy justifications resonant throughout O'Haganclearly root
the "fraud on the source" version of the misappropriation theory in wellrecognized goals of federal securities regulation, O'Hagan'sinvestor protection
and market integrity rationales for the "fraud on the source" misappropriation
theory are ultimately unsatisfying for two separate reasons. First, as discussed in
detail in the previous section, the "fraud on the source" theory of liability that is
justified by that rationale captures some but not all instances of trading on
misappropriated information.2 47 The "fraud on the source" theory therefore fails
to achieve the very policy goals that the majority purports are served by the
theory-a result that is particularly puzzling because there is nothing in the
248
statutory text that commands it.
The second significant problem presented by the "fair and honest markets"
rationale for O'Hagan'smisappropriation theory concerns the strained view of
causality on which it is predicated. Indeed, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his
dissent, 249 the majority's rationale is highly misleading because it posits that
deceiving the source of the information "in connection with" a securities
transaction causes harm to investors and damages confidence in securities
markets. Yet, those harms are actually caused by the misappropriator's use of the
misappropriated information in securities trading rather than by the
misappropriator's fraudulent nondisclosure to the source. Using the damage done
to investors and the securities markets to justify imposing criminal liability for a
fraud that was actually perpetrated on the information's source subjects
24 6

Transcript of Sentencing at 28, United States v. James Herman O'Hagan (Oct. 27,
1994) (Crim. No. 4-92-219), quoted in Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors and Counsel in
Support of Respondent at 8-9 n.7, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997), available
in 1997 WL 143793 [hereinafter Law Professors-Respondent Brief].
247 See supraPart III.A.
248 See ifra Part IV.A (contending that the statutory text would support a broader
misappropriation theory that would better effectuate the Court's policy goals).
249 See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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O'Haganto the charge that its misappropriation theory is merely a backhanded
way to penalize individuals for reducing investor confidence in the securities
markets and for treating investors unfairly.
a. O'Hagan's Failureto Producea Theory ThatAchieves Its Goals
O'Hagan's"fraud on the source" version of the misappropriation theory is at
once too narrow and too broad. Although the practical implications of its
narrowness was discussed extensively in the previous section,2 50 the restrictive
scope of O'Hagan's reasoning merits brief re-examination here due to the
dissonance between the rationale used in O'Hagan to justify the
misappropriation theory and the type of conduct that is actually prohibited by the
particular version it endorsed. Indeed, the "fraud on the source" version of the
misappropriation theory is woefully under-inclusive in that it fails to prohibit a
whole variety of securities transactions based on misappropriated information
that, under the majority's rationale, would be as unfair to investors and as
harmful to securities markets as the particular trading accomplished by
25 1
O'Hagan.
Ironically, the majority's own words reveal precisely why O'Hagan'sunderinclusiveness is so troubling. After discussing how and why the "fraud on the
source" theory was "well-tuned" to "insure honest markets" and "to promote
investor confidence," the majority concluded that it would make "scant sense" to
make O'IHagan's liability turn on whether his law firm represented in a tender
offer the target or the bidder. Arguments based on "sense," however, are
particularly nettlesome for O'Hagan's majority because the very same
arguments can be made regarding the types of individuals who are foreclosed
from liability under O'Hagan'stheory. The argument would go something like
this:
Considering the inhibiting impact on market participation of trading on
misappropriated information, and the congressional purposes underlying
§ 10(b), it makes scant sense to hold a lawyer like O'Hagan a § 10(b) violator if
he works for a law firm representing [the bidder in] a tender offer,252 [but not if
he hacks into the bidder's computer to learn that confidential information, or if
he breaks into a stranger'soffice to steal such information, or if he discloses to
his own lawfirm and client that he intends to use this confidential informationin
hispersonalsecuritiestrading].

250

See supra Part I.A.
251 See supra Part IIJ.A.
252 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210-11.
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To quote O'Haganagain, "investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital
in a market where [such] trading based on misappropriated nonpublic
25 3
information is unchecked by law."
Had the O'Haganmajority considered and rejected alternative formulations
of the misappropriation theory, it may have been poised to argue that its version
of the theory, while only a partial antidote for the problems it was designed to
alleviate, is nonetheless the only viable theory that fits within the textual
limitations of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. But the O'Hagan majority never
considered (or at least never acknowledged that it considered) whether there
were alternative theories that would exhibit a similarly faithful adherence to the
text of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 while at the same time would extend
liability to situations beyond the scope of a theory of liability premised on fraud
on the source.2 54 In, the absence of such careful considerations, O'Hagan's
"fraud on the source" misappropriation theory itself makes "scant sense" because
it fails to achieve the very policy goals that the Court advances to justify its
endorsement.2 55
b. The PretextualNature of O'Hagan's MisappropriationTheory
The other great irony presented by the majority's reasoning in O'Hagan
concerns the fact that while the misappropriator's interaction with investors in
the marketplace is legally irrelevant to the textual question of whether the source
of the information was deceived and defrauded "in connection with" a securities
transaction, the misappropriator's effect on the securities market is precisely the
normative justification put forth by the majority as to why such conduct should
be subject to prohibition under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.2 56 O'Hagan's
2 53

Id. at 2210. The majority's failure to treat similar cases similarly drew Justice Thomas

to remark: "Even if it is irue that trading on nonpublic information hurts the public, it is true
whether or not there is any deception of the source of the information." Id. at 2225-26
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
254 See infra notes 385-92 and accompanying text (contending that O'Hagan focused
exclusively on the validity of the "fraud on the source" theory advanced by the Government
and therefore left the validity of a broader misappropriation theory for future resolution).
255 Other securities law scholars have also pondered the restrictive scope of O'Hagan's
misappropriation theory. See Painter et al., supra note 142, at 187 ("Given the Court's
insistence that trading covered by the misappropriation theory 'harms members of the investing
public,' it is difficult to understand how the Court can exclude from the theory's reach such
conduct that has an identical effect on the investing public.").
256 Cf Mitchell, supra note 18, at 778-80 (contending that the "fraud on the source"

misappropriation theory "braid[s] together" two competing theoretical approaches to insider
trading: the post-Chiarellaapproach that focuses on the wrongfulness of an individual actor's
conduct in trading securities based on misappropriated information, and the Second Circuit's
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attention to harms done to the securities markets by trading on the basis of
misappropriated information is troubling because it evidences that the "fraud on
the source" version of the misappropriation theory may be functioning largely as
a pretext for enforcing the parity of information approach that was rejected by
the Supreme Court in Chiarella and Dirks.2 57 That is, the "fraud on the source"
version of the theory allows courts to "catch" unfairness to investors within the
proscriptions of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 without the necessity of having to
characterize the unfairness as "fraud."
The majority in O'Hagan appeared to be unconcerned that it was imposing
criminal liability for a fraud perpetrated on the source of the information, not
because of the damage done to that source, but because of the damage done to
individual investors and the securities market as a whole. The Court seemed to
view this substitution of victims as both necessary and appropriate because the
fraud perpetrated on the source purportedly caused injuries that properly fell
within the ambit of federal securities regulation: a misappropriator's securities
trading "deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms
258
members of the investing public."
O'Hagan'sclaim that investors are harmed by a misappropriator's securities
trading certainly has some intuitive appeal. But here it is important to return to
O'Hagan'sdescription of the conduct that is said to run afoul of the prohibitions
of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. To satisfy Santa Fe's clear dictate that
deception-and not merely a breach of fiduciary duty-must be demonstrated to
state a cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, O'Hagan separated
the act of using stolen information in securities trading (the breach of duty) from
the act of failing to inform the principal about the intent to use that stolen
information to trade securities (the deception). 259 Yet once it demonstrated that
Santa Fe's requirement of deception was satisfied in insider trading cases
premised on the misappropriation theory, O'Hagan blurred the deception with
the securities trading for purposes of establishing a harm that fell within the
zones of interests properly protected under the federal securities laws. The
problem is that the specific conduct which is said to violate Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 (nondisclosure to the source about one's intent to trade) is not in any
pre-Chiarellaapproach that focuses far less on the wrong done by the individual, and far more
on the effect that an individual's activities has on the integrity of the securities markets).
257

See Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Forgarty, Bases ofInsider TradingLaw, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 353, 366 (1988) (maintaining that under a misappropriation theory premised on fraud on
the source, "the breach involved may seem trivial in terms of the harm done to the person to
whom the duty is owed, suggesting that the whole theory is merely a pretext for enforcing
equal opportunity in information").
258 O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2209.
259

See id at 2208-09.
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real sense the cause of the injury to individual investors or the securities
marketplace. 2 60 As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, the injury to
investors is caused by the misappropriator's use of material, nonpublic
information in a securities transaction-an injury that occurs whether or not
2 61
deception within the meaning of Section 10(b) is involved.
To illustrate this point,it is useful to separate out the fraud perpetrated on the
source from the injury ultimately experienced by those individuals trading in the
market at the same time as the misappropriator. The only injury proximately
caused by the deception (as defined by OHagan)is an injury to the source of the
information who is "duped" into believing that the fiduciary is loyal and
trustworthy, while the reality evidences otherwise. The injury resulting from the
deception is therefore one of betrayal and the repercussions (financial or
otherwise) that flow from it.2 62 In contrast, individuals and the securities markets
are harmed, not from the misappropriator's deception of the source, but from the
very fact that the misappropriator was using stolen information in his securities
trading. That this injury stems from the trading, and not from the illegal
deception, is evidenced by the fact that brazen fiduciaries injure investors and
securities markets in much the same way as deceitful ones. 263 Imposing liability
260

See Painter et al., supra note 142, at 168 n.57 (stating that "it is difficult to

conceptualize how public investors are any worse off simply because the person with whom

they trade did not disclose her intent to trade to the source of her information").
261 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2226 & n.7 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas correctly identifies the majority's error as one
"[c]onflating causation with correlation." Id. at 2226 n.7. He explains:
That the misappropriator may both deceive the source and "simultaneously" hurt the
public no more shows a causal "connection" between the two than the fact that the sun
both gives some people a tan and "simultaneously" nourishes plants demonstrates that
melanin production in humans causes plants to grow. In this case, the only element
common to the deception and the harm is that both are the result of the same antecedent
cause-namely, using non-public information. But such use, even for securities trading, is
not illegal, and the consequential deception of the source follows an entirely divergent
branch of causation than does the harm to the public.
Id. at n.7 (quoting majority opinion at 2209). See also Painter et al., supra note 142, at 185

n.132 (emphasizing that "[t]he 'harm' to investors that coincides with this deception of a third
party links the misappropriation theory with the overall purpose of the statute, but is still
entirely distinct from the breach that is the linchpin of the violation").
262
See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's
attention in United States v. Newman to reputational and financial injuries caused by the
defendant's trading).
263 See supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text (discussing O'Hagan's liability
loophole for brazen fiduciaries).
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under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for defrauding the source "in connection
with" a securities transaction therefore seems to be a means of carrying out an
end otherwise barred by the dictates of Chiarella and Dirks: defendants are
prosecuted for their "unfair," though not necessarily fraudulent, treatment of
investors and for the damage done to public confidence in the securities
2 64
markets.
Provided the textual requirements of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 have
been satisfied, is there any real harm in substituting victims in insider trading
cases premised on the misappropriation theory?26 5 Several reasons account for
why a "fraud on the source" misappropriation theory that is viewed as a pretext
264

See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2225-26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part

and dissenting in part) (citing Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232-33, for the proposition that "use of
nonpublic information to trade is not itself a violation of § 10(b)" and emphasizing that
"regardless of the overarching purpose of the securities laws, it is not illegal to run afoul of the
'purpose' of a statute, only its letter"); see also Peter J. Henning, Between Chiarella and
Congress: A Guide to the Private Cause of Action for Insider Trading Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 39 KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990) (contending that the "fraud on the source"
misappropriation theory has allowed the government to "effectively bypass the holdings of
Chiarellaand Dirks").
265
The O'Hagan Court's readiness to substitute victims to bolster the "fraud on the
source" misappropriation theory with a convincing policy rationale can be compared %viththe
substitution of victims that has generally occurred when lower courts have analyzed the
element of materiality in misappropriation cases. That is, although courts view the
misappropriator's deception of the source of the information as the fraud prohibited by Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the materiality standard utilized by almost all lower courts in
determining the existence of a fraud has focused on whether investors would have considered
the misappropriated information important in deciding whether to purchase or sell the security.
See, e.g., SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that misappropriated
information met Rule lOb-5's materiality requirement because there was 'a substantial
likelihood.., that a reasonable investor would find [it] significant in deciding whether to buy
or sell a security, and on what terms to buy or sell"' (quoting Rowe v. Maremount Corp., 850
F.2d 1226, 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231
(1988))); see also United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 n.9 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing
TSC Indust., Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). But evaluating materiality in
insider trading cases from the vantage point of a potential investor makes sense only if the
fraud prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 consists of the trader's failure to disclose the
nonpublic information to the persons on the other side of the securities transaction. If the fraud
consists of a trader's failure to disclose personal securities transactions to the source of the
information, it would be far more logical to inquire whether the misappropriated information
'is solely for corporate purposes' and if a reasonable corporate executive would believe
keeping that information confidential was valuable to the corporation." United States v. Elliott,
1989) (quoting Dirksv. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983)). Yet
711 F. Supp. 425, 433 (N.D. 111.
this type of materiality standard, while clearly more fitted to the gravamen of a "fraud on the
source" complaint, has been adopted on only one occasion by a single district court. See Elliott,
711 F. Supp. at 432-33.
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is so troubling.
First, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5's prophylactic effect against insider
trading may be compromised if the misappropriation theory is viewed as merely
a pretext for prosecuting the unfair, though not necessarily illegal, treatment of
investors. In this regard, noted social scientists have theorized that individuals
tend to obey the law primarily out of a sense of obligation and respect for the rule
of law-fear of "getting caught" ranks as a lower motivational force. 26 6 Thus,
individuals who view the law as a pretext for taking action against conduct that is
not explicitly recognized as illegal are probably less likely to take the law
2 67
seriously.
Second, and once again ironically, because the "fraud on the source" version
of the misappropriation theory implicitly acknowledges that the federal securities
laws fail to provide investors with direct protection against outsiders who trade
on misappropriated information, public confidence in the securities markets may
actually be undermined. As the Court itself recognized in O'Hagan,investors'
willingness to invest money in the securities markets is largely a function of their
confidence level in the fairness and integrity of those markets. 26 8 Investors may
take little solace in the fact that they are only indirectly protected from unfair
securities transactions and only in those particular cases when the nonpublic
information was obtained by a fiduciary who owed a duty of trust and confidence
to the source.
Finally, premising liability on a fraud that is perpetrated on the source of
nonpublic information results in substantial reputational injury to the SEC
because the agency appears to be using Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
266 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A PoliticalPerspective, 66 U.

CIN. L. REv. 847, 856 (1998) (stating that "[i]t is difficult to gain sufficient compliance to
enforce the law using only the threat of punishment .... Research suggests that, in democratic
societies such as the United States, the effectiveness of both political and legal authorities is
heavily dependent upon the willing, voluntary cooperation of citizens with laws and legal
decisions."); Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and
RationalChoice:Extending the DeterrenceModel, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 837, 837-39 (1990)
(discussing research suggesting that moral concerns may be more important than legal
sanctions in explaining future intentions regarding crime).
267
See Tyler, supra note 266, at 858-60 (discussing research revealing that the public's
perception of the law's "legitimacy" is important to gaining voluntary compliance); see also
Tom R. Tyler, Compliance With IntellectualPropertyLaws: A PsychologicalPerspective, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 219, 225 (1996-1997) (discussing studies and concluding that "the
way people behave is primarily a reflection of their views about: (1) what is right and wrong
and (2) their obligations to the law and to legal authorities").
268
See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210 (recognizing that while "informational disparity is
inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a
market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law").
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illegitimately-to penalize unfair conduct vis-a-vis investors that is not itself
recognized as unlawful under these provisions. 269 Indeed, the public may view
the defendants in misappropriation cases as being treated unjustly, by a legal
system that imposes penalties for treating investors unfairly, even though such
unfairness does not, in and of itself, violate the law.270 One can see this from the
position taken by the amicus curiae supporting O'Hagan as his case went to the
Supreme Court,27 1 and in the subsequent criticism that has been launched at the
272
majority's decision.
As a securities lawyer, O'Hagan certainly knew that his treatment of
investors ran afoul of the spirit of the Exchange Act. It is unfortunate that judicial
reasoning has muddied the waters on the question of whether his treatment of
investors (as opposed to his treatment of the source of the information) also
violated the letter of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. If the majority in O'Hagan
believed that investors and the securities markets needed protection from those
persons who trade securities on the basis of misappropriated information, then
the majority should have looked beyond the pretextual "fraud on the source"
theory to recognize an alternative theory under which the failure to disclose to
investors could itself be considered fraudulent activity within the meaning of
2 73
Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.

269 Part IV.A infra contends that trading securities based on misappropriated information
not only treats investors unfairly, but also deceives and defrauds investors within the meaning
of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. But until a court explicitly recognizes the validity of this
theory, defendants in "fraud on the source" misappropriation cases will continue to pay a
penalty (literally as well as figuratively) for their unfair, as opposed to unlawful, treatment of
investors.
270 Cf Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider TradingRestrictions, 66 VA. L. REV.
1, 68 (1980) (stating that "[b]ecause the conduct regulated differs from the conduct [Rule lOb5] is intended to cover, the sanctions imposed [for insider trading] are unrelated to the
defendants' behavior and therefore arbitrary"); Karjala, supra note 18, at 1532 (contending that
the imposition of liability "for the defendant's wrongful act is proper only when the injury is of
a type with respect to which defendant's conduct is deemed wrongful . . ").
271 See Law Professors-Respondent Brief, supra note 246, at 8-9 n.7 (emphasizing that
O'Hagan "was found guilty of violating § 10(b) under the misappropriation theory, but was
sentenced to prison by a judge who, once the parameters of the misappropriation theory were
met, viewed [O'Hagan's] actions under a theory much more akin to the parity of information
theory rejected by [the] Court in Chiarella").
272
See Swanson, supra note 142, at 1160 (criticizing 0 'Hagan for "advancing policy
rationales not consistent with the holding"); see also Kathryn Keneally, Outside-In On Insider
Trading,21 CHAMPION 33, 36 (1997) (describing O'Haganas "result-oriented" and criticizing
the majority for "wrongly creat[ing] an entirely new theory of law").
273
See infraPart IV.A.
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C. O'Hagan andPrivateRights ofActionsfor Insider Trading
The O'Hagan opinion has thus far been criticized for its restrictiveness in
framing the scope of the conduct that triggers liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 and for its failure to infuse the misappropriation theory with a
rationale that ties the prohibited conduct to a recognized goal of federal securities
regulation. These two criticisms, however, are linked inextricably to O'Hagan's
third principal shortcoming: a "fraud on the source" version of the
misappropriation theory is very difficult to reconcile with both judicial and
congressional determinations as to which private parties have standing to pursue
actions alleging violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 based on a
defendant's insider trading. Indeed, if O'Haganis correct that the source of the
information is the party who is defrauded by the misappropriator's trading within
the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, then one would expect to see
questions of standing in insider trading cases brought by private plaintiffs
resolved in a manner that is very different from the way that they are resolved
under prevailing law.
1. Standingin Insider Trading Cases
Private plaintiffs generally initiate actions alleging insider trading pursuant

274
to one of two statutory avenues: an implied right of action under Rule lOb-5
or an express right of action under Exchange Act Section 20A.275 In cases

involving insider trading premised on the misappropriation theory, neither of
these provisions typically permit the source of the misappropriated information
to recover damages from the person who used that information in connection
with a securities transaction. 276 Persons who have violated Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 by trading on misappropriated information are, however, liable to
"contemporaneous traders" who sue under the express right of action codified in
277
Section 20A.

274 Although Rule

lOb-5 is silent with respect to whether private parties may institute

legal action against defendants who violate the rule, the Supreme Court has stated that the

existence of an implied private right of action under Rule lOb-5 "is simply beyond
peradventure." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); see also
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971) (first decision by the
Court confirming existence of implied right of action under Rule 1Ob-5).
275
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994) (quoted infra text accompanying note 290).
276
See infra text accompanying notes 278-84, 295.
277
See infra text accompanying notes 289-92.
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a. Implied Rights ofAction Under Rule IOb-5
2 78
The Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. ManorDrugStores
imposes a condition that most sources of information will be unable to satisfy in
implied actions for damages under Rule lOb-5. This case set forth what is now
the rule that standing to sue in private actions under Rule lOb-5 is limited to
"actual purchasers or sellers" of securities.2 79 The corporate plaintiff in Blue
Chip Stamps alleged that it had relied on fraudulent statements by the defendant2 80
issuer in reaching its determination not to purchase the defendant's securities
Although the Court did not deny that the plaintiff may have been defrauded by
the defendant's misstatements, it narrowly construed the statutory language to be
"directed toward injury suffered 'in connection with the purchase or sale' of
securities."2 81 The Court therefore reasoned that without a purchase or sale of
any security, the plaintiff could not assert an injury covered within the scope of

the statute. 282

Blue Chip Stamps therefore precludes most principals from suing their
fiduciaries for violating Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by trading on
misappropriated information. 283 For example, even though the Second Circuit
278 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
2 79
See id. at 730-31 (endorsing the Second Circuit's so-called "Bimbaum rule" that
standing to assert private cause of action for damages under Rule lob-5 was limited to actual
"purchasers and sellers of securities").
2 80
See id.at 726-27.
281 Id. at 733; see also id. at 734 (noting that "[w]hen Congress wished to provide a
remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble in doing so
expressly").
2 82
See id. at 733; see also id. at 755-61 (Powell, J., concurring) (writing separately to
emphasize the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
283 If the source of the misappropriated information were an actual purchaser or seller of
securities, and incurred damages caused by the misappropriator's securities trading, then the
Court's holding in Blue Chip Stamps would not foreclose standing under Rule lob-5. Such a
situation might arise in a merger or tender offer context in which an acquiring corporation had
to increase its offering price for a target's shares because a fiduciary's insider trading caused
the market price of the target's stock to rise. See, e.g., Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Brothers
Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1992) (acquiring corporation had standing to assert
implied action under Rule 10b-5 against its investment banker for insider trading that may have
resulted in the target's acquisition at a higher price); Anheuser-Busch v. Thayer, No. CA3-850794-R (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 1985) (settlement of private action under Rule lOb-5 against
director of acquiring company whose alleged insider trading in the target's securities caused the
target's stock price to rise dramatically, thereby increasing Anheuser-Busch's total cost of
acquiring the target); see also Gregory S. Crespi, The Availability after Carpenter ofPrivate
Rights of Action under Rule 10b-5 Based Upon the Misappropriation of Information
Concerning Acquisitions, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 709, 719-22 (1989) (analyzing cases where
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held in Carpenterthat the Wall Street Journalhad been deceived and defrauded
by the defendant-reporter's (and his tippees') securities trading,284 the Wall
Street Journal would have lacked standing to assert an implied right of action
under Rule lOb-5 against the reporter and his tippees because the Journalwas
not a purchaser or seller of securities.
Blue Chip Stamps's limitation, however, does not foreclose standing in Rule
1Ob-5 actions brought by those investors who traded with the person whose
securities transactions were based on misappropriated information. As "actual
purchasers or sellers" of securities, such investors are able to satisfy the statutory
requirement that their injuries occurred "in connection with" a securities
transaction. Instead, investors seeking to recover damages in implied causes of
action under Rule lOb-5 must defeat the hurdle erected by the Second Circuit in
Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.2 85 Recall that Moss involved a Rule lOb-5 suit by a
private plaintiff who unwittingly sold shares in a soon-to-be tender offer
target.2 86 The plaintiff sought to recover damages against multiple defendants,

including tippees who had purchased the target's securities at a bargain price
based on misappropriated information regarding the upcoming tender offer.
Rejecting the argument advanced by the SEC as amicus curiae,287 the Second
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing under Rule lOb-5 to assert a
claim for damages against the defendants because the misappropriators and their
tippees did not owe the plaintiff any duty to disclose the nonpublic information
on which their securities transactions were based.2 88
b. Express Rights ofAction Under Section 20A
Without congressional intervention, private actions for damages against
persons who violate Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by trading on misappropriated
information may well have been foreclosed by the combined effect of the
Supreme Court's holding in Blue Chip Stamps and the Second Circuit's holding
in Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc. However, in 1988, as part of the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act ('TrSFEA"), 2 89 Congress added Section
fiduciaries traded on information obtained through work for corporate clients); Jeanne M.
Hauch, Note, Insider Tradingby Intermediaries:A ContractRemedy for Acquirers' Increased
Costs of Takeovers, 97 YALE L.J. 115, 120-23 (1987) (same).
284
See supratext accompanying notes 64-67.
285 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
286
See id. at 8-9. Moss is discussed extensively at supranotes 88-99 and accompanying
text.
2 87
See supranote 91.
2 88
SeeMoss, 719 F.2d at 16.
289 Pub. L. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at various sections, 15 U.S.C. § 78
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20A to the Exchange Act providing an express private right of action against
insider traders. Section 20A provides that:
Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulitions
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material,
nonpublic information shall be liable in an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of
securities that is the subject of such violation, has purchased (where such
violation is based on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based
290
on a purchase of securities) securities of the same class.
Thus, if a "contemporaneous trader" 29 1 can show that a defendant's securities
trading constituted a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, then the
contemporaneous trader has a statutory right to recover damages against that
2 92
defendant
ITSFEA's legislative history reflects that Section 20A was enacted to
legislatively overturn the Second Circuit's determination in Moss that third party
(1994)).
15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1994). Section 20A further provides an express right of action
against tippers, specifying that "communicating material, nonpublic information" in violation
of the Exchange Act or rules or regulations thereunder renders such a person "jointly and
severally liable ... to the same extent as [the person] to whom the communication was
directed." 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(c) (1994).
291 In Section 20A, Congress chose not to define the term "contemporaneously;" instead,
the drafters sought to adopt the definition of the term "which has developed through case law."
290

HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD
ENFORCEMENT Acr OF 1988, H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6064 [hereinafter ITSFEA House Report]. Here, the ITSFEA House
Report was referring to decisions by lower courts that, under the classical theory of insider
trading, had permitted private plaintiffs to seek damages against corporate insiders for violating
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by trading securities while in possession of material, nonpublic
information. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comtech Telecomrm. Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that the scope of liability for implied actions under Rule 10b-5 is confined to
persons who traded "contemporaneously" with a corporate insider) (cited in ITSFEA House
Report, H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 27 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6063). In
general, to be considered a "contemporaneous trader," a person must have purchased or sold
their securities at the same time or within no more than a few days after the defendant's illegal
trading. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, at § 3.02[3] (discussing cases); WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 18, at 395-400 (same).
292 Section 20A's relatively generous standing

provision is somewhat tempered by its
limitations on a defendant's liability, which provides specifically that the total amount of
damages imposed "shall not exceed the profit gained or loss avoided in the transaction or
transactions that are the subject of the violation," an amount that is further offset by any
disgorgement paid to the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b) (1994).
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investors lack standing to sue when a defendant's violation of Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 is premised on the misappropriation theory. 293 Specifically, Congress
determined that the result in Moss was "inconsistent with the remedial purposes
of the Exchange Act." 294 ITSFEA's legislative history further reflects that
Congress considered, but chose not to extend, an express cause of action to any
2 95
persons other than contemporaneous traders.
2. Anomalies Presentedby Judicialand Congressional

DeterminationsofStanding
If the majority in O'Hagan is correct that defrauding the source of
information through personal securities trading constitutes a violation of Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and that trading on the basis of misappropriated
information harms investors but does not necessarily defraud them, then we
would expect to see a very different legal landscape of standing in insider trading
cases from the one that exists today. Indeed, if sources of information are the
actual victims of the fraud that is proscribed under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
one must ask why Congress refused to grant these victims an express right of
action to recover damages from the individuals who defrauded them within the
meaning of the federal securities laws. 296 Congress would certainly have been
293 See ITSFEA House Report, H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 26-27 (1988), reprinted in
1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6063 (noting that "[i]n particular, the codification of a right of action
for contemporaneous traders is specifically intended to overturn court cases which have
precluded recovery for plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is premised upon the
misappropriation theory" and citing Moss v. MorganStanley Inc.).
2 94
Id.at27.
2 95
See id. at 28. The ITSFEA House Report recognized that "there clearly are injuries
caused by insider trading to others beyond contemporaneous traders," but the Committee
believed that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 had "sufficient flexibility" to protect such
noncontemporaneous traders. See id. at 27-28. The ITSFEA House Report then went on to
discuss the Rule 10b-5 action filed by Anheuser-Busch against its former director in which the
company alleged that it suffered damages because the defendant's insider trading caused it to
pay a higher price to complete an acquisition. See supra note 283. Viewing Anheuser-Busch as
a clear victim of the director's securities trading based on misappropriated information, the
ITSFEA House Report maintained that "where the plaintiff can prove that it suffered injury as
a result of the defendant's insider trading, the plaintiff has standing to sue in this circumstance,
and the remedial purposes of the securities laws require recognition of such an action."
ITSFEA House Report, H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 28 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6043, 6065. Section 20A(d) codifies this determination by making clear that nothing in Section
20A "shall be construed to limit or condition the right of any person to bring an action to
enforce a requirement of this title or the availability of any cause of action implied from a
provision of this title." 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d) (1994).
296
See supranote 295.
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aware that most sources of information defrauded by a misappropriator's
securities trading would be unable to satisfy the "actual purchaser and seller"
requirement read into Section 10(b) by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip
Stamps.2 97 If Congress believed that sources of information were the actual
victims of a misappropriator's securities fraud, then extending standing to these
victims would seem logical.
What is even more curious is why Congress would have granted standing to
contemporaneous traders in the marketplace if Congress had agreed with Moss's
holding that investors who trade with misappropriators are not deceived and
defrauded. 2 98 Congress clearly viewed Moss's result as "inconsistent with the
remedial purposes of the Exchange Act."29 9 Yet whose injury did Congress
believe needed to be remedied? If the source of the information is the only party
who is deceived and defrauded within the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, then it would make no sense to provide contemporaneous traders with
standing in misappropriation cases.300 Yet, if investors' injuries need to be
remedied, then it makes equally little sense to permit recovery under the federal
securities laws unless such investors were deceived and defrauded within the
meaning of those laws. The unprincipled compromise that O'Hagan tries to
strike-that investors are hurt but not necessarily defrauded 301-simply does not
provide a justification for why contemporaneous traders should be accorded
standing to recover damages against persons who tip or trade on misappropriated
information.
Thus, read together, O'Hagan,Blue Chip Stamps, and Section 20A set up a
rather curious paradox: Section 20A grants contemporaneous traders a right to
sue misappropriators for violating Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 even though
297 Congressional awareness of judicial limitations on standing under Rule

10b-5 is

indicated by the ITSFEA House Report's fixation on the damages to securities purchasers
(particularly acquiring corporations in the tender offer context) when a fiduciary trades those

same securities on the basis of misappropriated information. See supra note 295. Indeed, while
the ITSFEA House Report spoke approvingly of the Second Circuit's decision in Carpenter,it
nowhere suggested that the Wall Street Journalcould or should possess standing under Rule
10b-5 to recover damages from the defendants who were previously convicted under the
misappropriation theory. See ITSFEA House Report, H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 30 (1988),
reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6067 (discussing facts and holding in Carpenter).
298 See supranotes 92-96 and accompanying text.
2 99

ITSFEA House Report, H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6064.
300 Cf MACEY, supra note 213,

at 59 (advocating a property-rights based

misappropriation theory and contending that "[t]he rules of standing under [Rule] lOb-5 should
reflect the injury to the owner of the information, not necessarily the people with whom the

insider has traded").
301 See supratext accompanying notes 130-31.
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their injury under these provisions remains legally unrecognized by the Supreme
Court, while Blue Chip Stamps ensures that most sources of misappropriated
information will be unable to demonstrate standing, even though O'Hagan
acknowledges that they have been deceived and defrauded within the meaning of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 30 2 A theory of liability that creates such
anomalous results calls out for reconsideration.
IV. REFRAMING THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY BY EMPHASIZING A

FRAUD ON INVESTORS

The foregoing critique of the O'Hagan decision brings to light a number of
fundamental problems with the "fraud on the source" theory. In view of these
problems, this Part proposes a way to reframe the misappropriation theory.
Rather than predicating the fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 on a
fiduciary's deceptive breach of a duty owed to the source of confidential
information, trading based on misappropriated information should be viewed as
a fraud perpetrated on those investors who traded in the marketplace
contemporaneously with the person using the misappropriated information. Not
surprisingly, Chief Justice Burger's contentions in Chiarellaprovide the starting
place for constructing a new misappropriation theory that premises Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 liability on a breach of duty to disclose unlawfully obtained
information.303 This Part builds upon those contentions and seizes compelling
support from a variety of additional sources.
A. Applying a "Disclosureor Abstain" Rule to TradingBased on
MisappropriatedInformation
Although the antifraud prohibitions in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are not
entirely coextensive with common law doctrines of fraud and deceit, 30 4 the
Supreme Court traditionally has looked to those common law causes of action in
determining the type of "manipulative or deceptive" conduct that Congress

302

See Macey, supra note 205, at 48 (contending that "[i]n light of the Court's fiduciary
duty analysis, it seems ironic that the only persons who may bring a private suit for violations
of Rule lOb-5 are purchasers and sellers who have bought or sold during the time the insiders
were trading").

303 See supranotes 53-57 and accompanying text; see also Langevoort, supra note 16,at

883-85.

304

See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983); see also
Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1214 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that "the common law of fraud
").
is generally more stringent in its requirements than the elements of Rule lOb-5 ...
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sought to proscribe "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 305
Thus, in deciding whether securities trading on the basis of misappropriated
information deceives contemporaneous traders in the marketplace within the
meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, it is to the common law that we must
first turn.
1. The Common Law
Under common law, a fraud occurs when a person intentionally
misrepresents a material fact that is justifiably relied on by another person to his
or her detriment.30 6 Although an affirmative misstatement is generally required
for a plaintiff to aver fraud,3 07 courts have recognized a number of circumstances
under which a defendant's "pure silence" may also constitute fraudulent conduct.
One such circumstance occurs in transactions where the defendant is under a
duty to disclose material information "because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence ....
"308 Indeed, the classical theory of insider
trading liability is premised precisely on this exception to the general rule of
caveat emptor.30 9
Nondisclosure by a fiduciary, however, constitutes only one of many wellrecognized categorical exceptions to the rule that silence in a business transaction
is generally not fraudulent. 3 10 Other situations where an affirmative duty to
305

See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that "[i]n general, the case law developed in this Court
with respect to § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 has been based on doctrines with which we, as judges,
are familiar: common-law doctrines of fraud and deceit"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744 (1975) (stating that "[i]n considering the policy underlying [the
purchaser/seller standing requirements for actions under Rule 10b-5], it is not inappropriate to
advert briefly to the tort of misrepresentation and deceit, to which a claim under Rule lOb-5
certainly has some relationship"); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35
("Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.).
306
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1976) (to be liable for fraud under tort
law, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant: "fraudulently [made] a misrepresentation of
fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing [the plaintiff] to act.., upon
it... [causing] pecuniary loss.., by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation"); see
also W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 736-37 (1984)

(discussing actions for fraud and deceit at common law).
307
See KEETON ET AL., supranote 306, at 737.
308

REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976).

309

See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella'srecognition of
a disclosure duty based on the relationship of trust and confidence between corporate insiders
and shareholders).

310 On this point, Justice Powell's dicta in Chiarellais somewhat misleading because his
language could suggest that a duty to disclose may arise only where there is a pre-existing
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speak may arise include: (1) when one party actively conceals information from
another party; (2) when one party's prior once-true statement is now incorrect
due to changed circumstances; (3) when one party makes a half-true or
ambiguous statement; and (4) when one party has superior knowledge or special
facts that the other party cannot obtain. 31 1 Because insider trading cases
premised on the misappropriation theory involve the use of unlawfully obtained
information, this latter category-superior, but unobtainable, knowledge-is
clearly the exception most relevant to analyzing whether a person who traded on
the basis of misappropriated information owes a disclosure duty to the investors
with whom he trades. To be sure, those investors trading contemporaneously in
the market with the misappropriator lack access to valuable information that, if
known, would negate their willingness to conclude the transaction at the
undervalued or overvalued market price.
Under common law, courts have recognized disclosure duties in a wide array
of business transactions where one party could not have obtained the superior
knowledge or special facts possessed by the other party.3 12 One such situation
involves instances where the informational advantage was acquired through

fiduciary relationship. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella's
recitation of the common law). As Professor Langevoort has pointed out, "the Court's principal
citation for its conclusion is RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976), which lists
a number of common law bases for compelling affirmative disclosure in addition to the
existence of a fiduciary relationship ....
" Langevoort, supra note 18, at 12 n.44; see also
Anderson, supra note 18, at 351 (noting that while "the Court appeared to be determined in
Chiarellato incorporate the common law of misrepresentation wholesale into the securities
laws, it did not acknowledge that, under the modem law of misrepresentation, the existence of
a duty to disclose is not limited to situations involving pre-existing fiduciary relationships");
Scheppele, supra note 225, at 131 (maintaining that "despite Justice Powell's claim that the
common law bolsters his argument about the obligation to disclose information, equitable rules
invoked by common law courts never supported such a narrow view of the duty in other sorts
of transactions").
311 See KEETON Er AL., supra note 306, at 737-40; see also Nicola W. Palmieri, Good
Faith DisclosuresRequiredDuringPrecontractualNegotiations,24 SETON HALL L. REv. 70,
120-41 (1993) (discussing a host of circumstances under which the general rule permitting
silence is not applicable); Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation-PartII, 37
MD. L. REV. 488, 523-27 (1978) (same).
312 In his Chiarelladissent, Justice Blackmun set out to prove precisely this contention.
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245-49 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
cases and noting that courts applying common law have taken steps "toward application of the
'special facts' doctrine in a broader array of contexts where one party's superior knowledge of
essential facts renders a transaction without disclosure inherently unfair"); see also infra notes
326-28 and accompanying text (discussing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS and the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS as well as trends in recent case law on fraud and
misrepresentation).
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wrongful or illegal actions.3 13
The idea that a party to a business transaction possesses a duty to disclose
information acquired by a wrongful act can be traced to the case of Phillips v.
Homfray,3 14 decided by an English court in 1871. The defendant-purchasers in
the case trespassed upon the plaintiff-vendor's land, acquired coal from
underneath it, and tested the coal for value prior to agreeing to purchase the land.
The vendors, not knowing the true value of the land, then sold the land to the
defendants at an undervalued price. The court refused to order specific
performance of the contract, reasoning that it "is not merely that the purchasers,
being more experienced men, knew the value of the coal better than the vendors,
but that the vendors being unable to gain access to the coal, the purchasers took
advantage of an unlawful access to it in order to test its value, and did not
communicate to the vendors the result." 3 15 The court therefore maintained that
the general rule of caveat emptor (or in this case caveat vendor) would only be
applied in those instances where the party with the informational advantaged
3 16
party employed a "legitimate mode of acquiring knowledge."
The holding in Homfray was embraced by the drafters of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 3 17 and, just recently, it was echoed by the Supreme Court
of Colorado in Mallon Oil Co. v. Bowen/Edwards Association.318 Indeed, the
313 See John F. Barry II,The Economics of OutsideInformation and Rule 10b-5, 129 U.

PA. L. REv. 1307, 1363 (1981) (emphasizing that while "the common law tolerated
exploitation of many informational advantages, it never condoned informational advantages

obtained by a tortious or illegal act, but denied to the wrongdoer the fruits of his wrongdoing
even if he otherwise would have been permitted to exploit the type of informational advantage
at issue"); see also infra notes 314-25 and accompanying text (discussing exception to general

rule in cases where superior knowledge or special facts are unlawfully obtained).
314 6 Ch. App. 770 (1871) (discussed in Keeton, supra note 56, at 25-26).
315
Id. at 779-80 (emphasis added).
3 16

Id. at 780. The Homfray court hypothesized an additional instance where an

unlawfully obtained informational advantage would trigger a disclosure duty:
Suppose a picture-dealer, employed to clean a picture, scrapes off a part of the
picture to see if he can discover a mark which will tell him who is the artist, and thus finds
a mark showing it to be the work of a great artist; that would not be a legitimate mode of
acquiring knowledge for the purpose of enabling him to buy the picture at a lower price
than the owner would have sold it for had he known it to be the work of that artist.

Id.
317 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 161 illus. 11 (1979) ("[Buyer] A learns
of the valuable mineral deposits from trespassing on [vendor] B's land .... A's non-disclosure
is equivalent to an assertion that the land does not contain valuable mineral deposits, and this
assertion is a misrepresentation).
318 965 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1998). The case involved a vendor of oil and gas exploration
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Mallon Oil court was explicit in recognizing that "[a]t common law, the general
rule is that a person rightfully on property does not have a duty to disclose
knowledge of the land to a seller of the land who does not have the same
knowledge." 3 19 However, citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the
court maintained that "this rule does not apply when the buyer acquires the
320
information through improper means, such as a trespass."
Although cases paralleling the facts of Homfray and Mallon Oil are rarely
litigated under common law doctrines of fraud and deceit,32 1 renowned scholars
in tort and contracts law have nonetheless contended that Homfray's recognition
of a duty to disclose unlawfully obtained information is an accurate statement of
rights on Native American tribal land who had sought to recover damages from the defendantcorporation that purchased those rights. The vendor claimed that the corporation committed
fraud when it failed to disclose in the course of the transaction that the tribal lands contained
methane gas-a fact that made the rights far more valuable than the negotiated price. See id. at
107-09. The plaintiff-vendor contended that the corporation was under a duty to disclose its
finding of gas because the corporation's agent had "trespassed" upon Mallon's exclusive right
to exploration. That is, the vendor-plaintiff argued that the general rule of caveat emptor did
not apply because the defendant-corporation's superior knowledge regarding the methane gas
was obtained illegally. See id. at 108. Although the court agreed as a matter of law with the
plaintiff's contention that the defendant-corporation would have had a duty to disclose if the
information had been obtained unlawfully, the court accepted the lower courts' factual finding
that the defendant's agent was rightfully on the land and therefore was not a geophysical
trespasser. See id. at 111-12; see also Mallon Oil Co. v. Bowen/Edwards Assoc., 940 P.2d
1055, 1061 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "because [the defendant's agent] was rightfully
on the land looking for coal, he was not a geophysical trespasser, and consequently, defendants
had no duty to disclose their discovery of gas").
3 19
Mallon Oil Co., 965 P.2d at 111 (citing W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL & GAS

§ 662 (1962)).
320

Id. at 112 (citing REsTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 161 illus. 11 (1981)).

321 Cases involving the fraudulent use of stolen information are often brought privately

under trade secret laws, see supra note 156, or prosecuted under the federal mail fraud or wire
fraud statutes codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1994). See, e.g., United States v. Kent, 608

F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1979) (mail fraud statute violated where defendant bribed a company's
employee to release geological data and other confidential company information and then
subsequently sold this misappropriated information to a third party who, in turn, used the
information to obtain valuable leases); Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1956)
(mail fraud statute violated where defendant bribed company employee to furmish him with
employer's copies of geophysical maps to facilitate scheme to acquire property at low cost);
see also United States v. Cherif, No. 89-CR-450, 1989 WL 112769, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19,
1989) (noting that the federal mail and wire fraud statutes "reach breaches of fundamental
concepts of fair dealing which society condemns as fraudulent" and stating that "[i]t takes no
cognoscente of paperback westems or grade B movies to know that someone who holds up the
stage to find out where the railroad is coming through, and then, armed with that information,
buys the widow's ranch for a pittance, should and will be brought to justice by the
conclusion").
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common law. For instance, in what has been described as "the most influential
article" on nondisclosure, 322 Dean Page Keeton cited Homfray and concluded
that "[a]ny time information is acquired by an illegal act... there should be a
323 Professors Bower and Turner have
duty to disclose that information .... ,,
expressed a similar conclusion stating that "suppression by a purchaser of facts
affecting the value of the property which are not merely within his own
knowledge, but the issue of his own volition and wrongful action, is equivalent to
a misrepresentation." 324 Significantly, none of these commentators appear to
limit the duty to disclose wrongfully acquired information to circumstances
where the unlawful acts of misappropriation were perpetrated against the other
325
party to the business transaction.
It is also important to recognize that both the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopt an even broader approach than
the courts in Homfray and Mallon Oil to the question of whether one party's
superior, but unobtainable, knowledge triggers a duty to disclose to the other
party in a business transaction. For example, Section 551(2)(e) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes a duty to disclose "facts basic to the
transaction" when one party to a business transaction "knows that the other is
about to enter into it under a mistake as to [those facts], and that the other,
because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other
322

See Palmieri, supranote 311, at 174 (characterizing Professor Keeton's article cited in

supranote 56).
323 Keeton, supra note 56, at 25-26; see also KEETON E"AL., supra note 306, at 739
(information acquired by an illegal act "makes a difference on the ethical equality of
nondisclosure").
324
GEORGE SPENCER BOWER & SIR ALEXANDER KINGCOME TURNER, THE LAW OF
AcriONABLEMISREPRFSENTATION 107 (3d ed. 1974).
32 5
See id. at 107; Keeton, supranote 56, at 25-26. Moreover, although both Mallon Oil
andHomfray involved situations where the superior information was allegedly misappropriated
by one party to the transaction from the other transacting party, neither court appeared to limit
the duty to disclose unlawfully obtained information to cases where the misappropriator was
transacting business with the party whose information was unlawfully obtained. See Mallon
Oil Co. v. Bowen/Edwards Assoc., 965 P.2d 105, 111-12 (Colo. 1998) (phrasing the exception
in broad-based terms); Phillips v. Homfray, 6 Ch. App. 770, 780 (1871) (same); see also
Cherif 1989 WL 112769, at *3 (hypothesizing fraud in a situation where a widow's ranch was
purchased "for a pittance" by someone who obtained superior information regarding its value
through illegal actions vis-&-vis a third party). But see Paula J. Dalley, FromHorse Tradingto
Insider Trading: The HistoricalAntecedents of the Insider TradingDebate, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1289, 1331 (1998) (contending that "[o]utside of the context of the 1934 Act, a
definition of fraud by silence based on misappropriation would run into the apparently
intractable remedy problem. To give the ignorant trader a cause of action based on the
knowledgeable trader's commission of a tort against a complete stranger to the plaintiff is
unthinkable in a world that still recognizes concepts of privity.").
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'32 6
objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.
Section 161(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts contains a similar
provision, 327 and the commentary to both Restatements emphasizes that, in some
circumstances, modem business ethics has created a reliance on the "good faith"
and "common honesty" of the parties. 32 8 Thus, the disclosure duty recognized
more than a century ago in Honfray today constitutes only the tip of the
iceberg.329 That is, although using unlawfully obtained information in a business
transaction amounts to quintessential bad faith and unfair dealing, modem courts
are willing to recognize disclosure duties in a variety of less egregious situations
where one party to a business transaction possesses superior knowledge while
330
the other party acts on a mistaken belief.
326
327

RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977).
Section 161(b) of the RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS states that:

A person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion that
the fact does not exist... where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a
mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the
contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 161(b) (1979).
328
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 551 crnt. 1:
[Tjhere are situations in which the defendant not only knows that his bargaining
adversary is acting under a mistake basic to the transaction, but also knows that the
adversary, by reason of the relation between them, the customs of the trade or other
objective circumstances, is reasonably relying upon a disclosure of the unrevealed fact if it
exists. In this type of case good faith and fair dealing may require a disclosure.
Id.; Restatement (SECOND) OF CONTRACS § 161 cmt. d (stating that a party "is expected... to
act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing, as reflected in
prevailing business ethics").
329
See Brass v. American Film Technologies, 987 F.2d 142, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1993)
(contending that "[i]t is no longer acceptable, if it ever was, to conclude in knowing silence, a
transaction damaging to a party who is mistaken about its basic factual assumptions
when ... he would reasonably expect a disclosure") (citing Gaines Serv. Leasing Corp. v.
Carmel Plastic Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 694, 697 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980)); see also id. (noting that
"New York has joined other jurisdictions in limiting the 'privilege to take advantage of
ignorance' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. 1)).
330
See Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of
Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65 (1994) (discussing cases where
courts have imposed disclosure duties in arm's-length transactions and arguing that these
nondisclosure cases cannot be rationalized by a single unifying theme); Palmieri, supra note
311, at 130-34 (discussing recent cases and concluding that "the superior knowledge or special
facts doctrine is being used to chip away at caveat emptor even in arm's length transactions");
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In addition to serving the common law's goal of preventing one party's
unjust enrichment at the expense of another party, prohibiting the use in business
transactions of information that was obtained by unlawful or wrongful acts is
also consistent with the common law's regard for economic efficiency. 331 As
one scholar has noted:
[A] privilege to exploit information improperly obtained would reduce the
incentive to invest in legitimate information production by exacerbating free
rider problems and by placing on producers the risk of misappropriation. Less
information would be produced, because at least some producers would shift
332
resources from additional production to theft of what others have produced.
It was the work of Professor (now Dean) Anthony Kronman 333 that placed
concerns of economic efficiency at the core of the common law's exceptions to
the general rule that informational advantages may be exploited in business
transactions without triggering liability for fraud. 334 Professor Kronman points
Susan Rogers Finneran, Knowing Silence ofNonentreprenuerialInformation is Not Sporting,
59 ALB. L. REv. 511, 553-55 (1995) (discussing cases and concluding that "[s]ilently
withholding... nonentrepreneurial information is not 'mere silence' within the bargaining
context; it is an assertion"); Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of
Nondisclosure, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 329, 386 (1991) (discussing cases and contending
that "a general theory [of nondisclosure] can only succeed when it is recognized that there are
discrete types of both nondisclosure transactions and arguments, and that each type must be
evaluated separately with the broader theory"); see also Anderson, supra note 18, at 352
(contending that "[t]he important characteristic of [modem misrepresentation] cases is not that
they have created a new duty to disclose termite infestation in real estate transactions, but that
they illustrate that the modem law of misrepresentation has evolved in response to changing
expectations about consumer protection and proper and improper bargaining tactics");
Langevoort, supra note 16, at 871 (emphasizing that "[t]oday, law books are filled with
decisions imposing an affirmative disclosure obligation on people engaged in business
negotiations").
331 See Barry, supranote 313, at 1364.
332 Ird.

333 See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1978). Professor Kronman's article has been described as
"groundbreaking," see Wonnell, supranote 330, at 340. It is also of some significance that the
SEC relied on Professor Kronman's article to support its argument as amicus in Moss v.
Morgan Stanley Inc. that the common law recognized a duty of disclosure in instances where
the informational advantage was obtained through misappropriation or other unlawful acts. See
Brief of the SEC, supranote 91, at 17 n.14 (citing Kronman, supra, at 9,34).
334 At the outset of his article, Professor Kronman drew attention to Dean Keeton's
recognition that, in deciding when to impose a duty to disclose superior information, courts
often look to the way in which the information was acquired. See Kronman, supranote 333, at
11 n.32 (citing Keeton, supranote 56). Professor Kronman then stated that "[t]he main purpose
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out, for example, that cases applying the rule of caveat emptor generally arise in
situations where the party charged with nondisclosure has obtained the
335
information through legitimate research or other bona fide economic activity.
Thus, in these situations nondisclosure is permitted to preserve incentives for
socially useful behavior. 336 He then contrasts these cases to situations where the
knowledgeable party's superior informational advantage is not the result of a
deliberate search and where diligence on the part of the ignorant party could not
have uncovered the undisclosed information. 337 In these cases of unilateral
mistake, "a rule requiring him to disclose what he knows will not cause him to
alter his behavior in such a way that the production of information of this sort
338
will be reduced."
The common law's reluctance to reward individuals for bad faith and
dishonesty, coupled with its regard for economic efficiency, provides a very
compelling case for why trading securities on the basis of misappropriated
information should be viewed as a fraud against the investors with whom the
misappropriator trades. Like the land purchaser whose informational advantage
was obtained through a trespass, the misappropriator gains his transactional
advantage only through unlawful means. And in such an instance, the general
rule of caveat emptor is no longer applicable because the misappropriator is
clearly operating in bad faith.33 9 Moreover, because a misappropriator's conduct
"quite clearly serves no useful function except his own enrichment at the expense
of others, '340 there are few costs associated with imposing a disclosure

of the present article is to develop this distinction between different kinds of information in a
more rigorous fashion, to justify the distinction on economic grounds, and to demonstrate its
explanatory power as a principle for ordering the disclosure cases." Id. at 11 n.32.
335See id. at 19-27; see also id. at 18 (stating that "[t]he cases permitting
nondisclosure... involve information which, on the whole, is likely to have been deliberately
produced").
336

See id. at 19-27; see also id. at 2 (contending that "a legal privilege of nondisclosure

is in effect a property right [and]... where special knowledge or information is the fruit of a
deliberate search the assignment of a property right of this sort is required in order to ensure

production of information at a socially desirable level").
337
338

See id at 18-27.
Id. at 32.

339 A duty to disclose or abstain from trading misappropriated information is particularly
warranted because, as other securities scholars have pointed out, the SEC's "elaborate public
reporting system has created an expectation that material information is generally accessible,
and... investors have no opportunity to inquire of one another as to the possible use or
possession of nonpublic information." Cox & Forgarty, supra note 257, at 359 (citing
Brudney, supranote 23, at 326-27).
340 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 241 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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obligation. 34 1
Thus, under the common law, O'Hagan could be said to have committed
two frauds: (1) he defrauded Dorsey & Whitney and Grand Met by remaining
silent while using their information to trade securities for personal profit; and (2)
he defrauded the investors who sold options and stock in Pillsbury by remaining
silent in the face of ill-gotten facts indicating that the Pillsbury securities he was
purchasing were undervalued significantly. Yet, although the Court recognized
that O'Hagan had harmed both the source of the information andinvestors in the
marketplace, the Court was prepared to characterize only the former harm as a
"fraud."
2. Section 10(b) andRule 10b-5
The conclusion that securities investors are deceived and defrauded by a
person trading on misappropriated information is not only supported by a fair
reading of the common law, but it is also consistent with Section 10(b)'s
statutory language and with prior Supreme Court precedents interpreting that
language. This conclusion is further supported by Congress's determination in
ITSFEA to amend the Exchange Act with the addition of Section 20A.
It goes almost without saying that the text of Section 10(b) is written
expansively, prohibiting "any person... in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security" from using or employing "any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of' SEC rules. 34 2 Rule lOb-5, phrased in equally
expansive language, renders it unlawful "[t]o engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 343 As the
Supreme Court recognized many years ago, "[t]hese proscriptions, by statute and
rule, are broad and, by repeated use of the word 'any,' are obviously meant to be
344
inclusive."
Although neither Section 10(b) nor Rule lob-5 state explicitly whether
See Seligman, supra note 18, at 1092 n.49 ('If traders could exploit material
nonpublic information by improperly obtaining it, rather than searching for it, they will reduce
their investment in information production. Ultimately, less information will be produced and a
less desirable allocation of resources will occur than if traders only had an incentive to search
legitimately for new information about material changes in market conditions.").
341

342 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
343 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(c) (1996).

344 Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); see also
id. at 151 (noting that "Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of
avoiding frauds to be construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purposes") (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195

(1963)).
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silence constitutes a fraudulent or deceptive device, the Supreme Court made
clear in Chiarellathat courts should look to the common law to determine when
"silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a
fraud actionable under § 10(b)."' 345 Thus, because the common law recognizes
fraud in cases where a party to a business transaction fails to disclose material
information that was obtained through unlawful means,34 6 the text of Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 may be read to prohibit such conduct, provided that the
nondisclosure occurs "in connection" with the purchase or sale of any
347
security.
Moreover, to the extent that Congress intended Section 10(b)'s text to alter
the common law, it intended that provision and the SEC rules promulgated
thereunder to provide greater, not lesser, protection for investors and the
securities markets. 348 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has observed on multiple
occasions, "the 1934 Act and its companion legislative enactments embrace a
'fundamental purpose... to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry.' 349 In particular, Congress sought to prohibit
"those manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to
fulfill no useful function" 350 and to "assure that dealing in securities is fair and

345 Chiarella,445 U.S. at 230.
346
See supra Part IV.A.1.

347 See infra notes 365-67 and accompanying text (contending that the "fraud on
investors" misappropriation theory is well suited to satisfying Section 10(b)'s "in connection
with" requirement because the theory posits that the defendant is deceiving and defrauding the
actual purchasers or sellers of securities).
34
8See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22 (1988) (stating that "[a]ctions
under Rule lOb-5 are distinct from common-law deceit and misrepresentation claims, and are
in part designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law') (citations
omitted); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (stating that "[a]n
important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the
available common-law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities
industry"); see also Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985)
(stating that the Court has "eschewed rigid common-law barriers in construing the securities
laws").
349 Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 151 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
350 S.REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934); see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (emphasizing that because "practices constantly vary and
where practices legitimate for some purposes may be tumed to illegitimate and fraudulent
means, broad discretionary powers in the regulatory agency have been found practically
essential") (citations omitted).
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without undue preferences or advantages among investors." 35 1 Where a person
obtains his informational advantage in a securities transaction through
misappropriation, imposition of a duty under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to
abstain or disclose to investors falls squarely within these broad congressional
352
purposes.
To be sure, in the specific context of insider trading, the Court has used
similar policy justifications to justify reading the text of Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 beyond the limits imposed by common law. For example, as noted earlier,
the ChiarellaCourt's classical theory of insider trading predicated liability on a
traditional insider's failure to disclose material information to the shareholders
with whom he was trading, even though the majority of courts at common law
did not recognize a fiduciary relationship between insiders and shareholders, and
most certainly did not recognize duties of disclosure in market transactions, such
as those conducted on a stock exchange. 353 Moreover, the Chiarella Court
expanded upon the common law when it read Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to
require insiders to disclose or abstain in transactions with prospective
shareholders of the corporation, on the theory that "it would be a sorry
351 H.R. CONG. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1976), reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 323.
352
Prior to O'Hagan,many scholars questioned the value of emphasizing Supreme Court
statements made in Section 10(b) cases decided prior to the mid-1970s, when the Court in a
series of "retrenchmenf' cases, see supra note 115, began to narrow its reading of the
protections available under federal securities law in general, and Section 10(b) in particular. See
Robert A. Prentice, Locating That "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line Between
Primaryand Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. Rev. 691, 713 n.99 (1997)
(acknowledging that "the current Supreme Court is not likely to stress [the broad holdings in
Affiliated Ute, Bankers Life, and CapitalGains] but to respond that 'generalized references' to
the securities laws' 'remedial purposes' are not enough justification to construe a securities
statute liberally") (quoting Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980)); see also William E.
Donnelley & Thomas J. McGonigle, Ringing Endorsement of the MisappropriationTheory
Sets Stagefor Wide-RangingProsecutionof InsiderTrading, LEGAL TIMES, July 14, 1997, at
550 (contending that the Govemment's decision to seek certiorari in O'Hagan was risky
because "[f]or the past 20 years, the Supreme Court has been generally unreceptive to many of
the SEC's more expansive, policy-oriented interpretations of the federal securities laws" and
emphasizing that "the Court has insisted upon confining the scope of Section 10(b) within the
narrower limits that the Court concluded were dictated by the language of the statute"). Yet, as
Dean Seligman has recently maintained, Justice Ginsburg's O'Hagan opinion "adopted an
earlier mode of analysis when she relied on a more generic legislative purpose for the entire
Act." Seligman, supra note 142, at 18. Support for a broader, more flexible reading of the text
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can therefore be drawn from O'Haganitself. See infra notes
393-97 and accompanying text; see also Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, The Limits of
Central Bank's Textualist Approach, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 21 (1997) (highlighting the
"broad policy considerations" undertaken in O'Hagan and contending that O'Hagan
establishes that"textualism does not require literalism").
353 See supranote 37.
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distinction" to regulate insider buying but not selling.354 In doing so, the Court
necessarily recognized that an insider can violate the Exchange Act even if he
owes no traditional fiduciary duty to the investor with whom he is trading.
The Supreme Court's holding in Dirks also adopted a flexible reading of the
statutory text when it held that a tippee's silence in trading securities based on
material, nonpublic information could be construed as fraudulent under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5, even though the tippee was a stranger who owed no
independent fiduciary duties to the shareholders of the corporation whose stock
he was trading. 355 Indeed, it was policy, rather than any precedent in common
law, that prompted the Court to conclude that "some tippees must assume an
insider's [fiduciary] duty to the shareholders not because they receive inside
information, but rather because it has been made available to them
improperly."356 This language from Dirks is particularly significant because it
demonstrates that the question of whether there is a duty to disclose under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 may require, in certain circumstances, an analysis
as to how the material, nonpublic information was obtained. It also demonstrates
that one's status as a stranger to the investors with whom one is trading does not
necessarily foreclose liability for trading based on material, nonpublic
information. 357 If Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are broad enough to impose a
purported fiduciary obligation on the part of an outsider whose informational
advantage was the product of an insider's improper tip, then these provisions can
certainly be read to trigger a specific disclosure obligation on the part of a person
who improperly obtains his informational advantage through an unlawful
misappropriation.
Finally, recognition that "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic
information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from
trading" 358 also fits within Congress's own interpretations of Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, particularly those statements in the legislative history of ITSFEA
explaining Section 20A's express private right of action for contemporaneous
traders. 35 9 Recall that Congress codified this express right of action specifically
to overturn the result in Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., where the Second Circuit
354

See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,227 n.8 (1980).
See supranotes 9, 41-48 and accompanying text.
356
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
357
See Langevoort, supra note 18, at 28 (contending that the Court's endorsement of
not adhere strictly to the idea that only fiduciaries
tippee liability "is an indication that it vill
are obligated to make disclosures when trading").
358 Chiarella,445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
359
See supra notes 293-95 and accompanying text; see also Steve Thel, Statutory
Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1091, 1108 & n.80, 1111-15
(1997).
355
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refused to recognize that a private plaintiff was deceived by the defendants'
purchases of stock based on misappropriated information concerning an
imminent tender offer.360 As Professor Langevoort has previously concluded,
Section 20A "as a practical matter, codifies the notion espoused by Chief Justice
Burger in his Chiarelladissent [that] persons who misappropriate owe by virtue
36 1
of that fact an affirmative duty of disclosure to the marketplace."
B. The Superiority ofa "Fraudon Investors "Approach
Refraiing the misappropriation theory to emphasize the fraud that is
perpetrated on the investors with whom a misappropriator trades is not only a
viable approach to insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
but, for a number of reasons, it is also an approach that is far superior to the
"fraud on the source" misappropriation theory that was endorsed in O'Hagan.
First, the "fraud on investors" theory is better suited to meeting both the
"deception" and "in connection with" requirements specified by the text of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Indeed, because the investors with whom a
misappropriator trades are the persons deceived within the meaning of these
provisions, the misappropriation theory would no longer be constrained to cases
fitting O'Hagan's "deception by a fiduciary" paradigm. Thus, although
computer hackers, "mere" thieves, and brazen fiduciaries would all escape
liability for trading based on misappropriated information under O'Hagan's
theory,362 the broader "fraud on investors" version would hold accountable all of
these persons under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for deceiving investors in
connection with a securities transaction. Similarly, the "fraud on investors"
theory eliminates potential problems with satisfying the "in connection with"
requirement in future misappropriation cases that may involve factual scenarios
more complex than the one at issue in O'Hagan.363 Under this alternative, the
timing of the fiduciary's breach of duty to the source of the information does not
have to "coincide" with the securities transaction because the fraud that is
proscribed under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 occurs when the defendant
purchases or sells securities without disclosing his unlawfully obtained
informational advantage to the other parties to the transaction. Any difficulties
that may be faced in future prosecutions of tipper/tippee misappropriation cases
360

See supranotes 88-96 and accompanying text.
361 LANGEVOORT, supra note 18, at 9-19; see also Mitchell, supra note 18, at 778
(contending that the "ITSFEA may have implicitly overruled, or at least severely limited, the
Supreme Court's seminal decision in Chiarella v. United States and the jurisprudential
approach it espoused") (citation omitted).
362
See supraPart III.A.1-2.
363
See supraPart III.A.3.
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under the "fraud on the source" theory 364 would therefore be avoided under the
alternative "fraud on investors" theory.
Along that same vein, the "fraud on investors" theory also satisfies the
principal criticism raised by the three dissenting Justices in O'Hagan: that the
O'Hagan majority misinterpreted Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by failing to
read the "in connection with" element to "require the manipulation or deception
of a party to a securities transaction." 365 Unlike the "fraud on the source" theory
endorsed in O'Hagan,the "fraud on investors" version necessarily satisfies this
more exacting interpretation of the "in connection with" requirement because the
proscribed fraud has a direct impact on the integrity of the defendant's securities
transaction. 36 6 Thus, had the majority endorsed the broader "fraud on investors"
version of the misappropriation theory, the arguments of the O'Hagandissenters
367
would have been the ones in need ofrefiraming.
In addition to these doctrinal advantages, restructuring the misappropriation
theory of insider trading to center around the fraud that is perpetrated on
investors eliminates the criticism that the "fraud on the source" theory is merely
a pretext for enforcing the parity of information approach that the Court rejected
in Chiarella and Dirks.3 68 Indeed, a misappropriation theory that emphasizes
fraud on investors reconnects the specific conduct prohibited by the terms of
364 See id.
365

United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 2220 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Justice Thomas's opinion (in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined) and supra
notes 133-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Scalia's opinion.
366
Justices Thomas and Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist would appear to endorse the
view expressed almost fifteen years ago by Judge Henry Friendly in Chemical Bank v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984). Judge Friendly
stated that:
The purpose of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to protect persons who are deceived in
securities transactions--tomake sure that buyers of securities get what they think they
are getting and that sellers of securities are not tricked into parting with something for a
price known to the buyer to be inadequate or for a consideration known to the buyer not
to be what it purports to be.

Id. at 943 (emphasis added). The "fraud on investors" misappropriation theory is fully
consistent with this view because the nondisclosure prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule lOb5 involves facts indicating that the securities will be worth far more (or less) in the future.
3 67

See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 151, at 1189-90 (stating that "[t]he Burger view [in

Chiarella]avoids some of the anomalies noted by Justice Thomas in treating the fraudulent act
committed on someone else as the basis for what otherwise would be nonfiraudulent vis-d.-vis
the party with whom the misappropriator traded").
368

See supraPart Il1.B.3.b.
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Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 with the well recognized investor protection and
market integrity goals of federal securities regulation. 369 Thus, under this theory,
trading on misappropriated information violates Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
because investors are deceived, and deceit practiced on investors is to be
prohibited because "[d]efrauded investors are among the very individuals
Congress sought to protect in the securities laws." 370 On the other hand, the
369 Shortly after Chiarella, Professor William Wang criticized Chief Justice Burger's
"fraud on investors" theory, maintaining that "[a] Rule 1Ob-5 duty to disclose to the party
[trading with the misappropriator] would compound the misappropriation or breach of duty to
the employer." Wang, supra note 18, at 1273. But this observation is equally applicable to
Rule lOb-5's mandate, under the classical theory, that insiders in possession of material,
nonpublic information must "disclose or abstain" from trading in the shares of the corporation.
See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. Indeed, if the disclosure alternative to the
"disclose or abstain" rule were exercised by insiders, the corporation's shareholders would
likely be worse off because the requisite disclosure would reveal confidential information that
was being kept secret by the corporation for the good of all shareholders. This is undoubtedly
why, under both the classical theory and the "fraud on investors" misappropriation theory, the
duty owed to investors is phrased in the alternative: insiders, and persons who have
misappropriated nonpublic information, have "an absolute duty to disclose that information or
to refrain from trading." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980). (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). Both "disclose or abstain" rules therefore effectively operate as a
mandate for abstention because neither insiders nor misappropriators are likely to comply with
the rule by disclosing confidential information to investors. In the case of insiders, such
disclosure would breach their duty of loyalty owed to all shareholders; and in the case of
misappropriators, such disclosure would reveal the misappropriation to the source. And in both
cases, disclosure to investors in the market would eliminate the trader's informational
advantage (without which there would be no trading profits).
370 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983). Like the "fraud on the
source" theory endorsed in O'Hagan,the broader "fraud on investors" theory would place on
the Government the burden of proving that the material, nonpublic information used in the
securities transaction was misappropriated from its source and that the defendant engaged in
the securities transactions with scienter. Cf Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193
(1976) (holding that "in the absence of any allegation of 'scienter,"' no cause of action for
damages will lie under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5). Ironically, under a "fraud on investors"
misappropriation theory, the easier cases will be those involving securities trading by "mere
thieves" because obtaining confidential information through theft, burglary, espionage, and the
like is clearly unlawful, see, e.g., supra note 156 (discussing the computer hacker who
misappropriates confidential commercial information), and proving scienter in a securities
transaction based on information that was clearly stolen should not be difficult in the wake of
judicial recognition that misappropriators of information have an absolute duty under Section
10(b) and Rule lob-5 to disclose or abstain from trading. The most complicated cases, of
course, will be those where the use of material, nonpublic information constitutes a
misappropriation only because the use of such confidential information breaches a fiduciary
duty to the source of the information (i.e., the physician-patient cases, the family relationship
cases, etc.). See supranote 63.
Under either misappropriation theory, there will likely be litigation as to which pre-
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theory does not reach as far as the parity of information approach because it
recognizes that lawfully obtained informational advantages do not trigger a
disclosure duty to the marketplace. 37 1 Viewing investors as the parties who are
deceived and defrauded by a misappropriator's securities trading also reunites
the illegal acts of nondisclosure with the standard of materiality that is actually
used in misappropriation cases and thereby eliminates the anomaly that exists
under current law.

372

Finally, premising violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 on the "fraud
on investors" rather than the "fraud on the source" would rationalize the
existing relationships prohibit securities trading based on confidential information learned in
the course of that relationship. See Coffee, supra note 226, at 5 (characterizing O'Hagan as
ambiguous regarding the nature of the relationship that triggers an obligation to disclose to the
source); Painter et al., supra note 142, at 188-200 (criticizing O'Hagan in part because "the
full reach of the misappropriation theory is far from clear, particularly when applied to
relationships not falling into one of the traditional categories of common law fiduciary duty").
Professors Painter, Krawiec, and Williams are particularly troubled by the O'Hagan Court's
unwillingness to confront the constitutional due process implications involved in criminal cases
where the theory is applied to purported misappropriations that take place in relationships that
are not clearly fiduciary in nature. See id. at 196 (maintaining that "[tihis common law
development of criminal standards arguably violates general canons governing judicial
construction of criminal statutes and implicates due process considerations"). But recharacterizing the legal effect of a misappropriator's securities trading does nothing to change
the Government's (admittedly, often difficult) burden of demonstrating that a misappropriation
in fat occurred. Likewise, under either theory, if the Government carries its burden of
establishing scienter, constitutional requirements of due process will be satisfied.
371 Recognizing that allunerodable informational advantages place investors at a trading
disadvantage, see Brudney, supra note 23, at 357, some securities law scholars might argue
that the "fraud on investors" misappropriation theory does not go far enough because Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 should be construed to prohibit all securities trading based on such
informational advantages. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 256-59; see also Salbu, supranote
18, at 233 (contending that "misappropriation theory cannot insure market integrity because the
focus on particular transactions fails to address the issue of information asymmetry"); Ronald
F. Kidd, Note, Insider Trading: The Misappropriation Theory Versus an "Access to
Ihfonnation" Perspective, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 101, 118-36 (1993) (advocating Professor
Brudney's parity of access approach to insider trading). Although a parity of information rule
may engender even greater public confidence in the securities markets, the rule would come
with costs that are too dear. Specifically, as the Court correctly recognized in Dirks, a parity of
information approach might chill legitimate and socially useful investment behavior, such as
diligent searches for information by investment analysts and other market participants. See
infra text accompanying notes 383-84 (contending that a "fraud on investors" theory can be
reconciled with Dirks because the theory only deters corporate theft of intangible property; it
will not reduce incentives to legitimately search out information).
372
See supra note 265 (pointing out that courts in "fraud on the source" cases generally
assess materiality by considering whether a reasonable investor would consider the information
significant).
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misappropriation theory of insider trading with both congressional and judicial
determinations as to who has standing to sue insider traders and tippers. In
particular, Section 20A's express private right of action would make far more
sense if contemporaneous traders with statutory standing to sue were actually the
parties who were defrauded by the person who traded on the basis of the
misappropriated information, or who tipped misappropriated information to a
373
person who then traded.

373

See supra notes 298-302 and accompanying text. In an amicus curiae brief
supporting Respondent O'Hagan, several law professors urged the Court to reject the
misappropriation theory, in part because "[u]ltimately, it is up to Congress to define the
parameters of illegal trading, and the necessary correlation between a trading transaction and
any third-party fiduciary relationship." Law Professors-Respondent Brief, supra note 246, at
28. Other securities law scholars have previously highlighted the need for a statutory definition.
See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 18, at 251 (contending that "Congress should replace the current
regime with a statute that is clear and predictable"); Homer Kripke, A Note on Insider Trading:
An Example of How Not to Make Law, 39 ALA. L. REV. 349, 349 (1988) (concluding that
"legislation is now needed to straighten out the mess we call insider trading law"); Seligman,
supra note 18, at 1090 (proposing that Congress enact a parity of information rule, which could
be modified where necessary with limited exceptions by statutory amendment or SEC
rulemaking). Yet, despite a number of serious attempts, Congress has not passed any
legislation setting the parameters of insider trading liability in general, or Section 10(b)
specifically (other than Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), which prohibits
so-called "short swing" trading profits by a corporation's officers, directors, and ten percent
shareholders). For a comprehensive description of Congress's attempts to define insider
trading, see FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, at Chapter IV. Indeed, Congress determined that
"the court-drawn parameters of insider trading have established clear guidelines for the vast
majority of traditional insider trading cases, and that a statutory definition could potentially be
narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the law." ITSFEA House
Report, H.R. No. 100-910, at 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6048.
Congress's contentment with the judicial development of insider trading law through the
existing anti-fraud prohibition in Section 10(b) is further evidenced by its decision in 1TSFEA,
and its decision four years earlier in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 ('ITSA'), Pub.
L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984), to expand significantly the SEC's enforcement arsenal in
insider trading cases. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, at §§ 4.03-4.05. With the
Govemment's victory in O'Hagan, a statutory definition of insider trading has never been less
likely. See McLaughlin, supranote 161, at 1 ("By preserving an important part of the SEC's
enforcement program, the [O'Hagan] decision takes the pressure off Congress to enact
legislation in this area."); Swanson, supranote 142, at 1212 (contending that, after O'Hagan,
"Congress lacks the impetus to define through legislation the parameters of insider trading
liability"). Thus, because it was the judiciary that created the misappropriation theory, the task
now once again falls on the judiciary to reframe the theory. Cf.Musick, Peeler & Garrett v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 292 (1993) (stating that "[t]he federal courts have
accepted and exercised the principal responsibility for the continuing elaboration of the scope
of the lOb-5 right and the definition of the duties it imposes").
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C. Reconciling a "Fraudon Investors" Theory with Chiarella, Dirks, and
O'Hagan
What, if anything, stands in the way of a misappropriation theory that
premises Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability on a trader's fraud on investors
rather than on a trader's fraud on the source of the information? According to the
Second Circuit in Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,374 the Supreme Court's decision
in Chiarella forecloses any possibility of a "fraud on investors" approach to
insider trading liability.3 75 But Moss's reading of Chiarella cannot be correct

because Chiarella expressly left open the question whether a person who
purchases securities on the basis of misappropriated information owes a
disclosure duty under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to the sellers of the
securities. 376 Moreover, O'Haganclarifies the dicta in Chiarellathat the Second

Circuit in Moss misconstrued to bar any broader misappropriation theory.
Indeed, as the O'Haganmajority correctly observed, "[tlhe Court did not hold in
Chiarellathat the only relationship prompting liability for trading on undisclosed
information is the relationship between a corporation's insiders and
shareholders. '377 Rather, Chiarella only foreclosed liability under the broadbased parity of information theory that previously had been endorsed by the
Second Circuit.3 78 Thus, as the Court further noted in O'Hagan,any statements
in Chiarellaseeming to limit liability to deceptions by insiders to shareholders
374 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).

375 See id. at 12-16.
376 Noting that "four Justices found merit in it," the Court in O'Hagan observed that
Chiarella"expressly left open the misappropriation theory before us today." O'Hagan, 117 S.
Ct. at 2212. Here, however, Justice Ginsburg's opinion is confusing because, as noted above,
the theory found meritorious by the four Chiarella Justices was Chief Justice Burger's
misappropriation theory premised on "fraud on investors" rather than Justice Steven's version
premised on the "fraud on the source." See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
Fortunately, a statement by the Court in Chiarellaitself clarifies that Chiarella specifically
reserved consideration of both misappropriation theories advanced by the Government. See
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 235-36 (acknowledging the argument in the Government's brief that
Chiarella's misappropriation supports "a conviction under § 10(b) for fraud perpetrated upon
both the acquiring corporation and the [securities] sellers" but concluding that "[w]e need not
decide whether this theory has merit for it was not submitted to the jury") (emphasis added);
see also id.at 243 n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that "the Court has not rejected the
view, advanced above, that an absolute duty to disclose or refrain arises from the very act of
misappropriating nonpublic information").
377 O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2212. In this regard, the O'Haganmajority's interpretation of
Chiarella clearly differs from the interpretation espoused by Justice Powell in his Draft of
Dissent from the Denial of Certiorari for Carpenterv. United States.See supranote 70.
378
See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2212.
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were plainly statements "rejecting the notion that § 10(b) stretches so far as to
impose 'a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information' and [should be confined] to
that context. '379 Recognition of a specific disclosure duty under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 in those particular cases where the nonpublic information used in
the securities transaction was unlawfully misappropriated is a far cry from the
parity of the information approach.
Does the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC3 80 stand in the way of a
misappropriation theory that imposes Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability for a
fraud on investors? Here, again, the answer is no. Dirks reinforced Chiarella's
core holding that the mere possession of material, nonpublic information in a
securities transaction does not trigger a general duty of disclosure. 38 1 Moreover,
in making the determination that Dirks did not violate Section 10(b) or Rule lOb5, the Court expressly noted that Dirks was not under an obligation to keep the
information confidential "[n]or did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the
information about Equity Funding. '382 Significantly, the Court did not limit this
statement to acts of misappropriation involving the breach of a fiduciary duty to
the source of the information-nor could it, because Dirks had no pre-existing
relationship of trust and confidence with either Secrist or Equity Funding (the
sources of the material, nonpublic information with which his tippers traded).
Thus, if Dirks's misappropriation of information would have changed the result
in the case, it necessarily would have been because he owed a disclosure duty
379

Id. (quoting Chiarella,445 U.S. at 233).
380 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
381 See id. at 655; see also O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212 (noting that Dirks "repeated the
key point made in Chiarella[that there is] no 'general duty between all participants in market

transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information"') (quoting Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 233). O'Hagan'snarrow construction of Chiarella'sdicta, see supranotes 377-79
and accompanying text, supports a similarly narrow reading of the dicta in Dirks, see Dirks,
463 U.S. at 654-55, that otherwise could be read to suggest that disclosure duties are triggered
only from the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212

(emphasizing that the Court in Chiarelladid not hold that the insider/shareholder relationship
was the only relationship triggering disclosure duties). Even before O'Hagan'sclarification of
the dicta in Chiarellaand Dirks, supporters of the "fraud on investors" misappropriation theory

argued that the theory could be reconciled with Chiarellaand Dirks.See NASAA Brief, supra
note 16, at 12 (noting that "Chiarella expressly leaves open the possibility of this alternative
duty of disclosure to the marketplace" and that while dicta in Dirks "might arguably be read to

foreclose this avenue ... the Court's holding.., does not foreclose a viable alternative duty of
disclosure when there has been a misappropriation").
382
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665. A few years later, the Supreme Court referenced this statement
in Bateman Eichler, HillRichards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) when it quoted Dirks
for the proposition that "a tippee may be liable if he otherwise 'misappropriate[s] or illegally
obtain[s] the information.' Id. at 313 n.22 (quoting Dirks,463 U.S. at 665).
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under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to someone other than the source of the
information-investors in the marketplace constitute the only logical alternative.
Restructuring the misappropriation theory to make fraud on investors central
is also in keeping with the public policy justifications offered by the Court in
both Chiarellaand Dirks.As Professor Langevoort has observed, the opinions in
these cases "were heavily influenced by the Court's desire to recognize the
ability of some market participants-especially investment analysts-to exploit
informational advantages free of the chill of the rule, under the assumption that
such exploitation is at the heart of market efficiency and therefore is of value to
all investors. '383 Unlike recognition of the broad disclosure duty stemming from
the parity of information theory, recognition of a narrow duty to disclose
misappropriated information does nothing to reduce incentives to obtain
information through research or other legal and legitimate means. 384 Indeed, it
simply reduces the incentive to misappropriate nonpublic information by
eliminating a purpose for which it ordinarily can be used. And few would debate
the wisdom of a rule with an effect of reducing the incidence of corporate theft.
Having reconciled the "fraud on investors" misappropriation theory with
both Chiarella and Dirks, the final question to be analyzed is whether
O'Hagan's endorsement of the "fraud on the source" version forecloses any
further consideration of an alternative version that focuses on a misappropriator's
"fraud on investors." In other words, after O'Hagan, is a lower court free to
recognize this broader approach to the issue of insider trading liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5? Several aspects of the O'Hagandecision indicate
that the "fraud on investors" misappropriation theory could in fact stand as a
viable alternative to the "fraud on the source" version that was endorsed by the
majority.
First, although the Court in O'Hagan acknowledged the existence of a
broader version of the misappropriation theory, the Court was careful to limit its
analysis to the specific "fraud on the source" theory advanced by the
Government. For example, in addressing the Eighth Circuit's reversal of
O'Hagan's convictions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Court focused
on the section of the Government's indictment charging "that O'Hagan
defrauded his law firm and its client, GrandMet, by using for his own trading
purposes material, nonpublic information regarding Grand Met's planned tender
offer [of Pillsbury]." 38 5 Later in the opinion, the Court stated explicitly that
"[u]nder the misappropriation theory urged in this case, the disclosure obligation
383 Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAm L. REv.

S7,S14
(1993).
3 84

Seesupranote 371.

385

O'Hagan,117 S.Ct. at 2205 (emphasis added).
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runs to the source of the information, here, Dorsey & Whitney and Grand
Met,"3 86 and that "[d]eception through nondisclosure [to the source of the
information] is central to the theory of liability for which the Government seeks
recognition."387 It was also "[t]he misappropriation theory advanced by the
Government''3 88 that the O'Hagan Court reconciled with its previous dictate in
Santa Fe that a finding of deception, rather than merely a breach of fiduciary
duty, is essential for liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 389 Particularly
when taken together, these statements suggest that the Court intentionally sought
to limit its statutory analysis to the Government's "fraud on the source" theory.
The manner in which the Court acknowledged the existence of a broader
"fraud on investors" misappropriation theory also supports the conclusion that
this theory continues to be viable in the wake of O'Hagan.Indeed, the sum total
of the Court's analysis of the "fraud on investors" theory was contained in a
footnote referencing Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Chiarellaand
noting that "the disclosure obligation, as he envisioned it, ran to those with
whom the misappropriator trades." 390 The Court then commented only that
"[t]he Government does not propose that we adopt a misappropriation theory of
that breadth." 391 The Court's silence as to the validity of Chief Justice Burger's
position suggests that, while it may have declined to adopt the "fraud on
investors" theory on this occasion, it may well have sought to preserve the "fraud
on investors" theory for future consideration.
O'Hagan's characterization of the "fraud on investors" theory as one of
"breadth" may nonetheless be read by some as an expression of concern on the
part of the Court as to the wisdom of that theory. Yet, even if this oblique
statement by the Court were intended to express concern about a broader theory,
386

Id. at 2208 n.6 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
388
Id. at 2209 (emphasis added).
389
See id. (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)). The Court
subsequently noted in a footnote that "the textual requirement of deception precludes § 10(b)
liability when a person trading on the basis of nonpublic information has disclosed his trading
plans to, or obtained authorization from, the principal." Id. at 2111 n.9. Although this footnote
has been read to implicitly reject a "fraud on investors" misappropriation theory, see Leading
Cases: MisappropriationTheory ofInsider Trading, 111 HARV. L. REV. 410, 415 (1997), the
more likely intent of the footnote is to highlight once again that the misappropriation theory
endorsed by the Court premised the textual requirement of deception on the fiduciary's
"feigning fidelity" to the source of the information. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209. Clearly,
with permission from the source, or where there has been full disclosure to the source, there
would be no deception of the source to satisfy the textual requirements of Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5. See id. at 2208-09.
390 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208 n.6.
3 87

391 Id.
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such concern would have been unfounded. Because the "fraud on investors"
theory is predicated on proof that there has been an unlawful misappropriation,
the theory's "breadth" will come into play primarily in those cases where the
misappropriator does not stand in a fiduciary relationship with the source of the
information, or in those cases where a fiduciary informs the source of his trading
intention but proceeds to trade without authorization or permission. Neither one
392
of these situations implicate legitimate activities relating to securities trading.
Viewed in this practical light, it is difficult to see why the O 'Haganmajority
would be opposed to recognizing Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability in those
additional cases where securities are traded on the basis of misappropriated
information but which fail to fit within the "deceit by a fiduciary" paradigm. To
be sure, the Court's policy justifications for its narrower "fraud on the source"
version are equally germane to a broader misappropriation theory premised on a
fraud on investors. 393 Indeed, without citing him specifically, the majority makes
the very same policy point that Chief Justice Burger advanced in Chiarella;
namely, that "[a]n investor's informational disadvantage vis-a-vis a
misappropriator with material, nonpublic information stems from contrivance,
3 94
not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill."
392

See supra notes 250-55 and accompanying text. Moreover, as noted above, whether

or not "contemporaneous traders" are deemed to be deceived and defrauded by a
misappropriator's fraud on the source, Section 20A (added to the Exchange Act by Congress as

part of ITSFEA) already accords such private plaintiffs an express right of action against
persons who purchase or sell securities while in possession of material, nonpublic information
inviolation of Exchange Act provisions or rules promulgated thereunder. See supra notes 28995 and accompanying text. A misappropriation theory that recognizes "fraud on investors" as
the violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 would therefore have only a negligible impact on
the amount of private litigation that is instituted for insider trading.
Ironically, it is O'Hagan's own "fraud on the source" version of the misappropriation
theory that raises a concern about private litigation that would not be implicated under the
alternative "fraud on investors" theory: because O'Hagan'stheory posits that the source of the
information is the party deceived and defrauded within the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule

10b-5, it opens the door to possible implied private actions against alleged misappropriators by
sources of information who seek to recover damages and who can satisfy Blue Chip Stamps's

"purchaser or seller" requirement for standing. See supranotes 283-84 and accompanying text

(discussing implied actions under Rule lob-5 initiated by Litton Industries and AnheuserBusch against fiduciaries whose securities transactions were based on misappropriated
information). These types of actions by private plaintiffs raise difficult issues because, as noted
above, compensating a source for a person's intrusion on its exclusive right to information
seems to be a goal that is far removed from the investor protection and market integrity based
objectives underlying federal securities regulation. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying
text.
393
See supranotes 240-46 and accompanying text.
394 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210. Compare id., with Chiarella,445 U.S. at 240 (Burger,
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Accordingly, because trading based on misappropriated information would have
much the same inhibiting market impact regardless of whether O'Hagan, a
computer hacker, a "mere" thief, or a brazen fiduciary is permitted to trade on
misappropriated information, 395 recognition of the broader "fraud on investors"
theory would be even more "well tuned" to the policy objectives advocated by
Congress and echoed by the O'Haganmajority.
In short, because securities trading based on misappropriated information
falls within the textual proscriptions in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, 396 and
because O'Hagan advocates an approach to statutory interpretation that
considers the investor protection and market integrity policy objectives
underlying the federal securities laws, 397 indirect support for the "fraud on
investors" misappropriation theory may even be drawn from O'Haganitself.
V. CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court reached a correct result, United States v.
O'Haganmay be criticized both for what it did and for what it did not do. By
endorsing an unnecessarily restrictive and misleading "fraud on the source"
misappropriation theory, the Court passed up the opportunity to adopt an
alternative theory that, for a host of reasons, would have been far superior. But
O'Haganfortunately left room for the recognition of additional disclosure duties
under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. To obtain the benefits of a broader theory
that is supported by both statutory text and congressional policy, the
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability should be reframed to
acknowledge that those investors who trade in the marketplace with a person
using misappropriated information are not only injured but are also deceived and
defrauded.

C.J., dissenting) (noting that, when a defendant trades on misappropriated information, the
"informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by
some unlawful means"), and Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("An
investor who purchases securities on the basis of misappropriated nonpublic information
possesses just such an 'undue' trading advantage; his conduct quite clearly serves no useful
function except his own enrichment at the expense of others.").
395
See supra Part III.B.3.a.
396
See supra Part IV.A.2.
397
See supra note 352 (citing statements by commentators that O'Hagan marks a
significant departure from recent decisions limiting the scope of liability under Section 10(b)
and is reminiscent of the Court's expansive interpretations in the 1960s and early 1970s).

